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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Civil society is based upon the concept of human rights which are essential not 
merely to fulfill biological needs of the mankind but as well as for the dignity of the 
individual. Without recognising the concept of human rights no polity can be a 
democratic one. Every democratic constitution tries to recognise the concept of 
Human Rights in one way or the other. Indian Constitution recongises the concept of 
human rights through its preamble. Human rights are implied as civil liberties 
(Fundamental Rights) and democratic rights (Directive Principles of State Policy) in 
the Indian Constitution.1  
 With the evolution of human life, certain rights of men have come to be 
considered as basic rights, which they enjoy as human beings. These human rights are 
inalienable rights of people. From their nature, these rights can hardly be considered 
as having been created at any given moment; on the contrary they must have existed 
in however nascent form for as long as man had lived in communities. The human 
well being is based on enjoyment of human rights. The measure of wellbeing is the 
extent to which the people are able to enjoy their human rights and freedoms. Thus 
human rights become very important in any society. 
                                              
1 Chiranjeet Singh and M.R.Garg, “ Human Rights as the Base Component of Democratic State,” in 
B.P.Singh Sehgal (Ed),  Human Rights in India-Problems and Perspectives, (New Delhi: Deep and 
Deep Publications, 1996), p.98. 
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 As pointed out by Louis Henkin, “(R)ights have bedeviled legal and political 
philosophers for centuries. There are volumes on the meaning of rights, their source, 
what gives them authority. There are continuing debates about the relations of rights 
to duties... Most of these jurisprudential enquiries are not material to the law, the 
politics or the sociology of human rights in our day. For our purpose human rights are 
claims asserted and recognised “as of right”, not claims upon love or grace or 
brotherhood or charity; one does not have to earn or deserve them. They are not 
merely aspirations or moral assertions but, increasingly, legal claims under some 
applicable law”.2 
 Human rights, in short, are statements of basic needs or interests. They are 
politically significant as grounds of protest and justification for reforming policies. 
They differ from appeals to benevolence and charity in that they invoke ideals like 
justice and equality. A man with a right has no reason to be grateful to benefactors; he 
has grounds for grievance when it is denied. The concept presupposes a standard 
below which it is intolerable that a human being should fall... Human rights are the 
corollary, then, of the equally modern notion of social justice.3 
 Human rights are legal rights against society as represented by government and 
its officials. In human rights, individual holds the status of ‘rights holder’ and the 
State is in the position of an ‘obligator’. Therefore, State by its act or omission should 
                                              
2 Louis Henkin, The Rights of Man Today, (London: Stevens and Sons, 1979), pp 1-2. 
3 The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Paul, Edwards, (Ed), Vol. VII, (New York:  Macmillan Publishing 
Co, Inc. & The Free Press, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers), pp.198-199. 
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not hit human rights.4 If it does so the state will be liable for the violation of human 
rights since it fails to discharge its obligation. State must protect the individual and 
provide legal remedies against the wrongdoer. The rights are claimed against the 
State. Earlier the human rights were thought of as limitations on what government 
might do to the individual; now they also include what society is deemed obliged to 
do for the individual. 
 The greatest positive contribution during the second half of the twentieth 
century to humanity is concretization of human rights values and realisation of the 
need for governance with a human soul. This was an outcome of eternal vigilance 
which was meticulously carried out by the concerned human rights organisations 
(international, national and local), conscious people, national leadership and active 
judiciary.5 Franklin Roosevelt’s famous four freedoms6 formed the basis of the United 
Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. When taken 
together, these freedoms are universal in appeal and application; only the emphasis is 
different in different countries.7 Although the United Nations Charter and the 
Universal Declaration do not offer a comprehensive recipe for the achievement of an 
                                              
4 Dr.B.L. Sharma, et.al., “ Human Rights; Sparse Productive Measures to Inhibit Defilements”, Law 
Journal: Alert, vol.1:1,2003, p.107. 
5 Dr. P.Ishwar Bhat, “The Role of NGOS in Protection of Human Rights, in The Changing Law”, in 
Lectures on Current Trends in Jurisprudential Thought, Geetha Bhaskar and Sri.V.Sudhesh (Ed.), 
(Bangalore: Prof.V.B.Coutinho SBC Committee, 2003), p.225. 
6 i.e. freedom of speech; freedom of worship; freedom from fear and freedom from want. 
7 F.S.Nariman, “ It Pays to be Free-Some Thoughts on The Fortieth Anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration” in  Human Rights in the Changing World,  Ed. Justice E.S. Venkataramiah, (New Delhi: 
International Law Association, 1988), p.155. 
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ideal world they do proclaim a set of values which give guidance to all nations in 
choosing a wide range of alternative policy options.8 The two International Covenants 
of 1966- on Civil and Political Rights as well as on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights- further provide a legal framework to the jurisprudence of human rights. 
 Human rights are now established in principle and are national and 
international law for many nations. There is common agreement that every individual 
has both political, civil and economic, social claims upon his society. But in a world 
of nation state the strength of commitment of human rights and the extent to which it 
is realised depends upon the particular state and its institutions, the condition of 
human rights thus differs markedly in different societies.9  
 Human rights are basic rights in political and social conditions variously 
defined to which every individual is entitled as a human being. Originally they were 
called natural rights or the rights of man and included the rights to life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness cited in the US Declaration of Independence. Over the years the 
concept of human rights has been broadened to include rights to social benefits such 
as social security, rest and leisure and education. These rights are basic to human 
existence and hence are also called basic rights.10 
                                              
8 Ibid p.156. 
9 Louis Henkin, supra n.2. p.31. 
10 Indhrani Sridharan, “ Practising Human Rights - A Feminist Perspective” (Ed) Chiranjivi J. Nirmal, 
Human Rights In India Historical, Social and Political Perspective”, (New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press 2000), p.91. 
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 Since the World Wars the concept of human rights which was essentially a 
concept  found in national laws of any state, has been internationalised. The birth of 
United Nations marked a sea change in the growth of international law. Concern of 
the mankind about the rights of people led to the declaration of human rights and to 
subsequent covenants. Universal Declaration of Human Rights was made which 
includes both justiciable civil rights such as equality 11and social or cultural rights 
such as right to participate in cultural life.12  The realisation of practical 
inconvenience led to separate Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
apart from Civil and Political Rights. New rules were framed through treaties and 
conventions, wherein many such rules related to the sphere of human rights. States are 
bound to recognise and give effect to the human rights which are enumerated 
basically in the two Covenants of 1966. However, unfortunately in majority of the 
cases an individual’s rights are violated by his own state. In the absence of 
international machinery for their enforcement, the domestic institutions remain the 
main instruments of effective implementation. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, which was proclaimed 
after three years of United Nations Charter with an elaborate list of human rights was 
a statement of intent or principle, and not a treaty or a legal agreement between 
countries or a binding legal document. However it influenced the constitutions and 
                                              
11 Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
12 Article 27 (1) Ibid. 
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legal systems of many countries.13  The concept of protection of human rights which 
emerged originally in the field of domestic legislations14 was translated into 
international terms only after Second World War.15  Keeping in view the fact that in 
majority of the cases an individual’s rights are violated by his or her own state, in the 
absence of an international machinery for enforcement, the domestic application of 
human rights norms remain the main basis for their effective implementation. The 
domestic courts can become the most effective means by which international 
conventions could be implemented and made effective. Effective enforcement of 
remedies requires that they be articulated as effectively, as impartially, and as 
sincerely as possible. And a real independent judiciary can be the most effective 
mechanism in this articulation.16 
The characteristic feature of the development of international human rights law 
is the fact that the relationship between the states and their own citizens, are regulated 
through the international human rights conventions. No doubt, it is a desirable 
development but, it is equally true that these rights are guaranteed to the individuals 
only through the intervention of states. Thus, the position is that these Conventions on 
being accepted by the states become legally binding upon them, but they do not 
                                              
13 Dr.A.K.Pandey, “Constitutional Contours of Human Rights in India”, in Ranbir Singh & 
Ghanshyam Singh (Eds), Human Rights Education, Law and Society, (Hyderabad:  Nalsar University, 
2004), p.152. 
14 E.g. the MagnaCarta in England, The Bills of Rights in the US Constitution and the Declaration of 
Rights Man in France. 
15 E.g. Provisions of United Nations Charter; Universal Declaration of Human Rights etc. 
16 Noor Mohammed Bilal, “National Human Rights Commission-A Shackled Watchdog”, K.U.L.R., 
vol.1, Dec 1994,  p.130. 
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enable the individuals to present claim against their own states for the vindication of 
their rights or for that matter to claim compensation.17 
Implementation mechanism is non existent and fragile in human rights. But, 
the requirement of effective implementation does not otherwise affect the concept of 
human rights since it is a requirement for the concept of the ‘law’ and not for the 
concept of ‘human rights’. If the concept does not consist an ‘effective 
implementation mechanism’, it has to be explored. It can not be a ground to 
disapprove the requirement of human rights.18 
 Human rights are best protected under the national systems,19 as most of the 
international instruments on the human rights leave the enforcement to the state 
parties. State parties are obliged to adopt measures to give effect to the human rights 
recognised under such instruments.  And also before the international protection of 
human rights violation, the instruments require exhaustion of local remedies and 
states consider human rights as matters of domestic jurisdiction.  The perception of 
human rights also differ depending upon the state’s cultural, socio-economic and 
political conditions. 
In India, human rights as basic or fundamental rights were recognised and 
demanded for even prior to the Constitution. The demand for guarantee of 
                                              
17 Dr. U. Chandra, Human Rights, (Allahabad: Allahabad Law Agency Publications, 1999), p.iii. 
18 Dr.B.L. Sharma et ,al ., supra n.3,  p.109. 
19 L.D. Naikar,  The Law Relating to Human Rights, (Bangalore: Puliani and Puliani, 2004),p.327. 
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fundamental rights was made as early as the Constitution of India Bill, 1885.20 The 
fight for civil liberties had been from the beginning an integral part of the Indian 
freedom movement. The Indian freedom movement also developed an internationalist 
outlook and visualised the Indian struggle as a part of worldwide struggle for 
freedom, democracy and social progress. The ideals of the freedom movement were 
sought to be reflected in the Indian Constitution.21 
Further India became member of the United Nations when she had recently 
become independent and signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 
when she had not yet made her Constitution. India shared the concerns of the 
Declaration ever since her National Movement for independence and they were 
reflected in the Constitution.22 The two different but inseparable aspects of human 
rights, namely the civil and political rights and economic and social rights are both 
reflected in the Constitution of India. The realization of civil and political rights was 
considered as a goal within immediate reach while the economic, social and cultural 
rights were regarded as ideals for which the country should strive.23 The framers of 
the Indian Constitution incorporated human rights into two parts, much the same way 
as International Covenants, civil and political rights, the justiciable human rights were 
included in Part III (Fundamental Rights) and non-justiciable social, economic and 
                                              
20 D.D. Basu, Human Rights in Constitutional Law, (New Delhi: Prentice Hall, 1994), p.49. 
21 Human Rights: A Source Book. NCERT, p.129 
22 S.P. Sathe, “Human Rights and Natural Law Thought: From the National Movement to The 
Constitution- An Indian Experience”, in Human Rights in the Changing World, supra n.7, p.222. 
23 L.D. Naikar,  supra n, 19, pp. 332-333. 
  
9
cultural rights were set forth in Part IV (Directive Principles of State Policy) of the 
Constitution.24  
The Preamble  to the Constitution, Fundamental Rights and Directive 
Principles which together have been described as forming the core of the 
Constitution25, and which together reflect the basic principles of Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and 
Economic  Social and  Cultural Rights. 
The Constitution envisages a nation where the values of justice, equality, 
liberty and fraternity prevail. The Constitution protects not just civil and political 
rights, which are found in the form of justiciable fundamental rights guaranteed in 
Part III of the Constitution. Along with these rights, there are directive principles of 
state policy which elaborate social, economic and cultural rights. Apart from this, the 
Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 was also enacted. Thus, human rights are 
guaranteed to the people of India. Now what remains to be seen is whether these 
guarantees alone should be sufficient to protect the human rights. The observations of 
Chief Justice Anand are apt to be quoted here: 
 “The Constitution though by itself is an important document, is after all 
a cold print on a piece of paper. What is important to remember is the 
system the Constitution seeks to introduce and the way that system 
works. The Constitution, no matter how it is drafted, it will not be able 
to deliver the goods unless the system which it introduces functions 
                                              
24 Ibid,  pp.333-334. 
25   Human Rights: A Source Book, NCERT, p.130  
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effectively to realise the dreams of the founding fathers of the 
Constitution. When we talk of the Constitution as living law it is usually 
understood to refer to the directives and understandings that the courts 
have invented, developed, spread and applied to make the Constitution 
work in every situation. It is well settled that while a Bill of Rights (like 
the chapter on Fundamental Rights in the Constitution of India) is the 
conscience of this Constitution, an independent judiciary is the 
conscience keeper”.26 
 
  The judiciary has increasingly interpreted the rights as being closely linked to 
fundamental rights.27 For example Article 21 has been held as entailing a number of 
rights to protect life, thus making some of the directive principle justiciable 
fundamental rights.  
In spite of having good constitution and also an independent judiciary, giving 
due consideration to ordinary human failings which may not be absent in the men 
adorning the judiciary also, there is not a substitute for an alert people. As Benjamin 
Franklin, one of the Constitution makers of U.S.A. observed, you can have a 
government that you want to have only if the people are conscious of their duties and 
rights and also ready to keep them up, if compelled by a struggle against those who 
try to derail the Constitution and the rule of law in its real sense.28 
                                              
26 Justice Anand, “Justice N. D. Krishna Rao Memorial Lecture,” (1997) AIR (Jour) 11.p.24. 
27 Sujata Manohar, “Human Right Agenda: A perspective for Development,” Vol.45, J.I.L.I., (2003),    
p.169 
28 T.Chandrasekharan Menon, “Protection of Human Rights in India”,(2000) C.U.L.R., XXIV, p.5. 
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In India during emergency, there was a suppression of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms by the overwhelming government and bureaucracy and misery 
of the poor and oppressed continued unabated. This situation paved the way for 
emergence of intensified human rights movement led by prominent social activists, 
journalists and some activist lawyers. They started approaching the Supreme Court to 
redress the grievances of the poor, oppressed and marginalised as the other two organs 
had failed in their constitutional endeavour. The judges of the court slowly began to 
respond to the demands of these activists and the result was, what was sometimes 
described as the birth of judicial populism.29 For long the Supreme Court was an 
arena of legal quibbling for men with long purses,30 now it became the ‘last resort for 
the oppressed and the bewildered31.This is a remarkable development in the attitude of 
the Supreme Court, which is witnessed in a number of decisions of public interest 
litigations. The Supreme Court relied on Article 21 of the Constitution, which 
guarantees individuals the fundamental right to life and liberty to enforce the claims 
of the poor and oppressed on the ground that the right to life implies right to live with 
human dignity and free from exploitation.32 
One of the most important task before the State is to protect and promote 
human rights of the people. But if the state misperforms or does not perform this task, 
                                              
29 Upendra Baxi, “Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of 
India,” in Jugga Kapoor (Ed) Supreme Court on Public Interest Litigation, vol. I,(New Delhi: LIPS 
Publication, 1997),  pp.A-93-94. 
30 Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225, p 947. 
31 State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (1977) 3 SCC 592. 
32 Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1981 SC.746, p 753. 
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then public interest litigation proves a good device to enable the people to enjoy their 
basic human rights. Public interest litigation is not concerned with rights of one 
individual only but the interests of a class or group of persons. 
In India justice was only a remote and even, theoretical proposition for the 
mass of illiterate, underprivileged and exploited persons in the country till public 
interest litigation was accepted as a part of the constitutional jurisprudence. They 
were unaware of the law or even their legal rights, unacquainted with the niceties of 
procedure involved, and too impoverished to engage lawyers, file papers and bear 
heavy expenditure on dilatory litigation. This vast underprivileged section of society 
found themselves utterly helpless. Nor could any one else take up their case for lack 
of locus standi or any direct interest in the matter.33 In such circumstances, the Court 
opening up new avenues as well as the new method of delivering justice through 
public interest litigation brought by justice conscious people proved very effective 
and became popular. The enlightened advocates, benevolent citizens, voluntary 
organisations etc., have come forward and brought many issues before the court for 
justice. The judicial response in the past three decades towards the protection of 
human rights has been substantial and effective as per the requirement of time. 
Judiciary has been vigilant and active in protecting the basic rights of the people 
through Constitutional or other laws. 
It is a matter of national concern that notwithstanding the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenants and other Declaration 
                                              
33 I.P. Massey, Administrative Law, (Lucknow: Eastern Book Company, 1985),  pp.291-292. 
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of rights and the adoption of human rights philosophy into municipal law, violations 
of human rights are on the increase in India. This shows the lack of awareness of 
human rights and promotion of universal respect for human rights among the 
instrumentalities of States and citizens alike with a view to preventing violations of 
these precious rights. 34   
 India is a party to the 1966 covenants since 1979 and is under an obligation to 
protect effectively the human rights. A study of our constitutional rights makes it clear 
that certain of these human rights –most important ones at least have been given 
constitutional status in India. They are enumerated in the part relating to Fundamental 
Rights (Part-III) of the Constitution. Some find place in the Directive Principles of 
State policy (Part-IV) of the Constitution. Certain of the other human rights are 
protected through different Acts of Parliament. 
 The most basic among the human rights is the right to life guaranteed under 
Art.21 of the Constitution as right to life and personal liberty. Many other related 
human rights that do not find express mention in Part-III are brought under the scope 
of Art.21 by judicial interpretation of the term ‘life’, since the courts opened up 
themselves by what is generally termed as judicial activism which resulted from 
public interest litigation. It is this new approach of the courts towards the vindication 
of rights in context of public interest litigation that has helped the millions of 
vulnerable people to effectively enforce their right to life.  
                                              
34 Furquan Ahmed,  “Compensation for Arbitrary Arrest  and Custodial Death: A Basic Human 
Right”, (2003) C.U.L.R.., Vol. XXVII,  p.58 
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1.1 The Problem  
 Often, victims of violations of human rights find it difficult to approach the 
courts due to illiteracy, ignorance, lack of financial resources, delay in disposal of 
cases and the like. As a result, in the last three decades, Supreme Court and high 
courts have found a way out when they opened new avenues for public spirited people 
and groups or organizations to espouse the causes of people affected by violation of 
their rights-including human rights. 
 Using public interest litigation as a springboard, the higher judiciary has 
dynamically interpreted right to ‘life’ to mean right to live with human dignity, right 
to privacy, right to clean environment amongst others. In the process, the courts have 
forged new tools for effective enforcement of right to life and by now an enforceable 
right to compensation has come to be firmly acknowledged. Often the courts have 
ruled by issuing directions to ameliorate the conditions of prisons, protective homes, 
quarries, etc.. In this context it becomes necessary to critically consider and evaluate 
the role played by judiciary in enforcement of human rights through public interest 
litigation. 
 
1.2 Objectives of the Study 
 This study is undertaken with the following objectives: 
1. To study the contribution of judiciary in creatively interpreting right to life 
to include a penumbra of rights. 
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2. To appreciate the new techniques and tools forged by the judiciary in the 
PIL to enforce right to life. 
3. To evaluate the effectiveness of the remedy provided by the courts in cases 
of violation of right to life. 
4. To understand the extent to which the international instruments have 
influenced to interpretation of the provisions of the constitution by courts. 
5. To find out, deficiencies, if any in the present court practices and make 
suitable suggestions for better protection of right to life as a basic human 
right. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
 The study is primarily doctrinal and not empirical. It employs descriptive 
method with critical analysis and evaluation of judicial decisions on matters in public 
interest litigations and others, legislations and other international instruments. In the 
course of analysis original sources such as judicial decisions of the Supreme Court of 
India and other courts, statutes and other reports of high power commissions will be 
consulted. For the purpose of critical appraisal of the role of judiciary, pertinent 
secondary sources such as juristic writings, studies conducted by eminent authorities 
will be consulted. Standard form of citations and references will be used in the work. 
 
1.4 Importance of the Study 
 The importance of the study lies in the fact that it tries to establish how 
effectively human rights, especially the right to life, are enforced by judiciary through 
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the instrument of public interest litigation. It is believed that the study is going to be 
useful to academicians, lawyers and social activists. The study is expected to be of 
special use for the judges as it involves a critical evaluation of significant judgements. 
Lastly, importance of the study lies in its purpose of making an original contribution 
to the discipline of law. 
 
1.5 Scheme of the Study and its Presentation             
 The investigation into the problem pertaining to enforcement of human rights 
through public interest litigation in India is planned to be carried out in eight chapters. 
The tentative chapterisation intended to be made is in the following form: 
 
1.5.1 Chapter I: Introduction 
 In this introductory chapter importance and relevance of the research topic and 
the aims and objectives of the study are identified. Subsequently the background 
under which this problem is selected for research, the delimitation of the research 
problem and its evaluation is given. The methodology adopted for the research in 
collecting the material and its analysis and the scheme of research work is also 
explained. 
 The human well being is based on the enjoyment of human rights. The measure 
of well being is the extent to which the people are able to enjoy their human rights 
and freedoms. Earlier the human rights were thought as limitations on the state’s 
authority. Now, they also include what the state is deemed obligated to do for the 
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people. The constitutions of the present day envisage the basic rights of the people. 
The Constitution of India also guarantees many of the human rights to its people in 
the name of Fundamental Rights.  
 
The judiciary in India has increasingly interpreted these fundamental rights to 
include few other human rights not expressly included therein and helped in enlarging 
the scope of human rights. In this context the contribution of public interest litigation 
in developing the human rights jurisprudence in India can not be ignored. Time and 
again the higher judiciary in India while dealing with matters of public interest has 
interpreted the provisions of the Constitution to include the human rights recognized 
under the national and international instruments, thus giving effect to many human 
rights. This chapter tends to introduce the subject and the framework of the work 
undertaken. 
 
1.5.2 Chapter II: Jurisprudence of Human Rights   
 The second chapter is devoted for the detailed discussion on the jurisprudence 
aspects and the growth of human rights and the present day importance of it under 
national and international law. This analysis is made as a general background study. 
 The evolution and crystallization of human rights has taken a long time. The 
concept is as old as political philosophy. Based on the Natural Laws, the human rights 
found expression through centuries and assumed a concrete shape since the 18th 
century when they were expressed in the form of Bills of Rights. The concept of 
Dharma in the Hindu jurisprudence also recognizes the concept of human rights. A 
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study of recognition of human rights in the form of fundamental rights is also made in 
this chapter. Thus this chapter deals with the jurisprudential aspects and the evolution 
and development of human rights. 
 
1.5.3 Chapter III: Concept of Public Interest Litigation 
 In the modern system of welfare states, the state is to protect and promote the 
basic human rights of the people. People must be enabled to enjoy their human rights. 
If the state itself violates the human rights by its actions or inactions it must be 
answerable. The concept and procedure of public interest litigation in India which 
have been fashioned by the Supreme Court of India becomes important in this 
context. With assistance of social activists, public spirited people and litigators, 
judiciary has recognized innovative ways of remedies for vindication of the state’s 
commitment to the welfare of the poor and the oppressed class and to protect and 
promote their human rights. This third chapter is devoted to the study of the concept 
of public interest litigation. 
 The concept of public interest litigation which originated in the West found 
expression in India too due to judicial activism.  A study of  the development of the  
concept of public interest litigation and how  it helped in realizing the object of 
protecting the human rights in India is made in this chapter.   
 
1.5.4 Chapter IV: Right to Life as a Human Right 
In this fourth chapter a study of right to life is made. The right to life is a 
primordial right. Most societies recognize right to life as the most basic right. For any 
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human being this right is most essential. Right to life is the most important right 
because all other rights depend upon it. If the right to life is not recognized, there 
would be no value in other human rights. Without right to life all other rights become 
meaningless. Almost all the international instruments on human rights recognize the 
right to life as a basic human right and require that it is to be protected by law. Each 
state party to such instruments is obliged to protect the same within its municipal legal 
system. In India, the Constitution under Art.21 guarantees this right by laying down 
“No person shall be deprived of life and personal liberty except according to the 
procedure established by law”.  
In the present chapter is devoted for the study of the right to life as a human 
right, its recognition under different international documents and under the Indian 
constitution as well as how this right has been interpreted and enforced extensively by 
the courts.  
 
1.5.5 Chapter V: Judicial Enforcement of Human Rights through Public Interest 
Litigation 
 
The courts have through judicial creativity evolved so many rights, which are 
part of the basic human rights, and have come out in the service of the weaker 
sections of the people. Public interest litigation has become the most powerful 
instrument in the hands of poor and the oppressed and those who have pro bono 
publico committment in the welfare of the poor and weaker sections of the society for 
safeguarding the human rights of such masses. Without public aid, no judicial process 
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can itself bring effective implementation of the human rights. Some one is needed to 
initiate the process of law. Wherever there are violations of human rights of the 
vulnerable groups, by the governmental agencies or by the powerful private 
individuals, the social organizations or the public spirited people can effectively 
tackle such repressions or violations on their behalf and thereby get their human rights 
vindicated. The Supreme Court of India which is the guardian of fundamental rights 
and the high courts have invented innovative steps to protect and enforce the basic 
rights of people; one of the key invention of the judiciary in this regard is the 
recognition and nourishment of the concept of public interest litigation.  . This chapter 
makes a study of such public interest litigation cases wherein the courts have given 
effect to certain of the human rights. 
 
1.5.6 Chapter VI: Judicial Enforcement of Right to Life: Inclusion of Some 
Specific Human Rights into it 
 
 The sixth chapter is devoted to examine how the basic right to life is enforced 
by the courts in India and in this process what other rights have been included into it. 
When  human rights are guaranteed in a written constitution, as is done in Indian 
Constitution under the name of fundamental Rights, question arises whether the 
enumeration thereof is exhaustive or not. The question arises because of the growing 
needs of and changes that take place in the society once the constitution is adopted. 
To meet the new demands, the constitution can not be so frequently amended. 
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Judiciary in this regard plays an important role; by liberal interpretation it includes 
many new rights which emanate from the express guarantees of the constitution. 
 This chapter makes a study of such other rights which emanate from and are 
enforced through judicial interpretation of right to life, like-right to privacy; right to 
live with human dignity; right to livelihood; right to travel abroad; right against 
torture; right against solitary confinement; right against handcuffing; right to speedy 
trial; right to free legal aid; right against delayed execution; right to shelter; right to 
health; right to education; right to environment and the right to compensation.  
 
1.5.7 Chapter VII: Conclusion and Suggestions 
 The study undertaken led the investigator to conclude that the human rights 
enumerated in the constitution and those unenumerated have been effectively 
enforced by the Indian judiciary through the activist interpretation. Public interest 
litigation has opened up a new avenue of protecting and enforcing the human rights 
when the victim is unable to protect his interest himself. The study tried to establish 
that time and again through public interest litigation the human rights and right to life 
in particular have been so interpreted and given effect to that the scope of the right is 
widened to include so many other novel aspects of life without which it is not possible 
to live a wholesome life. 
 
1.6  Conclusion 
 Throughout the investigation an attempt is be made to find out the role played 
by the judiciary in protecting and enforcing the human rights while dealing with 
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public interest cases. This consists of recognizing and enforcing by reading certain 
human rights into the right to life and thereby protecting people against violations of 
their human rights. The courts have rendered a signal service to the humanity by 
awarding compensation for violation of human rights. The study also tried to find out 
how the courts become active when other organs fail to protect or often violate the 
human rights of the people.        
 
 
CHAPTER –II 
JURISPRUDENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
2.1 Human Rights – Evolution of the Concept 
 Human Rights cover those essential rights which lead to the balanced 
development of individual human being.  They are independent, inalienable and 
inviolable and also universal.  The concept of human rights represents an attempt to 
protect the individual from oppression and injustice. 1   They provide a human 
standard of achievement for all the people and all the nations. 2  Human rights are 
currently a matter of international interest and concern for a wide variety of reasons.  
Some of these are deeply rooted in the historic experience and are part of man’s 
struggle for the realisation of all human values. 3 Human rights are those minimal 
rights which every individual must have against the state or other public authority by 
virtue of his being a ‘member of human family’, irrespective of any other 
consideration. 
 (T)he expression ‘human rights’ had its origin in international law, 
appertaining to the development of the status of  individual in the international legal 
system, which was originally confined to the relation between sovereign states, who 
were regarded as the only persons in international law.  For all practical purposes, the 
                                                 
1  A.P.Singh, “Human Rights: The Indian Context”, AIR 2000, Jour, p.8.  
2  Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.  
3  See L.M. Singhvi (ed.) “Horizons of Freedom” (1969) XV, Cited in S.L.Bhalla, Human Rights: An 
Institutional Framework for Implementation, (Delhi:  Docta Shelf Publications, 1991), p.2.  
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genesis of this international aspect of human rights is not older than the Second World 
War, though the concept of an individual having certain inalienable rights as against a 
sovereign state had its origin in the dim past, in the somewhat nebulous doctrines of 
natural law and natural rights.4 
 All human rights derive from dignity and worth inherent in the human person, 
and that the human person is the central subject of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.   In simple terms, whatever adds to the dignity and free existence of a 
human being should be regarded as human rights.  Evolution and crystallization of the 
concept took a long time.5 Prof. Louis Henkin explains human rights as thus: 
  “To call them human rights suggests that they are universal, they are due of 
every human being in every human society.   They do not differ with geography or 
history, culture or ideology, political or economic system or state of development.  
They do not depend upon gender or race, class or ‘status’.  To call them rights implies 
that they are claims as of right, not merely appeals to grace, or charity or brotherhood 
or love; they need not be earned or deserved.  They are more than aspirations or 
uncertain of the “good” but claims of entitlement and corresponding obligation in 
some political order under applicable law, if only a moral order under a moral law”. 6 
                                                 
4  Durga Das Basu, Human Rights in Constitutional Law, 2nd ed., New Delhi: Wadhwa and Company 
Nagpur, 2003,  pp 1-2.  
5  Arvind Kumar (ed.), Human Rights and Social Movement, ISD, (Lucknow and New Delhi: Anmol 
Publications Pvt. Ltd., 1999),  p.1.  
6  81, Columbia Law Review, 1582 (1981). 
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 Roots of human rights may be traced back to the Babylonian law e.g. 
Hammurabi Code and in Vedic period e.g. Manusmriti and later in Kautilya’s 
Arthashartha.  The concept of human rights embodying the minimum rights of an 
individual versus his own state is as old as political philosophy. 7  The concept found 
expression in Magna Carta.  The Magna Carta granted by King John of England to 
the English barons on June 15, 1215 ensured feudal rights and dues and to guarantee 
that the King would not encroach upon their privileges. 8  It assumed a concrete and 
justiciable shape when these individual rights came to be guaranteed against the state 
in written constitutions adopted since the Constitution of the U.S.A. in 1787, to which 
the Bill of Rights was formally added in 1791. 9  The effect of incorporation of 
individual rights in the form of Bills of Rights in a written Constitution is to 
incorporate human rights into municipal law of a state and to make them legally 
enforceable by an aggrieved individual against his own state, and to invalidate any 
state act, legislative or executive, which is found by a court of law to have violated 
any of the constitutionally guaranteed human rights belonging to the aggrieved 
                                                 
7  D.D.Basu, supra n.4,    p.2.  
8  Dr.Raj Pal Sharrma, “Human Rights – An Overview”, AIR, 2003, Jour  65.  
9  D.D. Basu, supra n.4,    p.2; and also the French Declaration of Bill of Rights of Man in 1789, 
followed by Sweden in 1809, Spain in 1812, Norway in 1814, Belgium in 1831, Denmark in 1849, 
Prussia in 1850, and Switzerland in 1874 which also made provisions  for the fundamental rights of 
man.  See also Aggarwal, H.O., International Law and Human Rights, 5th ed., Allahabad: Central 
Law Publications, 1999, p.648.  This trend of 19th century continued in the twentieth century also 
with the emergence of new nation states.  
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individual.10  These bills of rights proved to be very important milestones in the 
development of human rights.  
 There is a growing rhetoric in recent times as to the protection and promotion 
of human rights across the globe. This is understandably because of the flagrant 
violation of the so called human rights during the two great wars witnessed in the 
twentieth century and violation of human rights perpetrated by authoritarian regimes 
on their own subjects.  However, emergence of human rights philosophy is not as 
sudden as that of emphasis laid on their protection and promotion.  The philosophy of 
human rights germinated along with the inception of human civilization itself. 11  The 
origin of human rights in India can be traced in its philosophical-cum-speculative 
aspects in its somewhat amorphous ideal of welfare state as enunciated in the old 
Smriti and Mahabharata.12 
 In recorded history and scriptures, there have been references on the basic 
human rights, though they were not referred to by that name.13  Religion also 
influenced the human rights.  When Magna Carta was accepted, it stated that the 
grant was made “through the inspiration of God…. for the honour of God and the 
exaltation of Holy Church”.14  On closer examination, it would be seen that Magna 
                                                 
10 D.D.Basu, supra n.4,   p.2. 
11  Patil, J.S. and Patil, C.S., “Province of the Concept of Human Right Determined: A Jurisprudential 
Overview”, A paper presented at UGC National Seminar on Human Rights And Criminal Justice, at 
PG Centre for Human Rights Research , Saurashtra University, Rajkot, 26-27, March 2000, p.1.  
12  U.N.Ghoshal, History of Indian Political Idea”, Bombay, 1959, p.57.  
13   Arvind Kuman, supra n.5,  p.1.  
14  Z Chafee, Documents on Fundamental Human Rights, (Harvard, 1951), I, p.239.  
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Carta was a petition conceding certain rights to particular section of the people, which 
lacked universality of application and direct relevance to basic freedoms.  However, 
the positive law of human rights, through international, regional and national 
institutions began to develop more or less in the middle of the twentieth century, of 
course with a few exceptions.15  Although at the end of First World War, some 
attempts on modest level were made through the Treaty of Versailles to promote and 
universalise human rights but it met with no success.  Since the judicial conscience of 
the civilized world was very much in favour of safeguarding the rights of individuals 
against its violation by states, it is consistently realized that the rights of individuals 
must be universalised so that it may be guarded against its violation by one’s own 
state. 16 
 No declaration of human rights will ever be exhaustive and final.  It will ever 
go hand-in-hand with the state of moral consciousness and civilization at a given 
moment in history.  And it is for that reason that even after the major victory achieved 
at the end of eighteenth century by the first written statement of those rights it remains 
thereafter a principal interest of humanity that such declaration should be renewed 
from century to century.17  This is evident from the United Nations Charter which 
reaffirms faith in fundamental rights, in the dignity and worth of human person18  and 
                                                 
15  That of Magnacarta, American Bill of Rights, French Declaration of Rights of Man and few 
Constitutions of European States, see supra n.9.  
16  Dr. U .Chandra, Human Rights, (Allahabad: Allahabad Law Agency Publications, 1999), p.8.  
17  Jacques Maritain, “On the Philosophy of Human Rights”, in Human Rights Comments and 
Interpretation”, Jaques Maritain (ed.), (London & New York: Alan Wingate,)  p.74.  
18  See Preamble to the U.N. Charter.  
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enlists promotion and encouragement of “respect for human rights and for 
fundamental respect for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion”, 
as one of the purposes of the United Nations. 19  The General Assembly of the United 
Nations is under an obligation of “assisting in the realization of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without discrimination as to race, sex, language or 
religion.20 
 Similar is the case with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.  It 
is said to be an extension of the charter provisions dealing with human rights. It is 
rightly reckoned as “the mine from which all human rights have been quarried”.21 
Thus the first international pronouncement of human rights came in the from of 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1948, guaranteeing inalienable and inviolable rights of all members of 
human family as a matter of fundamental principle.  The Declaration could not and 
did not purport to be more than a manifesto, a statement of ideals, a “path finding 
instrument”. 22  Its most important contribution lies in the pioneering formulation of 
the principal human rights and fundamental freedoms.23  Further the two Covenants of 
                                                 
19   Art.1 (3) of the U.N.Charter. 
20  Art. 1 (3) (1b) Ibid. 
21  Dr.S.K.Kapoor, Human Rights Under International Law And Indian Law, (Allahabad: Central 
Law Agency, 1999), p.70. 
22  Although the Tehran United Nations Conference of 1968 on Human Rights was able to declare 
that the Declaration constituted “an obligation” for the members of the international community.  
23  J.G. Starke, Introduction to International Law, 10th ed., (New Delhi: Aditya Books Pvt. Ltd., 
1994), p.364.  
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196624 contain a longer and much more comprehensive list of rights enumerated 
under the Universal Declaration.  Restrictions imposed on the rights in these 
documents are also the same as in the Universal Declaration.25 
 The impact of the development of human rights jurisprudence at international 
level and on municipal law is tremendous.  Almost all democratic societies adopted 
them in their municipal sphere.   In Indian municipal law system justiciable position is 
accorded to the civil and political rights under the Part III of the Constitution and 
economic social and cultural rights are given non justiciable position under Part IV.  
2.2 Nature of Rights  
 Rights are those conditions of social life without which no man can seek, in 
general, to be himself at this best. 26  A right is merely the dominating relation of a 
man with the thing or object of his necessity; and the good consists in the absence of 
obstruction to, or the usurpation of, that thing or relation.  A right may thus be 
temporary or permanent and perpetual, in view of the temporary or permanent 
absence of such obstruction or usurpation. The rights being a part of man’s being, the 
security of the rights is the essence of his personality.27 Thus, possession of rights has 
been considered as very much essential for every man in all ages, for the realisation of 
his personality.  “Rights” is an ambiguous term used to describe a variety of legal 
                                                 
24 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights.  
25  Jaswal P.S. & Jaswal N., Human Rights and the Law, (New Delhi: APH Pub. Co., 1996), p.20.  
26  Herald J. Laski, A Grammar of Politics, (London, 1925), p.91.  
27  Chaturvedi R.C., State and Rights of Men, (Delhi: Metropolitan Book Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1971),         
pp. 106-107. 
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relationships. One finds in Hohfeldian analysis, right sometimes is used in its strict 
sense as the right holder being entitled to something with a correlative duty in 
another; sometimes it indicates immunity from having a legal status altered; 
sometimes as a privilege to do something; and also as power to create a legal 
relationship. Although all of these terms have sometimes been identified as rights, 
each concept invokes “different protections and produces variant results”.28  
 There are two competing, at the same time, widely accepted theories regarding 
the nature of rights29:  one emphasises “will or choice”; the other emphasises on 
“interest or benefit”. The chief exponent of the first theory- the will theory- is H .L. A 
Hart. For Hart, the purpose of legal rights is to recognise individual self expression. 
This theory is also subscribed by those who view the purpose of law as being to grant 
the widest possible means of self-expression to the individual, the maximum degree 
of individuals self assertion. 
 The theory identifies the right-bearer by virtue of the power that s/he has over 
the duty in question. S/he can waive it, extinguish it, enforce it or leave it unenforced. 
This decision is his/her choice.30 “Individual discretion is the single most distinctive 
feature of the concept of “rights”.31 
                                                 
28  Jerome J. Shestack, “The Jurisprudence of Human Rights”, in Theodor Meron (ed.), “Human 
Rights  in International Law ; Legal and Political Issues, Vol.1, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 
p.71.  
29  See Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, 17th ed., M.D.A Freeman, (London: Sweet and 
Maxwell Ltd., 2001), pp 353-355.  
30  Ibid., p.354.  
31  per R. Flathman, The Practice of Rights,  (1976) quoted by, Lloyd, Ibid, p.354.  
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 This theory seems to allow all rights to be waived, which is however, not so in 
reality. It fails to offer an adequate account of all the rights. Hart himself conceded 
that his analysis of rights does not offer an adequate account of all legal rights, let 
alone moral ones. Certain rights corresponding to duties can not be waived. For 
instance, one’s duty not to kill or torture can not be waived by potential victim 
releasing one from his duty not to kill or torture. Other difficulties in will theory are 
regarding procedure the children’s rights, rights of animals, or other things. 
 The interest or benefit theory was first propounded by Bentham, and was later 
adopted and espoused by others.32 According to these, the purpose of rights is not to 
protect individual assertions but certain interests. Rights are thus benefits secured for 
persons by rules regulating relationships.  
An important preliminary point is that a jural relation between two parties 
should be considered only between them, even though the conduct of one may create 
another jural relation between him and someone else.33 
 One version of the benefit theory says that X has a right whenever he stands to 
benefit from the performance of a duty by some one else. Another says that X can 
have a right (whether in moral theory or within a legal system). Whenever the 
protection or the advancement of an interest of his is recognised ( by moral theory or 
the legal system as the case may be) as a reason for imposing obligations,  whether 
                                                 
32  Like Jhering, Maccormick, Raz, Lyons and Campbell etc.  
33  Dias R.W.M., Jurisprudence, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001),  p.24.  
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they are actually imposed or not.34 This theory covers all types of rights and liberties. 
The only difficulty with the benefit or interest theory is that it fails to explain why 
rights should be tied to benefits at all, for under certain circumstances, an individual’s 
interests can be protected without recognising a right in him.  
2.3 Hohfeld’s Analysis of Rights 
 The contemporary discourse on rights basically influenced by its origin and 
derives from the language of the jurists and lawyers. It is largely concerned with the 
human and natural rights whether embodied in the law of the community or not. In 
case embodied, though with different names. To start with the contemporary juristic 
analysis of right talk, Hohfeld’s analysis of rights satisfactorily accommodates a wide 
range of uses of the term right. 
 There are different types of rights. The concept of right is used ambiguously, to 
cover different legal relations. Wesley N. Hohfeld discusses four different meanings 
of a right. They are claim-right, liberty, power and immunities. However, even prior 
to Hohfeld, Bentham had recognised this ambiguity, when he distinguished rights and 
liberties. Morden discussion of “rights” has a distinct feature, i.e., there is an attempt 
by philosophers and jurists to be more precise in their use of the concept of ‘right’. 
Modern approach began with Bentham and Austin, though their predecessors had 
known that right was related logically to duty and obligation, and also the concept of 
law like rules and principle,35 there was no systematic attempt to draw the said 
                                                 
34  Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, supra n.29,  p.355.  
35   Jeremy Waldron, Theories of Rights, (London: Oxford University Press, 1984), p.2.  
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relationships. Ultimately, it was Wesley, N, Hohfeld who analysed the concept to 
facilitate resolution of practical problems in judicial reasoning.36 But Hohfeld’s 
account of that concept37 was the most rigorous as remain accepted even today. 
 According to Hohfeldian analysis, a person has a “claim-right” to do when 
another person has a duty  to let him do. A person has a “liberty” to do something, 
when he is under no duty to do that thing. A person has power when he has the legal 
ability to change others claim-rights and duties in certain respects. A person has 
“immunity” when he has the legal guarantee against imposition of certain duties by 
another person or it is some person’s lack of power in certain respects. For these four 
rights, duty, no right, liability and disability are the correlatives. 
 For Hohfeld ‘Right’ in the strict sense was claim-right -with correlative of 
duty. A right is thought to consist of five elements. 
1) A right holder, (subject of a right); 
2) What is right to (object of right); 
3) Which he/she may assert, demand, enjoy, or enforce (exercising right); 
4) Against some individuals or group, (the person or persons who have correlative 
duty); 
5) The basis for such claim (justification of right). 
 
 
                                                 
36  W.J.Harries, Legal Philosophies, (London: Butterworths, 1980), p.77.  
37  In two articles, (1913) 23 Yale L.J., 16; (1917) 26 Yale L.J., 710, cited in Lloyds Introduction of 
Jurisprudence, supra n.29, p.355.  
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2.4 Definition of Human Rights 
From the study of different sources or basis as to human rights it can be said 
that it is difficult to conceptualise or define human rights. Yet attempts have been 
made by political thinkers and jurists to define human rights in variety of ways giving 
their meaning and application. However, their common focus is in the idea that the 
human rights apply to all human beings because they are human beings. Some of the 
definition can here be referred to: 
1) According to Tiber Mecham, ‘human rights are universal and irrevocable 
elements in a scheme of justice. Accordingly, justice is the primary moral 
virtue within human society and all rights are fundamental to justice’.38 
2) Kant Baier defines human rights as ‘those moral rights whose moral ground 
and generating factors are the same, namely being human in some relevant 
sense.39 
3) Human Rights, per Joel Feinberg, are basic moral entitlements possessed only 
by persons. He defines human rights as, “moral rights held equally by all 
human beings, unconditionally and unalterably”. Thus, they are claims based 
on human nature or moral claims based on primary human needs.40 
4) Maurice Cranston defines human rights as “a universal moral right, something 
which all people, everywhere at all times ought to have, something of which no 
                                                 
38 Tiber Mecham, “Prima Facie v. Natural (Human) Rights”, in The Journal of Value Inquiry No.2, 
1976, pp 119-131.  
39  Kant Baier, (ed.), Chapman, Human Rights, Nomos, XXIII, (New York Press, 1981), p.19.  
40  Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy, (New Jersey:  Prentice Hall, 1973), p.85.  
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one may be deprived without grave affront to justice, something which is 
owing to every human being simply because one is human”.41 
5) In similar way D.D. Raphael defines human rights to constitute those very 
rights which one has precisely because of being human being. 
6) For Durga Das Basu, human rights are those minimal rights which every 
individual must have against the state or other public authority by virtue of his 
being a member of the human family, irrespective of any other consideration.42 
7) International instruments43 refer to human rights as equal and inalienable rights 
of all members of the human family. 
8) In the national sphere, the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, defines 
human rights as “the rights relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity of the 
individuals guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the International 
Covenants and enforceable by courts in India”44. Thus in India only 
enforceable rights embodied in the Constitution are human rights. 
These definitions generally focus on one idea that the human rights 
apply to all human brings for reason only that they are human beings. This 
further distinguishes human rights from other legal, contractual and 
conventional rights.    
 
                                                 
41  Maurice Cranston, What are Human Rights, (Delhi: National Academy, 1973), p.7.  
42  Durga Das Basu, supra n.4,p.8 
43  Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948; the two Covenants of 1966 etc.  
44 Section 2(d) of Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993. 
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2.5 Classification of Human Rights 
Louis B. Sohn has classified human rights in the following three categories.45 
1) The Human Rights of First Generation; 
2) The Human Rights of Second Generation; and 
3) The Human Rights of Third Generation 
2.5.1 The Human Rights of First Generation 
The human rights of first generation are civil and political rights of the 
individuals. The various civil and political rights are conferred through different 
Constitutions and also by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 
1966. However these rights are not new rights. They have been recognised since very 
long periods. These rights have developed from the time of Greek city states and over 
the period have found expression in different national charters. They have been 
concretized in the form of Magna Carta of 1215; The American Declaration of 
Independence, 1776, and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen 
of 1789. 
The right to life, liberty, security, free speech, assembly and worship etc are 
some of the civil rights. Right to free elections and representative institutions are 
examples of political rights which provide legitimation, integration and participation 
by linking the ruler to the consent of the ruled. These rights are human rights arising 
out of the conflict between people and governmental tyranny. For this reason, the 
                                                 
45  Louis B. Sohn, “The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than 
States”, 32 Am.U.L.Rev.1 (1982), Cited by Dr .U. Chandra, supra n.16, p.20. 
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main source of the civil and political rights is considered to be the American and 
French Revolutions. These rights came as formal assurance against the oppression and 
arbitrary governmental tyranny. Moses Moskowitz calls the human freedom and 
liberty as “the fruits of struggle against the authority of state”.46  
The  human rights of first generation reflect long established human values and 
as such are incorporated not only in almost every Constitution of various States but 
also in the  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966; in the  
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom, 1950, and in  
American and African instruments of  1969 and 1981, respectively. 
As the civil and political rights are incorporated in different national, regional 
and international instruments, they represent an overwhelming consensus of 
international community and further have given rise to rules of international 
customary law of general application. Louis Sohn has suggested that “the consensus 
on virtually all provisions of the covenant on civil and political rights is so widespread 
that they can be considered as part of the law of mankind, a jus cojens for all. 47 
2.5.2 The Human Rights of Second Generation 
These rights are the economic, social and cultural rights. Rights to education, 
health, freedom from want, fear or terror are examples of economic and social rights.  
These rights require that the Government should act to secure these to the people.  
Freedoms of thought, of communication, and of cultural and aesthetic experience are 
                                                 
46  Moses Moskowitz, Human Rights and World Order, (New York: Oceana Publications Inco., 
1958), p.159.  
47  Ibid. 
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examples of cultural rights. These rights are claimed in response to threat of mass 
manipulation. 
These rights are incorporated in the International Covenant on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. The main source for the origin of these rights is 
considered to be the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Paris Peace Conference of 
1919. The Russian Revolution is significant in recognising economic rights. The Paris 
Peace Conference is more significant for the establishment of the International Labour 
Organisation. The International Labour Organisation has laid emphasis on the concept 
of social justice by proclaiming that “peace can be established only if it is based upon 
social justice”;  and that “the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of 
labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the 
conditions in their own countries”.48 
(T)he real credit for giving expression to economic and social rights goes to the 
American President Roosevelt. He, for the first time expressed his hope for an 
instrument dealing with the economic and social rights. In his message to the 
Congress of January 6, 1941, President Roosevelt referred to the four essential 
freedoms viz., freedom of speech and expression, freedom of every person to worship 
God in his own way, freedom from want and freedom from fear to which he looked 
forward as the foundation of a future world.49  “Freedom from want” formed the basis 
on which the concepts of economic and social rights were formulated. President 
                                                 
48  Fenwick, Charles G., International Law, 3rd ed., Indian Reprint, 1971, n.67, p.152.  
49  See (1941), 35 A.J.I.L., p.662, cited in Dr. U. Chandra, supra n.16, p.21.  
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Roosevelt in his another message to Congress in 1944 made the concept of “freedom 
from want” clear.  He contemplated that “true individual freedom can not exist 
without economic security and independence” and that “people who are hungry and 
out of job are the stuff of which dictatorships are made”, thus economic truths have 
become accepted as self-evident. He was of the view that economic problems in the 
present day world have acquired alarming magnitude, therefore, he advocated for 
drastic economic and social reforms. In his opinion, “true individual freedom can not 
exist without economic security and independence”.50 These pronouncements had 
exercised their full impact upon the United Nations when it began to address itself to 
the human rights issue.51 
2.5.3 The Human Rights of Third Generation 
These are collective rights. According to Louis B. Sohn, individuals are also 
members of communities- family, religious communities, social or professional 
communities or racial communities (groups) or political community, the state. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that international law not only recognises inalienable rights of 
individuals, but also recognises certain collective rights exercised jointly by 
individuals who are grouped into larger communities including people and nations.52 
                                                 
50  Eleventh Annual Message to Congress, Jan, 11, 1944, 2881, cited by Dr.U. Chandra, supra n.16,  
p. 21.  
51  Dr.U. Chandra, supra n.16, p.21 
52  Thomas Buergenthal and Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in the Americas, Cases and 
Materials, 1995, p.11, cited in Dr.U. Chandra, Ibid., 21.  
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The right to self-determination, right to development, right to peace and right to 
solidarity are examples of third generation human rights. 
 According to Karel Vesak, the third generation of human right refer to the 
fraternity or brotherhood. This category of rights is based on the sense of solidarity, 
which is essential for the realisation of the major concern of the international 
community such as peace, development and environment.53 
 The human rights of third generation infuse the human dimension into areas 
where it has all too often been missing having been left to the state or states and these 
rights can be realised only “through the concerted efforts of all the actors on the social 
scene; the individual, the state, the public and private bodies and the international 
community.54 These are the rights which belong to people as group; they emphasise 
that human needs are best fulfilled within a collectivity.           
2.6 Religious Approach to Human Rights 
 The religions texts, be it the Vedas, the Upanishads, the Qoran or the Bible, all 
have references to the divinity of man. Every human being is a divine being and has a 
claim to dignity, liberty and equality. This theory held sway in that period of history 
when society was not so complex and the political structure a simple one55. Human 
rights as claims of the human beings found recognition at such early ages.  
                                                 
53  Lecture by Karel Vessak, “Tenth Study Session of the International Institute of Human Rights,” 
(July, 1979), cited by Thomas Bergenthal and Dinah Shelton, ibid., p.15.  
54  Ibid. 
55 Govind Mukhoty and Ranjani Ramakrishna, “Universals Declaration of Human Rights- Its 
Application to India”, in Human Rights in the Changing World, ed., Justice E.S.Venkataramaiah, 
(New Delhi: International Law Associated , 1998), p.140.  
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2.6.1 Hinduism 
 Hindus consider law as a revealed law. Theory is that someone amongst us, our 
great Rishis had attained such spiritual heights that they would be in direct 
communication with God. The revealed law has come to us in the form of four Vedas. 
The assumption is, the later development, the smrities, the Digests and Commentaries 
are nothing but exposition of sacred law contained in the Vedas.56 
 In the Hindu philosophical thought, the concept of ‘Dharma’ pervades 
throughout. And law is considered as a branch of Dharma. According to Manu, 
‘Dharma’ is “what is followed by those learned in Vedas and what is approved by the 
conscience of the virtuous who are exempt from hatred and inordinate affection”.57 
‘Dharma’ in simple parlance means the sum total of religious, moral, social and legal 
duties. There is no distinction between legal duties and moral and religious duties. 
There is a blending, and inter-working of religious, ethical and legal principles, 
because law was not separated from religion. Hindu philosophy spoke of 
Righteousness in terms of law, and law in terms of righteousness.58 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
56  Sen, General Principles of Hindu Jurisprudence, (Allahabad: Allahabad Law agency 1984), p.11.  
57  Manu Smriti, II, 1, quoted by Naikar L.D., The Law Relating to human Rights, (Bangalore:    
Puliani and Puliani,  2004), p.67.  
58 Derret Duncan, Religion and State in India (Faber and Faber, London 1968), p.29, cited in Naikar 
L.D., Ibid. 
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In ancient India, original Vedic concept of ‘Dharma’ is a fine blend of rights 
and duties of an individual and it stood like a colossus during the whole period of 
Indian Civilisation.59 
  In the Hindu Philosophy, the starting point is not the individual; it is the 
whole complex concatenation of the Real. Dharma is the order of the entire reality, 
that which keeps the world together. The individual’s duty is to maintain his rights; it 
is to find one’s place in relation to society, to the cosmos, and to the transcendent 
world. As Pannikar writes: 
 “Human rights are not Rights only. They are also duties and both are 
interdependent. Humankind has the ‘right’ to survive only in so far as it performs the 
duty of maintaining the world (Lokasamagraha). We have the right to eat only in as 
much as we fulfil the duty of allowing ourselves to be eaten by a hierarchically higher 
agency. Our right is only a participation in the entire metabolic function of the 
universe”.60 Rigveda which is regarded as the oldest document declares that all 
human beings are equal and they are brothers. The Atharvana Veda declared that all 
human beings have equal right over water and food (natural resources). The Vedas 
including Upanishads (shrutis) were the primordial source of ‘Dharma’ which is a 
compendious term for all human rights and duties….61   The ancient philosophers 
                                                 
59  Patil,J.S. and Patil, C.S., supra n. 11, p.1.  
60  Pannikar, Is The Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept? 120, Diogenes, 75 (1982), in Henry 
Steiner and Philip Alston, International Human Rights, In Context, Law Politics, Moral, 2nd ed., 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.388. 
61  Rama Jois, Seeds of Modern Public Law in Ancient Indian Jurisprudence, 2nd ed., (Lucknow:  
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considered that a right can be secured to every individual by creating a corresponding 
duty in other individuals, and preferred a ‘duty-based society where the right given to 
an individual is the right to perform his duty’. 62   
 Human rights gain meaning only if there is an independent judiciary to enforce 
rights. Here the dharmashastras are clear and categoric. As quoted by V.R. Krishna 
Iyer: 
 “The independence of the judiciary was one of the outstanding features 
of the Hindu judicial system. Even during the days of the Hindu 
monarchy, the administration of justice always remained separate from 
the executive. It was a rule independent both in form and in spirit.  It 
was the Hindu judicial system that first realised and recognised the 
importance of separation of the judiciary from the executive, and gave 
this fundamental principle a practical shape and form…. The evolution 
of the principle of separation of the judiciary form the executive was 
largely the result of the Hindu conception of law as binding on the 
sovereign.  Law in Hindu jurisprudence was above the sovereign. It was 
the dharma.63          
 
 Thus the King was subject to the law as any other citizen.  As Justice Rama 
Jois aptly observes:  ‘According to Rajadharma the king was given the power only to 
enforce the law.  Dharmasastras did not confer on or recognise any legislative power 
in the King...But under the kingship as recognised and established under the 
                                                 
62  Ibid., p.175. 
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Dharmashstras the laws were those laid down by the Dharmasashtras themselves.  
They did not authorise the king to lay down new laws or amend the provisions of 
Dharmasastras.   On the other hand, Dharmasastras also laid down the laws 
governing the conduct of the king himself (Rajadharma).64  The best known Indian 
Treatise, Arthashastra by Koutilya, treats the ‘duties’  of a king towards his subjects 
rather than of devine ‘perogaratives’.  It says: In the happiness of his subjects lies the 
king’s happiness;  in their welfare his welfare; whatever pleases the king himself the  
king shall consider as good.  The king shall ever be active and discharge his duties.65  
It not only affirmed and elaborated the civil and legal rights formulated by Manu, but 
also added a number of economic rights.  It also prescribes: “the king may be 
punished if he does not follow the path of dharma”.66 
 While religion prescribed certain duties, it propounded certain freedoms, 
freedom form violence; wants; exploitation; dishonour and from early death and 
diseases; certain virtues like tolerance compassion for fellow beings; knowledge; 
freedom of thought and conscience and from fear or despair (frustration).67 The Hindu 
Dharmashastra  and Arthashastra etc.,  contain a system which regulates the duties of 
persons – from king to his subjects.  The functional focus of Dharma is social order.  
                                                 
64  Justice Rama Jois, Legal and Constitutional History of India,  Part-I, p.13.  
65  D.P. Khanna, Reforming Human Rights, (New Delhi: Manasa Publications, 2001), p.77. 
66  Ibid. 
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The message is dharma is the supreme value which binds kings and citizens, men and 
women. 68 
2.6.2 Christianity 
 Though the term ‘human right’ as such is not found in traditional religions, 
human rights are found to have basis in a law higher than the State.  The Almighty or 
the Supreme Being is held to be the source of the higher law.  With reference to 
concept of rights it is said that a common father gives rise to common humanity and 
from this flows a universality of rights.  Since rights stem from divine sources, they 
are inalienable by moral authority.  There is a positive aspect to divine order since 
obedience derives from one’s duty to God.   Since duties are ordered by God, those 
duties accrue to the individual benefit and therefore it should not be violated by 
state.69 
 Expressions of many of the human rights are found in Bible.  For instance, 
limitation of slavery;70 racial equality;71 justice to the poor;72 fair treatment to 
strangers73  etc. Equality of all human beings is recognised on the basis of the 
common fatherhood of man.  This is also evident from the words of Jesus Christ, 
                                                 
68  V.R. Krishna Iyer, supra n.63,   p.115.  
69  Naikar L.D., supra, n.57, p.15.  
70  Exodus 21:2. 
71  Amos 9:7. 
72  Isaih 1; 16.17. 
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when he said: “Do not do unto others what is hateful to you.  The God will know. Do 
unto others as you would have them do unto you”. 
 Universality, higher than territorial possessions, denunciation of unrighteous 
riches and exploitation of the poor, egalitarianism of all in the eyes of God, respect for 
the despised and the destitute etc were implicit   in Christ’s gospels….. The right to 
dignity, self-expression and other freedoms even for the destitute and the despised and 
for those branded as prostitutes were integral to the ideology of Jesus.  He, incarnated, 
as it were, to spread the message of the noblest version of human rights and the 
divinity of all God’s children and opposed exploitation, material and sacerdotal. 74 
2.6.3 Islam 
 Islam is the Arabic word for submission to the will of God (Allah), emphasised 
unity of humanity.  Equality, the status of women, the rights of the less privileged 
(minorities, poorer working groups)... were reflected in the Prophet’s message”. 75   In 
the Holy Qoran there is an injunction that all men are brothers and that non-Muslims 
should be treated with no less dignity and respect for their personality than Muslims.  
The Qoran prohibits discrimination against all persons whether white or black. 76 
Quran and Sunna have repeatedly talked about the importance of human rights. The 
basic principle of Islam is that all men are equal and Islam believes in universal 
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brotherhood. There are a number of Quranic verses, which recognise absolute equality 
between human beings.77 Galwash observes it in the following words:78 
 “Equality of right was the distinguishing feature of the Islamic 
Commonwealth. A convert from a slumber clan enjoyed the same rights 
and privileges as one who belongs to the noblest Quraish.”  
 
 In Islam human rights are concerned with dignity of the individual, the level of 
self-eastern that secures personal identity and promotes human community.79 
Community has gained primacy over individuals. Individual as a part of the 
community was to realize that community provides for the integration of human 
personality. Individual owed obligations for the good of community as a whole. 
  So in Islam the language of duty seemed more natural than that of rights, and 
obligation is consolidated by its being owed to God. Rules of conduct for all Muslims 
were laid down by Allah, and communicated through Mohammad, and Muslims do 
service to God through obedience to these rules… Thus essential characteristic of 
human rights in Islam is that they constitute obligations connected with the divine and 
derive this force from this connection.80     
 Muslims are enjoined constantly to seek ways and means to assure to each 
other what in modern parlance called human rights. Quran contemplated certain basic 
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rights like - Right to protection: to justice; to equality; to disobey what is unlawful; to 
participate in public life; to freedom; to freedom of conviction; of expression; to 
protection against persecution on the ground of religion; to protection of honour and 
good name; to privacy; to property to adequate remuneration and compensation.81 
 
2.7 Theoretical Basis of Human Rights 
2.7.1 Natural Law Theory 
   Human rights are those irreducible minima which belong to every member of 
the human race when pitted against the state or other public authorities or group or 
gangs and other oppressive communities.82 As a member of human family, he has a 
right to be treated as human. It is an inalienable right. When this right is denied, 
human mind expresses dissatisfaction. Whenever there was an attempt ‘to suppress 
the individual’s freedom an appeal to natural law was made on the assumption that, 
beyond religious superiors and crowned heads, there was a system of natural law 
which embodied reason, justice and universal ethics’.83  
 Natural rights which were akin to modern human rights were derived from 
natural law. The credit of giving birth to natural law goes to the Greek, with great 
scholars like Sophocles and Aristotle. Romans further developed it. The early law of 
Romans was called ‘Jus civil’. Later the Romans developed the legal systems called 
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‘Jus gentium’, this was the law of universal application. In the republican era of 
Rome, jus gentium was reinforced by natural law as jus natural. Jus natural meant 
“the sum of those principles which ought to control human conduct because founded 
in the very nature of man as a national and social being.84 According to Romans 
natural law embodied the elementary principles of justice which were the dictate of 
right reason.85 From this natural law based on right reason, ‘the right of man as a legal 
or moral concept’ first appeared in the form of natural rights.86 These natural rights of 
man were moral rights which every human being, every where, at all times, ought to 
have simply because of the fact that, in contradiction with other beings, he is rational 
and moral.87 The natural rights of man, being embodiment of right reason, were “not 
the particular privilege of citizens of certain state, but something to which every 
human being, everywhere, was entitled in virtue of the simple fact of being human 
and rational.88 As man is endowed with reason, for that reason, he is also endowed 
with “certain rights without which he ceased to be a human being.89 Thus, the natural 
rights were derived from the nature of man for these are inherent in the nature of man 
and form part of his intrinsic nature. 
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 During middle ages, St. Thomas Aquinas preached for equality within the 
framework of a stable society. Teutonic law stressed the fact that law belonged to the 
community, to the folk, and was thereby the common possession of everyone. Even 
feudalism, while prescribing duties owed by a vassal to his lord, inspired the idea of 
‘right’ by saying that no more could be demanded of him than was due.90 During the 
period of Reformation and Renaissance, philosophers like Hobbes, Locke and 
Rousseau propounded social contract theories advocating for individuals inalienable 
rights for life, liberty and estate, and insisted that the purpose of government was to 
protect these rights. However, these rights were retained by individuals within a 
system of social contract - a balancing factor.91        
2.7.1.1 Natural Rights 
 The Natural law theory led to the Natural rights theory. For John Locke, the 
chief exponent of this theory, natural law can be understood as protective of the 
subjective interest and rights of individual persons.92 It is asserted that the failure to 
respect natural law, the violation of the principles of equality and non-arbitrariness, 
provided justification for the natural rights. The doctrines of natural rights have 
received their fullest expression in the writing of John Locke and other social contract 
theorists.93 Locke writes, ‘man is by nature endowed with enough freedom to become 
a man in conformity with his law... This law in shape of reason, obliges everyman to 
                                                 
90  Dias R.W.M., Jurisprudence, (London: Butterworths,1985), p.78. 
91  Patil J.S. and Patil C.S., supra n.11, p.2.   
92  Rosenbaum, (ed.), Philosophy of Human Rights, (London:  Aldwych, 1981), p.11. 
93  Margaret  Macdonald, “Natural Rights” in Jeremy Waldron (ed.), supra n.35, p.23.  
 51
preserve his life and limits his liberty and possession and to be active in rendering the 
same service to others. For everyman his original liberty has meaning only by 
reference to this law.94 
 The need to delineate the scope of natural rights perhaps was not pressing for 
the early natural law philosophers. Life, liberty, property, trial by jury, the right to 
assembly and to petition appeared to represent such self-evident values that they 
seemed to require little elaboration. Hence, the doctrine of natural rights was less 
concerned with the content of the rights than with the rationale, such as the inherent 
nature of man, the divine will, or historic tradition.95 In all, the rationale determined 
the content. 
 Under Locke’s view of human beings, in the state of nature, all that was 
needed was the opportunity to be self-dependent; life, liberty and property were the 
inherent rights that met this demand.96 
 The list of natural rights varied with each exponent.97 Most of the norm-setting 
of natural rights theories contain a priori elements deduced by the norm setter, thus, 
the rights considered to be natural differ from theorist to theorist, according to the 
theorist’s conception of nature. The natural rights doctrine was frequently associated 
with metaphysical and theological principle and also natural rights were confined to 
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negative rights protected against the state.98  The other weakness was that, the natural 
rights were claimed to be inalienable, absolute and unalterable and therefore, claimed 
natural rights unless confined to a single right, tended to come into conflict with each 
other.99 Further natural rights theory was also criticised by utilitarians like Bentham 
and by Marxist. Bentham calls natural rights as “simple non-sense; natural and 
imprescriptible rights rhetorical non-sense, non-sense upon stilts.100 His rejection of 
natural rights derives from his analysis of rights and obligations,101 that is, one has a 
right only if one is supposed to benefit from another’s compliance with an obligation. 
Thus, he could not recognise moral or natural rights, independent of social recognition 
and enforcement Marxists reject the doctrine of natural rights because they were 
opposed to liberal individualism.  
Making a scathing attack on natural rights concept in “On the Jewish 
Question” Marx considers it as the ideological expression of bourgeois egoism and 
social atomisation. “The so called rights of man... are nothing but… the rights of 
egoistic man, of man separated from other men and, from the community… None of 
the so called rights of man, therefore, go beyond egoistic man, beyond man as a 
member of civil society, that is, individuals withdrawn into himself, and separated 
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from the community102…. None of the so called rights of man, therefore, go beyond 
egoistic man, beyond egoistic man, beyond man as a member of civil society, that is, 
an individual withdrawn into himself, and separated from the community. 
F.M. Bradely too opposed the idea of individual rights when he wrote, “The 
rights of the individuals today are not worth serious criticism. The welfare of the 
community is the end and is the ultimate standard. And over its members the right of 
its moral organism is absolute. Its duty and right is to dispose of those members as it 
seems best”.103 
The effect of such criticism of natural law and natural rights theory was to 
undermine the rationale behind the theory and also of its universality. One 
consequence of the weaknesses recognised in this helped the other - especially 
utilitarian concept to gain significance and prevail during the 19th and the early 20th 
century.104    
2.7.1.2 Revival of Natural Rights 
 The revival of natural rights is a consequence of revival of the theory of natural 
law itself. Kelsen has said: ‘The theory of natural law, which was dominant  through 
out the 17th and 18th centuries, after relapsing during the 19th, has again in the 20th    
re-entered the foreground of social and legal philosophy, in company with religious 
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and metaphysical speculation.105 An approach kindred to that of ‘natural law’ colours 
the current movement to bind states by international covenants to observe human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, while to some extent a ‘natural law’ philosophy 
underlines the Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States of 1949 prepared 
by the International Law Commission of the United Nations. ‘Natural law’ was 
invoked also in order to justify the punishment of offenders, guilty of the grosser and 
more brutal kind of war crimes.106 
 Though the heyday of natural rights proved short, the idea of human rights 
nonetheless endured in one form or another. The abolition of slavery, factory 
legislation, popular education, trade unionism, the universal suffrage movement -these 
and other examples of the  19th century reformist impulse afford ample evidence that 
the idea was not to be extinguished even if its transempirical derivation had become a 
matter of scepticism. But it was not until the rise and fall of Nazi Germany that the 
idea of rights - human rights - came truly into its own.107  
 The twentieth century saw the revival of natural rights as human rights. The 
natural rights doctrine remains one of the most powerful concepts and “its regained 
prominence is apparent in national and international law and politics”.108 This is 
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evident from the fact that almost every state in the modern world has incorporated the 
concept of human rights in its constitution. Importance of human rights is also 
recognised in international law - a number of instruments on human rights are made 
since 1948.  
 Many factors can be held responsible for the revival of natural rights theory:  
(i) The great wars of twentieth century and the need for peace and respect for 
human rights;  
(ii) Need to counter dreadful treatment of people by totalitarian governments; 
(iii) Need to make persons and states accountable for their crimes against 
humanity; 
(iv)  Desire for international peace and security and countering terrorism etc. 
Human rights have become a fundamental premise in the international 
premise in the international, political dialogue. The most important manifestation of 
human rights in the world scene is the belief that a totalitarian regime may no longer 
victimise its own people with impunity or in virtual silence.109  
2.7.2 Positivism 
In the era of legal positivism Bentham held that rights could be    evaluated by 
reference to the principle of utility and thereby shifted the basis of rights from 
morality to positive law. He and others in analytical tradition such as Austin, Kelsen 
and H.L.A. Hart transformed natural rights into positive legal rights.110 
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Positivism dominated the legal theory during the nineteenth century and 
continued to be accepted in the twentieth century. According to the Positivists, the 
source of Human rights lies in the enactment of a system of law with sanctions 
attached to it. Classical positivists deny an a priori source of rights and assume that 
all authority stems from what the state and officials have prescribed. This approach 
rejects any attempt to discern and articulate an idea of law transcending the empirical 
realities of existing legal systems.111    
For positivist the law is actually laid down; it is a command.112  It has to be 
kept separate from the law that ought to be.113  Hence the source of rights - human 
rights is to be found only in enactments of a system of law.  According to Austin, it is 
by virtue of sanctions that expression of desire not only constitutes commands but 
also imposes an obligation or duty to act in the prescribed way.  
H.L.A. Hart has a refined approach of this philosophy. Hart finds that Austin’s 
analysis confuses, having an obligation to do something with being obligated to do it.  
He points out that whether someone has obligation on particular occasion is 
independent of the likelihood of his incurring the threatened evil on the particular 
occasion… what is required according to Hart, are rules that confer authority or power 
on persons to prescribe behaviour and to visit breaches of the prescriptions with the 
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appropriate evils.114  For Hart, the rules may be primary and secondary rules, and they 
constitute the core of legal system.  Hart finds the authority of the rules of law in the 
background of legal standards against which the government acts, standards that have 
been accepted by the community.  He supports a concept of law which allows the 
invalidity of law to be distinguished form its morality. 115  This is the difference 
between natural rights philosophy and positivist philosophy.  
2.7.3 Marxist Theory 
Marxism is concerned with the nature of human beings. Marx regarded ‘the 
law of nature’ approach to human rights as ‘idealistic’ and ‘historical’. He saw 
nothing ‘natural’ or ‘inalienable’ about human rights. In a society in which capitalists 
monopolise the means of production, he regarded the notion of individual rights as a 
bourgeois illusion.116 Thus, Marxism sees a person’s essence as a potential to use 
one’s abilities to the fullest and to satisfy one’s needs.117 In a capitalist society 
protection is controlled by a few, hence it can not satisfy those individual needs. 
Marxist concept of rights of individuals is distinct from the rights of the society 
as a whole. Marxists hold that only by achieving the upliftment of the society or 
community, the higher freedoms of individuals can be achieved. Thus even 
satisfaction of basic needs of individuals is contingent on realization of social goods. 
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Since the ultimate goal is the realisation of communism and law is an 
instrument whose aim is to teach citizens, it imposes observance of social duties. This 
is because in the communism there would be no class, if there are no class conflicts or 
conflict between interests of Government, and people, there should be no rights. Yet 
they have it through the state, the people grant themselves certain rights not as a 
matter of expediency by self interested right ruling class, but as a product of collective 
will of the people.118   As Berman points out, rights thus are conferred in the limited 
sense, in order to encourage one to be loyal, hardworking, well disciplined and a 
virtuous citizen.119 Thus, according to Marxism, only legal rights granted by the state 
to a limited extent exist to fulfil the obligation of the state. 
Marxists recognition of rights stems from its view of individual as indivisible 
from the social whole; it is only by meeting of the will of the whole that the higher 
freedom of individual can be achieved. Thus, even satisfaction of basic needs can 
become contingent on realisation of societal goal. 
The whole history suggests that the concept of human rights is not new and it 
existed in all civilisation known to the world in one form or the other. These rights 
were called ‘natural rights’ or ‘rights of men’ or ‘duties of the king’ by different 
philosophers but the aim of all those was the same, that is to protect and provide 
certain basic rights.120 
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2.7.4 Sociological Theory 
The sociological approach as far as human rights are concerned, directs 
attention to the questions of institutional development aimed at classifying 
behavioural dimension of law and society, focuses on the problems of public policy 
and identifies the empirical components of human rights in the context of social 
process.121          
For human rights theory, a primary contribution of the sociological school is its 
emphasis on obtaining a just equilibrium of interest among prevailing moral 
sentiments and the social and economic conditions of time and place.122  One of the 
leading sociological thinkers, Roscoe Pound pointed out that ‘during the nineteenth 
century the history of law was written largely as a record of an increasing recognition 
of individual rights’. He further pointed out that in the twentieth century “this history 
should be written in terms of a continually wider recognition of human wants, human 
demands and social interests”.123  He did not try to give value preference to these 
interests. His guiding principle was one of “social engineering”, that is, the ordering 
of human relations through politically organised society so as to secure all interests 
insofar as possible with the least sacrifice of the totality of interests. This approach is 
useful in the understanding of the scope of human rights and their correlation with 
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demands. It takes into account the realities of the social process; and how to focus on 
rights in terms of what people are concerned about and what they want.  
However, one difficulty with the sociological approach is its lack of focus on 
how rights are interrelated or what the priorities should be; how a normative 
conclusion about rights can be empirically derived from factual premises such as the 
having of interests. This made Llewellyn to note that “a descriptive science in the 
social field is not enough”.124 Nevertheless this approach sharpened the perceptions of 
the values involved and the policies necessary to achieve them. 
2.7.5 Theories Based on Justice 
 If law is a system of rules, then some aspects of ‘procedures’ and of ‘formal’ 
justice may be inherent in it.125  When justice is used as the measure of the law, the 
assumption is that law could be made to conform to justice; ‘justice’ in this context 
stands for a substantive moral criterion sometimes called ‘distributive justice’ or more 
recently ‘social justice’. The law ought to distribute rights and duties in a certain way, 
and if it does not it is unjust. Thus the object of justice is proper distribution of social 
goods.126  This theory of human rights based on justice is advanced by Prof. John 
Rawls.   According to John Rawls, the chief exponent of this theory,127 “Justice is the 
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first virtue of social institutions”. The role of justice is crucial to understanding human 
rights. Human rights are an end of justice. 
 For Rawls, the principles of justice provide a way of assigning rights and 
duties in the basic institution of society and also define the appropriate distribution of 
benefits and burdens of social cooperation. The general conception of justice behind 
the principles of justice is one of fairness. The concept of fairness is found throughout 
in theories based on justice. The concepts of fairness and justice help to determine all 
social primary goals, such as liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the 
leases of self respect which are to be distributed equally unless an exception is made 
for the benefit of least forward.128 
2.7.6 Theory Based on Equality of Respect and Concern   
The basic premises of this theory propounded by Dworkin is that governments 
must treat all their citizens with equal concern and respect. He proposes the ‘right to 
treatment as an equal to be taken as fundamental under the liberal conception of 
equality’.129 Dworkin has affirmed the utilitarian principle that ‘everybody can count 
for one, nobody for more than one’. He even advances the idea of state intervention in 
order to achieve social welfare. In his view, “a right to liberty is too vague to be 
meaningful”130 but there are certain specific liberties, such as, freedom of speech, 
freedom of worship, rights of association and personal and sexual relation require 
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special protection against government interference.131 Dworkin holds that if these 
liberties were left to a utilitarian calculation or an unrestricted calculation of general 
interest, the balance would tilt in favour of restriction instead of general interest. The 
liberties thus must be protected against external preferences and must be given a 
preferred status. 
 Dworkin’s theory of human rights seems to be similar to the rights in the 
natural law tradition. He minimises the tension between liberty and equality, by 
retaining both the benefits of rights theory without the need for an ontological 
commitment and the benefits of utilitarian theory without the need to sacrifice basic 
individual rights. 
2.7.7 Theory Based on Dignity 
 Dignity of person or human dignity is an expression of a basic value accepted 
by all. The expression human dignity finds place in many of the international 
instruments132 on human rights and freedoms. Human rights derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person. 
 In one sense dignity is the intrinsic worth of human person. The worth of every 
person should mean ‘that individuals are not to be perceived or treated merely as 
objects of the will of others’. The idea that human rights are derived from the dignity 
of the person has two corollaries. The first corollary is the idea that basic rights are 
not given by authority and therefore may not be taken away; the second is that they 
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are rights of person, every person.133 This way dignity is private or individual. In the 
other sense, dignity is collective, “prescribed by social norms”.134  Dignity here means 
the particular cultural understanding of the inner moral worth of their human person 
and the person’s political relation with the society. 
 Thus, this theory regards protection of human dignity as a paramount objective 
of social policy.135 This is a value policy oriented approach based on protection of 
human dignity. The demands for human rights are demands, for wide sharing in all 
the values upon which human rights depend for effective participation in all 
community value processes. There are eight such independent values as basis for 
human rights like; respect, power, enlightenment, wellbeing, health, skill, affection 
and rectitude.136 This theory based on dignity envisages that members of the 
community should participate in democratic distribution of values. The ultimate goal 
here is to ensure a world community in which there is democratic distribution of 
values, and where protection of human rights is the paramount objective of social 
policy. 
 In all these and some of the other theories, a common feature, that appears by 
and large is the attempt to balance rights of individuals i.e., human rights with the 
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societal interests. This aspect is more clearly visible in the revived natural law 
philosophy.137 For instance, John Rawls argues for equal liberty and arrangement of 
social and economic inequalities for the greatest benefit of the least advantaged; with 
a ‘just savings principle; while John Finnis  makes a fine blend of basic values and 
practical reasonableness in formulating his natural rights theory, Dworkin proceeds 
from the postulates of political morality, thus, the jurisprudential basis for a balanced 
and comprehensive concept of human rights is strongly laid in all these different 
theories.      
 2.8 Position of Human Rights in India 
Many reasons account for the contemporary international concern with human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.  Some of these are deeply rooted in historical 
experience and are part of man’s struggle for the realization of all his human 
values.138  The enjoyment by individuals everywhere of their human rights is a 
prerequisite to peace, security and progress of any society or state.  In the modern 
world of “community of states”, the human rights obligations of states exist at three 
levels.  First 139 and foremost, states human right obligations exist in the fundamental 
law of the land, the Constitution… Under the Indian Constitution, Parts-III and IV 
define the nature and scope of Indian State’s human rights obligations.140  Indian 
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Constitution, republican and democratic in nature, is created or consented by the 
‘people’ making them the ultimate sovereign.  None, even the highest executive 
authority in the state is above the law. Dr. Justice Anand concisely made this point 
clear when he stated that “the Constitution is the fundamental law of the land which 
establishes the judiciary and empowers it to eliminate those acts of the legislature and 
/or actions of the executive as one found to be unconstitutional.   The courts are the 
guardians of the Constitution framed by ‘we the people of India’...  The accountability 
of the judges is therefore not only to their conscience but also to the people in whom 
the ultimate sovereignty vests.  It is therefore imperative that their vast power is used 
in public interest…..”141  These two general but cardinal principles of the Constitution 
are the basis of human rights obligations of the Indian State.  
The human rights under the Indian Constitution are divided on the ground of 
enforceability in the courts under the Part III and Part IV of the Constitution.  
Otherwise, the rights in both Parts are equally fundamental.  They are complementary 
of each other because together they constitute the human rights regime including 
respectively the civil and political rights and the social and economic rights.142  
Together they have been called the conscience of the Constitution.143  
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India became independent in 1947, had its Constitution adopted in 1950, with 
provision guaranteeing basic human rights to the people in the form of fundamental 
rights.  Prior to independence it signed the United Nations Charter and then after 
independence the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.  
Though India emerged as an independent nation form colonial rule in 1947, the 
struggle for independence which had proceeded in the three decades before 1947 had 
the seeds of what later came to be recognised as fundamental rights.144 Though prior 
to the period during which India had gone under colonial rule, fundamental rights 
were not known in India, during the struggle for independence and after 
independence, there was recognition, on the part of the constitution makers as also on 
the part of the populace at large, of the need for some provision in the constitution for 
fundamental rights.145 
 
2.8.1 Evolution of Fundamental Rights in India 
2.8.1.1 During Freedom Struggle 
 The idea of fundamental rights originated in the nineteenth century. During the 
British regime in India, the Indian National Congress started the agitation for the 
recognition of civil rights. However, the constitutional recognition of the fundamental 
rights came in the year 1895. Perhaps the first explicit demand for fundamental rights 
                                                 
144  R.A.Jahagirdar, “Human Rights- the Indian Experiment”, Justice E.S. Venkataramaih (ed.) supra, 
n.76, p.92.  
145  Ibid., p.93.  
 67
appeared in the   Constitution of India Bill, 1895146, in which several rights were 
incorporated147. Thereafter, the Indian National Congress was expressing the wishes 
of the people of India through various Bills, testaments, schemes, reports and 
resolutions.148 The demand for rights was revived in the beginning of the twentieth 
century. A series of Congress Resolutions adopted between 1917 and 1919 repeated 
the demand for civil rights and equality of status with Englishmen. The resolution 
called for “equal terms and conditions in bearing arms”, for a wider application of the 
system of trial by jury; and for the right of Indians “to claim that no less than one half 
of the jurors should be their own countrymen”.149  This right of equality is one of the 
most important, basic, human rights. 
 By the mid twenties, the demands of the Indians “no longer aimed at 
establishing the rights of Indians vis-à-vis Englishmen, a goal that was to be achieved 
through the Independence Movement; the purpose however was to assure liberty 
among Indians.150  The Commonwealth of India Bill 1925 was another demand by the 
Indian National Congress for fundamental rights.151 In 1927 the appointment of the 
Simon Commission impelled the Indian National Congress to set up a committee to 
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draft a constitution on the basis of a declaration of rights. The committee152  thus set 
up in 1928 suggested that fundamental rights should be incorporated in the future 
constitution of India. The Nehru Report153 declared that the first concern of Indians 
was to secure the fundamental rights. The Report said: “it is obvious that our first care 
should be to have our fundamental rights guaranteed in a manner which will not 
permit their withdrawal under any circumstances”.154 
 Next development was the Karachi Resolution for the adoption of the 
fundamental rights by the congress session in 1931, “in order to end the exploitation 
of the masses, political freedom must include the real economic freedom of the 
starving millions.155 Subsequently, in all the three sessions of the Round Table 
Conferences that preceded the making of the Government of India Act, 1935, 
discussions were held on the subject of Fundamental Rights and the Indian leaders 
made concerted efforts for the inclusion of a Bill of Rights in the Proposed 
Constitution Act.156  
 The next stage of development was the appointing of Sapru Committee by an 
all Parties Conference in 1944-45. The Sapru Committee with Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru 
as its chairman published its report in 1945 recommending that the declaration of 
fundamental rights was absolutely necessary. Sapru Report gave a standing warning 
                                                 
152  Motilal Nehru was the Chairman of the Committee.  
153  It incorporated Fundamental Rights.  
154  G.Austin  op cit, p.55.  
155  Chakrabarthy  and  Bhattacharya, op cit, p.28.  
156  P.Sarojini Reddy, Judicial Review of Fundamental Rights, (New Delhi: National Publishing 
House, 1976), p.10.  
 69
to all, that what the Constitution demands and expects is perfect equality between one 
section of the community and another in the matter of political and civil rights, 
equality of liberty and security in the enjoyment of the freedom of religion, worship, 
and the pursuit of the ordinary applications of life.157  The Committee envisaged 
justiciable and non-justiciable rights but did not suggest which all rights should be 
included in the future constitution. The issue was left to framers of the Constitution. 
 The British Cabinet Mission in 1946 envisaged a Constituent Assembly for 
framing of Constitution of India. 
2.8.1.2 Constituent Assembly and Fundamental Rights 
 The Constituent Assembly’s first ever meeting on 9th December 1946 was a 
fulfilment of long cherished hope, and it symbolised the commencement of great task 
of framing the Constitution of India. In furtherance of this task, the Constituent 
Assembly on 24 January 1947 voted to form the Advisory Committee, on adoption of 
a resolution moved by Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant.158 Advisory Committee in turn set 
up five sub committees on Fundamental Rights. 
 The Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee was faced with a problem of 
balancing the individual liberty vis-à-vis social control. The former being necessary 
for fulfilment of individual’s personality and the latter for the peace and security of 
society. The members found that although there was some disagreement on technique, 
there was little difference on principles. The members of the Sub-Committee quickly 
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decided that the Fundamental Rights should be justifiable, that they should be 
included in the Constitution and they decided what form these rights should take... 
and also included within the rights the legal methods by which they could be 
secured... Therefore, Assembly passed Fundamental Rights which are divided into 
seven parts having close resemblance with human rights enshrined in various 
international human rights document.159  
2.8.1.3 Post Constitutional Period and Human Rights  
The historical and political developments in India made it inevitable that a Bill 
of Rights or Fundamental Rights, as we all call them, should be enacted in our 
constitution.160 Part III of the Constitution embodies those rights. The rights 
embedded in this part are ensured as effective guarantees against the state action.161  
In has been aptly observed that ‘enshrining of these rights makes our constitution 
sublime’.162 The observations of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar on the object and purpose of 
Fundamental Rights in the Constitution were very clear when he said: 
 “The object of the Fundamental Rights is two-fold. First, that every citizen 
must be in a position to claim those rights. Secondly, they must be binding upon every 
authority. I shall presently explain what the word authority means - upon every 
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authority which has got either the power to make laws or the power to have discretion 
vested in it”.163  
 The promulgation of the Constitution on 26th January 1950 was a watershed in 
the history of the development of human rights in India. The Preamble, the 
Fundamental Rights, the Directive Principle of State Policy together provides the 
basic human rights to the people of India.164  (C)ourts too have played a positive role 
in incorporating and enforcing the rights available at international level into the Indian 
law, through judicial construction. The Supreme Court of Indian in particular through 
judicial interpretation has widened the horizon of human rights in India.165   
 Since 1950 the civil and political rights have been adopted in the Constitution 
and they have been made enforceable through the judicial process.  Still there are 
quite a few human rights which touch the people at the grass root level but have not 
been received sufficient attention. While a number of human rights covered under 
Part III of the Constitution as justiciable fundamental rights, others are covered under 
Part IV, which are mere directive policies not justiciable. In case of the enforceable 
rights also it was felt only the rich and well to do who could take advantages of the 
judicial process.  Bhagwati, J., has aptly remarked that: “it is absolutely essential to 
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get out of the obsession with the grandiose concept of human rights and come to the 
grass root concept of human rights.166     
 Further India has signed the Interntional Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights, 1996 and the International Covenant on Economic, social and Cultural 
Rights, 1966. In 1979 she satisfied the Covenants too. Another important development 
in the area of human rights in India is the enacting of the Protection of Human Rights 
Act, 1993, to provide for the constitution of a National Human Rights Commission, 
State Human Rights Commissions  in States and Human Rights Courts for better 
protection of human rights and matters connected there with or incidental thereto. 
 ‘Human Rights’, under the Act, means the rights relating to life, liberty, 
equality and dignity of life, guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the 
International Covenants and are enforceable by court in India167.   
 This apparently covers the rights guaranteed by the Constitution or those 
embodied in the International Covenants. This is, as Noorani has aptly remarked, “a 
cosmetic fraud”168. For the qualification that follows “and are enforceable by courts in 
India” takes way the rights under the Covenants altogether. So, unless the rights under 
the Covenants are enforceable by Indian law, they would be of no relevance to the 
human rights commission. An international treaty can have no direct effect on 
                                                 
166  P.N.Bhagwati, “Human Rights and Democratisation of Remedies”, Ind. Bar Rev., Vol.10 (4) 
1983, p.586.  
167  Section 2 (d) of Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993.  
168 A.G. Noorani, “Rights and wrongs – A Commission and Many Omissions”, p.39, Frontline, 
August 1993, cited by Noor Mohammad Bilal, “National Human Rights Commission – A Shackled 
Watchdog”, K.U.L.R., Vol.I, Dec. 1994, p.133. 
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domestic law unless implemented by a legislation. The net effect of the qualifying 
expression is to take away with one hand what is offered by another. However, this is 
not going to exempt India from international obligations as a state party to the 
Covenants.169   
 This situation reveals the fact that provisions of the Constitution incorporating 
human rights as enforceable fundamental rights and making the courts custodian of 
these rights becomes very much important. 
 The Fundamental Rights of the Constitution are, in general, those rights of the 
citizens, or those negative obligations of the state not to encroach on individual 
liberty, that have become well known since the late eighteenth century and since the 
drafting of the Bill of Rights of the American Constitution- for the Indians, no less 
than other peoples, became heir to this liberal tradition.170 In keeping with this 
tradition the Indian Constitution guarantees certain fundamental rights to individuals. 
These fundamental rights are divided into six parts: the right to equality, the right to 
freedom, the right against exploitation, the right to the freedom of religion, cultural 
and educational rights and the right to constitutional remedies. 
 A fundamental right, as defined in the Constitution, differs from a non-
fundamental right in one vital aspect: a fundamental right (subject to the qualifications 
defined in the Constitution itself) is inviolable, whereas a non-fundamental right 
                                                 
169  Ibid.  
170  G.Austin, supra n.143 pp 55-51 
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possesses no such characteristic.171  Fundamental rights are limitations on the powers 
of the legislature as well as the executive. They are designed to discipline the state 
and review all those actions which threaten or transgress fundamental rights beyond 
the permissible limits defined by the Constitution.172 The real enforcement of the right 
in case of every contravention must also be possible in the constitutional scheme.173 
The mode of redress should be appropriate in the facts of the case. Therefore, the 
Constitution provides special jurisdiction under Art. 32, a provision which was made 
under Part III of the Constitution itself to enforce these fundamental rights. The 
Supreme Court under Art. 32 and High Courts under Art. 226 are under a duty to 
grant relief for violation of a substantive fundamental right.  
 The framers of the Constitution of 1949 wanted to incorporate a guarantee of 
fundamental right so that they might impose limitations on the arbitrary exercise of 
power by any organ of the state.174  This object has been secured in the Constitution in 
several ways under Article 12175, Art. 13 (2)176, Art 32177 and Art 245 (1).178 
                                                 
171  V.N.Shukla, Constitution of India, 10th ed., by M.P. Singh, (Lucknow: Eastern Book Co. 2001),  
p. A-42.  
172  B.P Jeevan Reddy and Rajeev Dhavan, “The Jurisprudence of Human Rights”, in David M.Beaty 
(ed.) Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Comparative Perspective, (London: Martinus Nijhof Pub. 
1994), p.178. 
173  G.L.Wazir  “Right to Compensation under Public Law in India: A Basic Human Right and an 
International Commitment”, Legal News and Views, July 1997, p.15.  
174 CAD Vol.III, p.612.  
175   Art.12 as a Key to part III says that the Fundamental Rights will be enforceable against all the 
organs of the state. 
176   So far as legislature is concerned Art.13 (2) says that “the State shall not make any law which 
takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this 
clause shall to that extent of the contravention be void;  even in the absence of Art.13, Court has 
always the power to declare an enactment, to the extent it transgresses its limits invalid, see Gopalan 
v. State of Madras (1950) SCR 88, also State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga, AIR 1998  SC 1703. 
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 Inclusion of human rights recognised under the international instruments in the 
Constitution reflects India’s spirit to promote and guarantee human rights and 
fundamental freedoms without distinction. 
 For sometime now, the courts in India have started relating the fundamental 
rights in the constitution to the International Human Rights. For example, many a 
time while interpreting provisions of fundamental rights under the Constitution the 
Supreme Court has expressly referred to international instruments on Human 
Rights.179 In Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das, the Supreme Court has 
referred to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, when it observed: “the 
applicability of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and principles thereof 
may have to be read if need be, into the domestic jurisprudence”180. 
 The concept of fundamental rights thus represents a trend in the modern 
democratic thinking. The enforcement of human rights is a matter of major 
significance to modern constitutional jurisprudence.181  This, the courts have made 
through the public interests litigation cases.  
                                                                                                                                                       
177  Art.32 provides that a person who complains of violation of his fundamental rights may move the 
Supreme Court (high courts under Art.226) for the issue of appropriate direction, order or writs. 
178  Under Art.245 (1) - the opening words “subject to the provisions of this constitution”, ensure that 
the otherwise plenary powers of the legislature are subject to the limitations imposed by the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution.   
179   E.g., Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597; M.H. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra, 
AIR 1978  SC 1548; (1978) 3 SCC 544; Randhir Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 879; Madhu 
Kishwar v. State of Bihar; AIR 1996 SC 1864; (1996) 5 SCC 125; D.K.Basu v. State of West Bengal, 
AIR 1997 SC  610;  Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) AIR SCW 3043; (1997) 6 SCC 241; 
Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K.Chopra, AIR 1999  SC 6251; (1997) 1 SCC 759; 
Chairman Railway Baord v. Chandrima Das, AIR 2000 SC 988; (2000) 2 SCC 465 etc 
180  Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandriama Das, AIR  2000 SC 988 at 997. 
181  M.P.Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 5th ed., (New Delhi: Wadhwa and Company Nagpur,  2003), 
p.969. 
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 Initially, the attitude of judiciary in India towards the Directive Principles was 
not favourable and it had nullified many important legislations embodying socio-
economic reforms.182 With the passage of time, however, there has been a shift in the 
attitude of the judiciary towards socio-economic rights contained in the Part IV of the 
Constitution, as the court felt the need for change in its earlier outlook.183 
 Under the Indian Constitution Directive Principles of State Policy are jural 
postulates (achievable goals). Until recently the Directives were not considered 
seriously by the courts because of the strict legalistic positive approach adopted by 
them. The recent technological approach of the court provides the basis for the 
meaningful understanding of the human rights.184 The Supreme Court started seeing 
these directive principles as a basis for meaningful enforcement of fundamental rights 
and thus the scope of right to life and personal liberty under Art. 21, in particular, was 
widened. This trend is also seen in a number of public interests matters decide by the 
courts.   
2.9 Conclusion 
 Human rights, available to every person for the reason that he is a human 
being, compelled the concern of international law from World War-II onwards. 
However, these human rights, which go to make life with dignity possible found place 
in ancient civilisations, be it Babylonian or Vedic times. At the international there is 
                                                 
182  see State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, AIR 1951  SC 226. 
183  State of  Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh, AIR 1952, SC 252.    
184  Dr.D.S. Prakasa Rao, “Human Rights- Ideology And  Practice- Indian Perspective”, Journal of 
Indian Legal Thought, Vol.1, 2003, p.62  at p.68.  
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the U.N. Charter; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948; Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, 1966; Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 
amongst other instruments which compel the member nations to create an 
environment in municipal spheres wherein the human rights of the individuals can be 
meaningful. 
 In the modern form, human rights found expression in Magna Carta of 1215, 
American Constitution of 1787, French Declaration of Rights of Man of 1789 
followed by a host of other countries which have adopted a controlling constitution 
organising the liberty of the individual within the constitution. India could not deviate 
from this trend of providing for a constitutionally entrenched bill of human rights. 
Rightly, it guaranteed long list of these important human rights under Part-III of the 
Constitution titled “Fundamental Rights”.  
 Different theories have been evolved regarding nature of human rights. All 
these theories are in agreement about the inviolable and inalienable nature of them. 
These rights operate as limitations upon the authority in order to secure life with 
human dignity. Human rights being classified into three generations viz,: first 
generation, second generation and third generation, address different dimensions of 
human life and activity. 
 The thread of morality is interwoven in human rights, for different religions 
have evolved and nourished principles for protection of human rights. Diverse 
theoretical bases have been evolved to support human rights. Although each of these 
is subjected to criticism, each one is imbued with rationale which cannot be so easily 
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dismissed. In the present day scenario, theories based on natural rights, justice and 
dignity appear to be most acceptable. 
 In India, the ancient concern towards sanctity of human beings is echoed in the 
Constituent Assembly debates. The human rights are provided constitutional 
foundation. The preambular promise of securing justice, liberty and equality along 
with dignity to every individual elaborated in the parts relating to fundamental rights 
and directive principles of state policy make the commitment of the Constitution to 
human rights manifest. This commitment is further reinforced by the fact that India is 
a party to all major international human rights instruments and has enacted domestic 
laws for the realisation of human rights.  
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CHAPTER-III 
CONCEPT OF PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION 
 
Protection and promotion of the human rights of the people is an important 
task before the state. If the state fails in this task, by mis-performance or non-
performance, the question is how to make the people enjoy their basic human rights, 
perhaps, “public interest litigation” is a partial answer to this. It is pointed out that 
“with the active assistance of the social activists and public interest litigators, the 
judiciary in India is promoting innovative remedial attention for vindication of the 
governmental commitment to the welfare and relief of the oppressed and in protecting 
and promoting human rights of the people. 1  The concept and procedure of public 
interest litigation in India have been fashioned by the Supreme Court of India,2 
followed by the High Courts.  Public Interest Litigation in India has been initiated by 
some judges of the Supreme Court themselves.  Its ideology and content too are 
developed by them.3  It can be said that the concept of public interest litigation is 
“judge made and judge led”4 which has made law and justice more accessible to the 
                                                 
1 Dr. Jaswal Paramjeet S. and Jaswal Nishta, Human Rights and the Law, (New Delhi: A.P.H. 
Publishing Corporation, 1996), p.141. 
2 See. S.K. Agrawala,   Public Interest Litigation A Critique, (Bombay: N. M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd, 
1985), p.1. 
3 Ibid p.6. 
4 Dr. Jaswal Paramjeet S. and Jaswal Nishta, “Judicial Activism: The Genesis and Progress”, Ind. Bar 
Rev., Vol 28  2001, p.224. 
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generality of the people5 in India.  It is proving to be an effective instrument by 
rendering justice within the existing framework of Indian legal system.  
 The origin of public interest litigation lies in the liberalisation of locus standi 
by the Supreme Court.  Judiciary in India has made a strikingly innovative departure 
from the fetters of the orthodox Anglo-Saxon jurisdiction by promoting public interest 
litigation.6  It intends to bring justice within the reach of the poor masses, through 
public interest litigation, which is different from the traditional litigation which is 
essentially of an adversarial nature.  As M.P. Jain points out, the grievance in a public 
interest action, generally speaking, is about the content and conduct of governmental 
action in relation to the Constitutional or statutory rights of segments of society and in 
certain circumstances the conduct of governmental polices. 7 
 Public interest litigation is brought before the Court not for the purpose of 
enforcing the right of one individual against another, as happens in the case of 
ordinary litigation, but it is intended to promote and vindicate public interest which 
demands that violations of the Constitutional or legal rights of large number of people 
who are poor, ignorant and in a socially or economically disadvantaged position, 
should not so unnoticed and undressed.8 
                                                 
5 Dr. B.L. Wadehra,  Public Interest Litigation - A Handbook, (Delhi: Universal Law Publishing Co. 
Pvt. Ltd, 2003),  p. 53. 
6 V. K. Bansal, Right to life and Personal Liberty in India, (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 
1987),   pp. 220-221.  
7 M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 5th ed.(New Delhi: Wadhwa and Company, Nagpur, 2003),   
p. 1555. 
8 Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1473. 
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 The public interest litigation is “an act of judicial utilitarianism and 
welfarism”.9 Through it people even those who can not otherwise take resort to Court 
for protection of their interests and enforcement of their human rights or constitutional 
and legal rights are admitted by proxy into the Court. The grievance also, in many 
cases, is picked up from news paper reports. There is hardly any independent research 
or data collection by the petitioner himself to support his petition. The action is 
initiated by some social action groups or other spirited citizen including some young 
lawyers.10 Thus, the enforcement of human rights and other rights of individuals could 
be / is made easier and more effective through public interest litigations. It is 
necessary here to know what is public interest and what is public interest litigation 
and how it has developed. 
3.1  Meaning  
Public interest means - act beneficial to general public, or action taken for 
public purpose. A matter of public or general interest does not mean that which is 
interesting as gratifying curiosity or a love of information or amusement.11 
Public interest is also defined as: “something in which the public, the 
community at large, has some pecuniary interest by which their legal rights or 
liabilities are affected. It does not mean anything so narrow as mere curiosity or as the 
                                                 
9 M.C. Jain Kagzi, The Present Constitutional Issues and Views, (New Delhi: Metropolitan Book Co. 
Pvt. Ltd., 1987),  p.216. 
10 S.K. Agrawala supra n.2,  p.6.  
11 Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, Vol. VI, 4th ed quoted in AIR 1996 Cal 181, at p.196. 
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interests of the particular localities, which may be affected by the matter in 
question”.12 
Litigation is a legal action including all proceedings therein, initiated in a 
Court of law for the enforcement of a right or for a remedy. Therefore, lexically, 
public interest litigation means “a legal action initiated in a Court of law for the 
enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class of the 
community have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or 
liabilities are affected.13 Thus, ‘public interest litigation’ or ‘social action litigation14 
or pro bono public litigation’ is a litigation at the instance of public spirited citizen 
espousing the cause of others15. Justice Krishna Iyer calls it “a product of creative 
judicial engineering”.16 It is an institutional innovation of judiciary in India, whose 
origin lies in the endeavour to solve socio-economic problems of the masses and to 
make law and justice more accessible to all. 
3.2 Definition 
 Public interest litigation (or ‘social action’ or ‘class action’ litigation as it is 
variously called), means a litigation which serves public interest. It is a litigation 
                                                 
12 Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed. Quoted in ibid.  
13 P.M. Bakshi, Public Interest Litigation, (New Delhi: Ashoka Law House, 2000), p.1. 
14 Upendra Baxi gave the expression social action litigation, See “Taking Suffering Seriously: Social 
Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of India” in “Judges and the Judicial Power” (Bombay: N.M. 
Tripathi 1985),  p.290.  
15 V.N. Shukla, Constitution of India, 10th ed. by M. P. Jain, (Lucknow: Eastern Book Company, 
2001), p.289. 
16 Justice Krishna Iyer, Justice at Crossroads, p.105, cited in Dr.B.L. Wadehra, supra n.5, p.253.  
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which vindicates a right of a larger number of people, perhaps millions, or, redresses a 
wrong done to them.17 
 The Apex Court explained the public interest litigation as “an innovative 
strategy which has been evolved by the Supreme Court for the purpose of providing 
easy access to justice to the weaker section of Indian humanity and it is a powerful 
tool in the hands of public spirited individuals and social action groups for combating 
exploitation and injustice and securing for the under-privileged segments of society, 
their social and economic entitlement. It is a highly effective weapon in the armoury 
of the law for reaching social justice to the common man.18 It is for making basic 
human rights meaningful to the deprived and vulnerable sections of the community 
and to assure them social, economic and political justice.19 
 Supreme Court has defined public interest litigation as part of the process of 
participative justice and standing in civil litigation of that pattern must have liberal 
reception at the judicial door steps.20 It is “a litigation undertaken for the purpose of 
redressing public injury, enforcing public duty, protecting social, collective, diffused 
rights and interests of vindicating public interest”.21      
                                                 
17  Dr.B.L.Wadehra, supra n.5, p.21.  
18  State of  Himachal  Pradesh v. Parent of  a Student, Medical College, Simla and others, (1985) 3 
SCC 169.  
19  Ram Saran Ayotan  Parasi v. Union of India, 1988 (4) JT 557; AIR 1989 SC 356.  
20 Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344 at 355; P.V.Kapoor v. 
Union of India, 1992  2 Cr.L.J. 128, at 134 (Del).  
21  S.P.Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC (149); (1981) (supp) SCC 87. 
 84
The Supreme Court exhaustively defined public interest litigation as a 
litigation “where a legal wrong or a legal injury is caused to a person or to a 
determinate class of persons by reason of violation of any Constitutional or legal right 
or any burden is imposed in contravention of any Constitutional or legal provision or 
without authority of law or any such legal wrong or legal injury or illegal burden is 
threatened and such person or determinate class of persons is by reason of poverty, 
helplessness or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position, unable 
to approach the Court for relief, any member of the public can maintain an application 
for an appropriate direction, order or writ in the High Court under Article 226 and in 
the case of breach  of any fundamental right of such person or determinate class of 
persons, in the Supreme Court under  Article 32 seeking judicial redress for the legal 
wrong or injury caused to such person or determinate class of persons.22 In Peoples 
Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India,23 the Court called it a strategic arm of 
legal aid movement and which is intended to bring justice within the reach of poor 
masses, who constitute the low visibility area of humanity. It further observed that 
“public interest litigation is essentially a cooperative and collaborative effort on the 
part of the petitioner, the state or public authority and the Court to secure observance 
of the Constitutional or legal rights, benefits and privileges, conferred upon the 
vulnerable sections of the community and to make social justice reach them”.24       
                                                 
22   AIR 1982 SC149 para 17. 
23  (1982) 2 SCC 235.    
24  Ibid. 
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In a public interest litigation, unlike traditional dispute-resolution mechanism 
there is no determination or adjudication of individual rights, while in ordinary 
conventional adjudications the party structure is bipolar and the controversy pertains 
to the determination of the legal consequences of past events. In a public interest 
action the proceedings cut across and transcend these traditional forms and 
inhibitions. The compulsion for the judicial innovation of the technique of a public 
interest action is the constitutional promise of a social and economic transformation to 
usher in an egalitarian social order and a welfare state. Effective solutions to the 
problems peculiar to this transformation are not available in the traditional judicial 
system. The proceedings in a public interest litigation are, therefore, intended to 
vindicate and effectuate the public interest by prevention of violation of the rights, 
constitutional or statutory of sizeable segments of the society, which owing to 
poverty, ignorance, social and economic disadvantages can not themselves assert and 
quite often not even aware of those rights. The technique of public interest litigation 
serves to provide an effective remedy to enforce these group rights and interests.25 
Public interest litigation as developed in recent years marked a significant 
deviation from the traditional and normal judicial proceedings. But for this 
development may be, the guarantees of fundamental rights and the assurances 
                                                 
25  Sheela Barase v. Union of India, in Supreme Court on Public Interest Litigation – Cases and 
Materials, Vol.II, (New Delhi: LIPs Publications), p.122.  
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embodied in Directive Principles would not have been meaningful or effective to the 
large majority of illiterate and indigent citizens under the adversarial proceedings.26           
3.3 Origin and Development 
 The rudiment of public interest litigation can be traced to Roman Law under 
which it was open to any person to bring what was called an actio popularis in respect 
of public delict or to sue for a prohibitory or restitutory interdict for the protection of 
res sacrae and res publicae.27 The actio popularis may be the ancestor of our public 
interest litigation.28 
 
3.3.1 Public Interest Litigation in United States of America 
 United States can be called the originator of the modern concept of public 
interest litigation. In the U.S. this branch of law is subsumed under the term “public 
interest law”.29  It is an effort to provide legal representation to groups and interests 
that have been unrepresented or underrepresented in the legal process. These include 
poor and the disadvantaged and also those who can not afford lawyers to represent 
them and thus lacked access to Courts, or other legal forum. 
 The Counsel for Public Interest Law set up by the Ford Foundation in USA 
defined the “public interest litigation” in its report of Public Interest Law, USA, 1976 
as follows: “Public Interest Law” is the name that has recently been given to efforts to 
                                                 
26 Justice, Shivraj Patil, Common Man and the Constitution of India, AIR 2005  Jour 1, at p.8. 
27 de Smith, S.A., Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1973) p.363, cited in K. Surendra 
Mohan, “Public interest Litigation and locus stnadi”, 1984, C.U.L.R., Vol.8, p.523. 
28  K.Surendra Mohan , supra n.27.  
29  Dr.B.L.Wadehra, supra n.5, p.37.  
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provide legal representation to previously unrepresented groups and interests. Such 
efforts have been undertaken in the recognition that ordinary market place for legal 
services fails to provide such services to significant segments of the population and to 
significant interests. Such groups and interests include the proper environmentalists, 
consumers, racial and ethnic minorities and others”.30 
 Public interests law emerged in America as a response to the problems of 
policy formulation, lacunae in the law and legal system. Starting with the nascent 
attempts of some lawyers who acted as protagonists of the Civil Rights, Civil 
Liberties and Legal Aid Movements, public interest law has moved into some new 
areas today.31 The PIL represents for America a distinctive phase of socio legal 
development for which there is no counterpart in India… The issue within the sway of 
PIL in the United States concerned not so much state repression or governmental 
lawlessness but rather civil participation in governmental decision making”.32 
 The use of the term public interest litigation to cover the efforts to provide 
legal representation goes back no further than mid 1960’s,33 though the various 
                                                 
30 Quoted in Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2004 SC 280, at 284; B. Singh v. 
Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 1927. 
31 Mamta Rao, Public Interest Litigation, (Lucknow: Eastern Book Company,  2002), p.V.  
32 Upendra Baxi, “Taking Suffering Seriously; Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of 
India”, in Jugga Kapoor (ed) Supreme Court on Public Interest Litigation, Vol I, (New Delhi:  LIPS 
Publication Pvt Ltd), pp. A 91-92. 
33 See, Heineman, Book Review, “In Pursuit of the Public Interest”, 84, Yale Law Journal 182, (1974) 
cited in Dr. S.K. Agrawala, Public Interest Litigation,  supra n.2,  p.3. 
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movements and programmes that contributed to the shaping of underlying ideology of 
public interest law reach back to 1876 when the first legal aid office was established.34 
 In USA the administrative agencies were considered to represent the public 
interest. The agency proceedings were to be the forum for vindicating public interest. 
Litigation in public interest began acquiring popularity in the US in the early sixties.35 
Since 1960’s in response to changed social, economic and political environment the 
American Supreme Court gradually began to liberalise strict procedural rules in 
appropriate cases.36   The issues within the sway of public interest litigation in the 
United States concerned not so much state repression or Government lawlessness but 
rather civil participation in Governmental decision making.37    The public interest law 
emerged as a means to vindicate the rights of minorities and weaker sections in 
society like women, children, the physically and /or mentally handicapped, the poor, 
the consumer public, environmentalists etc.  Thus when existing system failed to 
protect their interest because of problems of access to Court, public interest lawyers 
found this way out.  
 
 
                                                 
34  Supra n.2,  p.5. 
35  K. Surendra Mohan, supra n. 27,  p.524. 
36  Eg. Gideon v. Wainuwright 372 US 335 (1962); Flast v. Cohen 392 US 83 (1968); Association of 
Processing Service Organisation v. Camp. 397 US 150 (1970); Office Communications of the United 
Church of Christ v. F.C.C 123 US App. D. C. 328; Sierra Club v. Morton 405 US 727 (1972) for 
details see Dr. B.L. Wadehra,  supra n.5, p.39. 
37 Upendra Baxi, supra n. 14, p. 290.  
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3.3.2 Public Interest Litigation in United Kingdom 
 In England, there was, from the very early days, the device of relator action.  
The foundation of this principle is the interest of the Crown as parents patriae in 
upholding the law for the benefit of the general public.  The crown is interested in 
seeing that public bodies discharge their functions properly and that they do not abuse 
or misuse their powers.  This device imposes a measure of control over situations 
where, otherwise, members of the public might bring uncoordinated actions, resulting 
in confusion.  Basically, this is a regulated form of actio popularis.38  Relator action 
was a device for vindicating public interest.  The Attorney-General used to represent 
public interest.  He could lend his name to a private action and convert it into an 
action in public interest.  
 As regards availability of writ remedies, the traditional rule was that a person 
who invoked the jurisdiction of the Court could be heard only if he had suffered a 
‘legal injury’ as a consequence of the violation of his ‘legal right’.  It was not enough 
that the entire public had suffered an injury and the person complaining was one of 
them. 39 This was because England followed the strict rule of locus standi under the 
Anglo Saxon jurisprudence.  However, Lord Denning departed from this strict rule in 
R v. Thomas Magistrate’s Court, Ex parte Greenbaum.40  Again R.v. Paddington 
                                                 
38 K. Surendra Mohan,  supra n.27. 
39 Dr. B. L.Wadehra, supra n.5, p. 43; the classical case on the strict rule of locus standi is exparte 
Sidebotham, (1880) 14 Ch. D. 458. 
40 (1957) 5 LGR 129 cited in ibid, p. 44. 
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Valuation Officer, Ex parte Peachey Property Corporation Ltd, 41 a rate payer alleged 
that the property valuation list of the whole area had not been properly prepared.  
Lord Denning accorded him locus standi and held; “The Court would not listen to, of 
course, to a mere busybody, who was interfering in things which did not concern him.  
But it will listen to anyone whose interests are affected by what has been done…. So 
here it will listen to any rate payer who complains that the list is invalid”.42  
 A series of cases,43 since then, were brought to the Court by Mr. Reymond 
Blackburn, a public spirited person, to whom Lord Denning accorded locus standi and 
through these and other similar cases, the concept of public interest litigation 
developed substantially in United Kingdom. Under the new Rules of Courts of 1978, 
Order 53 now lays down one simple test of locus standi that the applicant must have a 
sufficient interest in the matter of which the application is made.  What is sufficient 
interest will be decided having regard to all the circumstances of the case.  Only a 
busybody is excluded.  
3.3.3 Public Interest Litigation in India 
 Public interest litigation appeared in the Indian judicial scene in mid seventies, 
when the rigid concept of standing proved to be an obstacle in achieving the great 
ideals of socio-economic justice.  To disarm the strong and to arm the weak was 
                                                 
41 (1966) I Q B 380 (400); this was later approved by the House of Lords in Arsenal Football Club v. 
Ende (1977) 2 W L R 974 supra n.5, p. 44. 
42 Quoted in supra  n.5,  p.44.  
43 R. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, ex parte Blackburn (1968) 2 QB 118; Blackburn v. 
Attorney General (1971) IWLR 1037; R v. Police Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn (1973) 2 QB 
241; R. v. GLC, ex parte Blackburn, (1976) 1 WLR 550.   
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essential to change the social order.  The judiciary under such circumstances had to 
innovate new methods and device new strategies for providing access to justice to a 
section of society which was deprived and vulnerable.  This way it could be an 
instrument of distributive justice. 44 
 During the period of emergency, India witnessed utter suppression of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.  This situation gave impetus to the emergence of 
intensified human rights movement.  Prominent activists, public spirited persons, 
activist lawyers and journalists started espousing the cause of aggrieved persons or 
group of persons, affected in their rights by the government or bureaucracy.  These 
people stated approaching the Courts, seeking redress to the aggrieved.  The judges of 
the Court slowly began to respond to the demands of these activists and the result 
was, what was sometimes described as, the birth of judicial populism. 45 Until then the 
higher judiciary was an “arena of legal quibbling for men with long purses”.46  Now, 
the Courts have recognised that the role of law required to be played for the poor and 
ignorant who constitute a large bulk of humanity in this country and the Court must 
uphold the basic human rights of weaker sections of the society.47  The transition from 
a traditional captive agency with a slow social visibility into a liberated agency with a 
high socio-political visibility was a remarkable development in the career of the 
                                                 
44 Mamta Rao, supra n. 31.  
45 Upendra Baxi, supra n.32, p. A-94. 
46 Keshvanandas Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 at 947; P.N. Bhawati, Judicial 
Activism and Public Interest Litigation, (Dharwad : Jagrat Bharat, 1985),  p. 10  
47 Veena Sethi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 339; 1983 Cr. L. J. 675. 
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Indian appellate judiciary. 48 People now know that the Court has Constitutional 
power of intervention, which can be invoked to ameliorate the miseries arising from 
repression, governmental lawlessness and administrative deviances.49  
 The origin of public interest litigation lies in the liberalisation of locus standi 
by the Supreme Court. 50 The rationale underlying the standing rule continues to serve 
as far as private actions are concerned.  In a private action, two opposing parties are 
locked in a confrontational situation which pertains to the determination of the legal 
consequences of past events.  In contrast, public law litigation is resonative of policy 
overtones because it is concerned with conflict resolution (of different interest groups) 
rather than dispute resolution.  It has evolved in response to new challenges posed by 
an expanded role of Courts, new demands on judicial responsibility, the rise and 
growth of various systems of judicial review and the emphasis on access to justice. 
All these factors have caused the evolution of a broad rule of standing which allows 
any member of the public acting bonafide and having sufficient interest, in instituting 
an action for redressal of public wrong or public injury.  51 
 Unlike this, locus standi, means the legal capacity to invoke the jurisdiction of 
the Court.  If the petitioner has no locus standi he cannot be heard in a Court of law.52  
                                                 
48 Upendra Baxi, supra n.32, p. A-91. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Dr. B.L. Wadehra, supra n.5, p.10. 
51A.K. Ganguly, “In Public Interest: A Review of PIL, in Supreme Court” in Jugga Kapoor (ed) 
Supreme Court on Public Interest Litigation,(New Delhi : LIPs Publications Pvt Ltd.), p. A-10.   
52  Chaman Lal Sahu v. Giani Zail Singh, AIR 1984 SC 309. 
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The traditional view in regard to locus standi in writ jurisdiction has been that, only 
such person has locus standi who – 
i) has suffered a legal injury by reason of violation of his legal right or 
legally protected interest; or  
ii) is likely to suffer a legal injury by reason of violation of his legal right 
or legally protected  interest.  
 Standing or locus standi is the right of a person to sue or to seek relief in a 
Court of law, as distinguished form a substantive right or interest possessed by him 
and which is alleged to be infringed or endangered by a state action.  It is this factor 
that gives the litigant the personal qualification to challenge an illegal administrative 
or legislative act.  Two principles have been held to underlie the concept of locus 
standi;53 that the litigant himself must have a grievance and no one can bring to Court 
a purely academic dispute.  
 Thus before a person acquired locus standi, he had to have a personal or 
individual right which was violated or threatened to be violated.54  He should have 
been a “person aggrieved” in the sense that he had suffered or was likely to suffer 
some prejudice, pecuniary or otherwise.55   This traditional concept of locus stnadi is 
liberalised by the Court in pubic interest litigation in favour of persons other than the 
“persons aggrieved”.  For public interest litigation to exist, someone else should be 
                                                 
53   V.S.Deshpande, “the Standing and Justiciability” 13 J.I.L.I. 1971, 153 at 158 
54  Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962  SC 1044..  
55 Adi Ferozshah Gandhi v. H. M. Sheervai, AIR 1971 SC 385.  
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able to approach the Courts on behalf of others who cannot come to the Court and that 
person cannot be a “person aggrieved” in the traditional sense.  
 In the landmark cases of S.P. Gupta v. Union of India,56 Peoples Union for 
Democratic Rights v. Union of India,57 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v.  Union of India,58 
Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration,59 and D.S.Nakara v. Union of India,60 etc the 
Supreme Court evolved a new rule viz., any member of the public, acting bonafide 
and having sufficient interest can maintain an action for redressal of public wrong or 
public injury. However, it would have to be decided from case to case as to whether 
the person approaching the Court for relief has ‘sufficient interest’ and has not acted 
with malafide or political motives.61  Such member of the public approaching the 
Court should not be a mere busybody or a meddlesome interloper but one who has 
sufficient interest in the proceeding.  
 The process of liberal expansion of the rule of locus standi started in 1975 in 
Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dhabolkar,62 in which Krishna Iyer J., had 
professed that “in the years ahead legal aid to the poor and the weak, public interest 
litigation and other rule of law responsibilities will demand a whole new range of 
                                                 
56 AIR 1982 SC 149. 
57 AIR 1982 SC 1473. 
58 AIR 1984 SC 802. 
59 AIR 1980 SC 1759.  
60  (1983) 1 SCC 304. 
61 Dr. J. N. Pandey, ‘Constitutional Law of India’ 37th ed. (Allahabad: Central Law Agency,  2001),  
p. 321. 
62 AIR 1975 SC 2092; (1976) 2 SCC 291. 
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responses from the Bar or organised social groups with lawyer members.63  Court in 
this case had held that the State Bar Council is a “person aggrieved” to maintain 
appeal.  
 The concept of public interest litigation-without giving it a nomenclature was 
initiated in India by Krishna Iyer J. in 1976 in Mumbai Kamgar Union v. Abdul 
bhai,64 wherein the learned justice observed: “Test litigations, representative actions, 
pro bono publico and like broadened forms of legal proceedings are in keeping with 
the current accent of justice to the common man a necessary disincentive to those who 
wish to bypass the real issues on the merits by suspect reliance on peripheral, 
procedural short comings… Public interest is promoted by spacious construction of 
“Locus standi” in our socio-economic circumstances and conceptional latitudinalism 
permit taking liberties with individualisation of the right to invoke the higher courts 
where the remedy is shared by a considerable number, particularly when they are 
weaker. Less litigation consistent with fair process is the aim of adjective law….” In 
majority of cases, the strict principle that ‘only that person whose fundamental right is 
infringed can move the Court’ holds good. But there are certain laws that affect the 
public in general and persons directly affected may not assert their rights…. Hence, 
the Courts, deviating from strict application of rule of locus standi have been allowing 
any member of public having sufficient interest for enforcement of fundamental rights 
                                                 
63  Ibid  para. 24.   
64  AIR 1976 SC 1465.  
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of others.65 This was what Krishna Iyer J., had foreseen in 1975-76. He further 
observed in Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karmachari Sangh (Rly) v. Union of India,66 that: 
“We have no hesitation in holding that the narrow concept of ‘cause of action’ and 
‘person aggrieved’ and individual litigation is becoming obsolescent in some 
jurisdiction”. 
 Restrictive rules of locus standi are in general inimical to a healthy system of 
administrative law. If a plaintiff with a good case is turned away, merely because he is 
not sufficiently affected, that means that some governmental agency is left free to 
violate the law, and that is contrary to public interest. It is absolutely essential that the 
rule of law must keep the people away from lawless streets and win them for the 
Court of law.67 Through liberalisation of locus standi, through the device of public 
interest litigation access to justice could be provided to people who were denied of 
their basic human rights, their freedom and liberty. This was recognised by the 
Supreme Court in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India,68 when it 
held “locus standi must be liberalized to meet the challenges of the times… So as to 
promote justice in its true facets”. 
                                                 
65 L.D. Naikar, The Law Relating to Human Rights, (Bangalore: Puliani and Puliani, 2004),                
p. 368.  
66 AIR 1981 SC 298. 
67  B. Schwartz and H. W. R. Wade, “Legal Control of Government”, 291 (1972), cited in supra n.4, 
p. 225. 
68 AIR 1981 SC 344.   
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 The expression “public interest litigation” was for the first time used by the 
Indian judiciary in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India,  Krishna 
Iyer, J., speaking for himself and P.N. Bhagwati J., (as he then was) pointed out: 
 “Public interest litigation is part of the process of participate justice and 
“standing” in civil litigation of that pattern must have liberal reception at the judicial 
door steps”.69  
 However, the principle took its root and present shape in S .P. Gupta v. Union 
of India.70  In this case Bhagwati, J., observed:71 
 “Today a vast revolution is taking place in the judicial process; the theatre of 
the law is fast changing and the problems of the poor are coming to the forefront. The 
Court has to innovate new methods and devise new strategies for the purpose of 
providing access to justice to large masses of people who are denied their basic 
human rights and to whom freedom and liberty have no meaning. The only way in 
which this can be done is by entertaining writ petitions and even letters from public 
spirited individuals seeking judicial redress for the benefit of persons who have 
suffered a legal wrong or a legal injury or whose Constitutional or legal rights have 
been violated but who by reason of their poverty or socially or economically 
disadvantaged position are unable to approach the Court for relief”.   
 He further expressed his view in the following words: 
                                                 
69 Ibid., p.355. 
70 AIR 1982 SC 149 also known as Judges Transfer Case: (1981) (Supp) SCC 87.  
71 Ibid at 189; at 210.   
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 “It may therefore now be taken as well established that where a legal 
wrong or a legal injury is caused, to a person or to a determinate class of 
persons by reason of violation of any Constitutional or legal right or any 
burden is imposed in contravention of any Constitutional or legal 
provision or without authority of law or any such legal wrong or legal 
injury or illegal burden is threatened and such person or determinate 
class of persons is by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or 
socially or economically disadvantaged position, unable to approach the 
Court for relief, any member of the public can maintain an application 
for an appropriate direction, order or writ in the High Court under 
Article 226 and in the case of breach of any fundamental right of such 
person or determinate class of persons, in this Court under Article 32 
seeking judicial redress for the legal wrong or injury caused to such 
person or determinate class of persons…. This Court will readily 
respond even to a letter addressed by such individual acting pro bono 
publico.  It is true that there are rules made by this Court prescribing the 
procedure for moving Supreme Court for relief under Article 32 and 
they require various formalities to be gone through by a person seeking 
to approach this Court.  But it must not be forgotten that the procedure 
is a handmaiden of justice and the cause of justice can never be allowed 
to be thwarted by any procedural technicalities.  The Court would 
therefore unhesitatingly and without the slightest qualms of conscience 
cast aside the technical rules of procedure in the exercise of its 
dispensing power and treat the letter of public minded individuals as a 
writ petition and act upon it…”72 
 
 “…… any member of the public having sufficient interest can maintain 
an action for judicial redress for public duty or for violation of some 
                                                 
72 Ibid , para 17. 
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provision of the Constitution or the law and seek enforcement of such 
public duty and observance of such Constitutional or legal provision.  
This is absolutely essential for maintaining the rule of law, furthering 
the cause of justice and accelerating the pace of realisation of the 
Constitutional objectives”. 73 
 
 It has been stated that where foul play is absent and fairness is not faulted, 
latitude is a grace of procedural justice.  Test litigations, representative actions, pro 
bono publico and like broadened forms of legal proceedings are in keeping with the 
current accent of justice to the common man.74 
   This development of the concept of PIL has been much lauded achievement 
of the Indian judiciary.75  The Indian judiciary more so the Supreme Court has done 
yeoman service in the field of giving relief to the helpless masses of India.  Thus, it is 
the gross violation of basic human rights which compelled the judiciary to discard its 
conservative cloak and come to the rescue of suffering masses.76  The Court has of 
late adopted an activist stance and has boldly come out of the appalling inhibitions of 
the old legal order as to access to justice.  The public interest litigation movement is 
the manifestation of discomfort of the social activists over the gap between promise 
and performance and a correct reaction from the court in the shape of judicial effort to 
                                                 
73 Ibid. The other Judges on the Bench Gupta, Tuljapurkar, Fazal Ali Desai and Pathak J.J., have all 
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74 Per Sameresh Banarjee J.,  in Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary, AIR 1993 SC 892 at 907.   
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solve the much agitated problem of access to justice.77 And also in an attempt to 
transform the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution of India into a living 
reality for the masses, the Supreme Court of India adopted a pro-active stance and 
relaxed the rules of standing for petitioners.78  In India, freedom suffers from atrophy 
and activism is essential for participative justice.   Therefore public minded citizens 
must be given opportunities to rely on legal process……, when a person wishes to sue 
merely out of public spirit, he should not be discouraged.79  The Courts enjoy a lot of 
freedom to evolve their own rules of standing for Art.32 and Art.226 and the rules are 
so framed as to confer a good deal of discretion on them in this matter. (All) this has 
come about by a simple assertion by the Supreme Court that it will entertain litigation 
initiated in the public interest to command the state to obey the law or forbear from 
disobeying the law.80 In its quest for justice new approach is adopted by the court for 
the enforcement of basic rights which require positive action on the part of the State 
and its authorities.  Through this approach of the judiciary and the judges the pledges 
made to people will come true.  It is in this spirit that courts have been entertaining 
public interest litigations.  
 
                                                 
77  See, Vinod K. Razdan, “Access to the Courts: Expanding Horizons of the Processual Justice”, 
(1989) C.I.L.Q., (Part 1) at. 76.  
78 Supra  n.75. 
79  K. Shrinivasa Rao, “locus standi and Public Interest Litigation”, Academy Law Review, Vol. 7, 
1983 p. 237. 
80 Ibid., pp. 234-5.  
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3.4 Expansion of the Concept of Public Interest Litigation Following 
Liberalisation of Locus Standi 
 
  As far as the concept of public interest litigation in Indian legal system is 
concerned, there is a tremendous development and dynamic progress in the area of 
public interest litigation in spite of multitude of criticism levelled against the various 
aspects of public interest litigation.  To achieve the Constitutional goals of social 
justice the Supreme Court has over the years-specifically after the emergency-
expanded the concept to multifarious areas, which need to be noted.  
3.4.1 Treating Letters as Writ Petitions 
 In the early stages of liberalisation of locus standi the Court often has said that 
the procedure being a handmaiden of justice cannot stand in the way of access to 
justice to the weaker sections of the society, and Court would not insist on a regular 
writ petition.81  In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India,82 a letter addressed by a public 
spirited person or social action group acting pro bono publico was found sufficient to 
ignite the jurisdiction of the Court. Court has been treating letters addressed to it as 
writ petitions and granting relief in appropriate cases.  
 The letters have been converted into writ petitions on the logic that Art.32 (1) 
of the Constitution does not say as to “who” shall have the right to move the Supreme 
Court nor does it say by “what” proceedings.   The word “appropriate proceedings” is 
too wide and so moving the Court through a letter can be appropriate proceeding 
                                                 
81  Eg. In S.P. Gupta v. Union of India,  AIR 1982 SC 149; Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. 
Union of India,  AIR 1982 SC 1473; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 802 
etc.  
82  (1987) ISCC 395 at 406.  
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because it would not be right to expect a person acting pro bono publico to incur 
expenses for having a regular writ petition prepared by a lawyer.  It has to be 
appropriate not in terms of any particular form, but appropriate with reference to the 
purpose of the proceeding. 83 
 In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration,84 the Court accepted a letter written to 
the Court by Sunil Batra, a prisoner from Tihar Jail, Delhi complaining of inhuman 
treatment meted out to a fellow prisoner.  Court treated the letter as a writ petition, 
allowed the petition and issued directions to the concerned authorities.  Dr. Upendra 
Baxi v. State of U.P.,85 Veen Sethi, v. State of Bihar,86 Peoples Union for Democratic 
Rights v. Union of India,87 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India,88 etc are 
examples of exercise of such epistolary jurisdiction by the Court.  
 In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India,89  Pathak, J., expressed his view 
that, ‘he considers the requirement of verification of the petition or other 
communication at the earliest stage and before issuing notice to the respondent, to be 
necessary.  It is all the more (so) where petitions are received by the Court through the 
post.  He does, however, recognise the existence of special circumstances which may 
justify the waiver of the rule.  E.g. when habeas corpus jurisdiction is invoked or 
                                                 
83  S.K Aggrawala, supra n. 2, p.19.  
84  AIR 1980 SC 1579; (1980) 3SCC 488.  
85  (1983) 2 SCC 308.  
86  AIR 1983 SC 339; (1982) 2 SCC 583.  
87  AIR 1982 SC 1473.  
88  AIR 1984 SC 802: (1984) 2 SCR 67.  
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when the authorship of the communication is so impeccable and unquestionable that 
the authority of its contents may reasonably be accepted prima facie until rebutted. 90 
The Court, often, has been treating letters addressed to it as writ petitions and granting 
relief in appropriate cases.91  
 This trend of the Court has also extended to take cognizance of letters written 
not only to it but also to newspaper editors, published in the newspapers.  The Court 
has taken suo moto notice of such matters and treated it as writ petition Justice 
M.P.Thakkar, Judge of the Gujarat High Court went to the extent of taking suo moto 
cognizance of a letter to editor of a newspaper.92  He converted it and treated it as a 
writ petition.  The letter to the editor conveyed the plight of a hapless widow because 
of the non-payment of the provident fund, family pension after her husband’s death.  
The arrears were paid just after the first hearing.  In Ram Pyari v. Union of India,93 a 
news item carried in a Rajasthan daily depicting the miseries of a soldier’s widow in 
her struggle to get pension was treated by a High Court Judge as a writ petition. 
 
 
                                                 
90 A. N. Sen. J., endorses the view of Pathak J., but is less specific than Pathak J., in identifying the 
special circumstances or exceptional cases. He takes it to be a matter of discretion of the Court 
depending upon facts and circumstances of each case.  
91 Eg. Neerja Chaudhari v. State of am.p. (1984) 2SCC 243; Mukesh Advani v. State of M.P. AIR 
1985 SC 1363; Veena Sethi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 934; Sheela Barase v. State of 
Maharashtra, AIR 1983 SC378; Upendra Baxi v. State of U.P., AIR 1983 Sc 308; Aman HIngorani v. 
Union of India, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 601; D.K.Basu v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1997 SC 610 etc. 
92  Mrs. M.P. Mantiyam v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Ahmedabad, (1983) Gujarat Law 
Report. 
93 AIR 1988 Raj 124. 
 104
3.4.2  Enforcing Public Duties 
 It is not only because of conventional form of procedure that people fail to get 
easy access to Court and then to justice.  Often, the people feel frustrated because 
governmental decisions and their execution fall short of constitutional requirements.  
Inaction or mal-actions on part of the public authorities may also result in violation of 
peoples basic human rights.  Then, the Court steps in and vindicates public interest, 
their rights by compelling the authorities to act and act properly.  The Supreme Court 
also has observed that to enforce the public duties, public minded persons and 
organisations are to be allowed to move the Court, so that Court can enforce the 
public duties.  The Court held, “it is for this reason that in public interest litigation 
undertaken for the purpose of “enforcing pubic duty protecting social, collective, 
“diffused” rights and interests vindicating public interest and citizen who is acting 
bonafide has to accord standing”.94  An action for judicial remedy could be enforced 
by Court for redressing public injury arising from breach of public duty or from 
violation of some provision of the Constitution or the law and seeking enforcement of 
such public duty and observance of such Constitutional or legal provision.  This is 
absolutely essential for maintaining the rule of law, furthering the cause of justice and 
accelerating the pace of realisation of the Constitutional objectives.95  
It is after all the mandatory constitutional function of the Courts to keep the 
other organs within their constitutional bounds and to direct them to perform their 
                                                 
94  AIR 1982 SC 149 at 194.  
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affirmative Constitutional obligations. 96  The Court has done this by issuing 
directions and orders to the executive authorities especially in matters of 
environmental pollution, violation of labour laws, violations or denial of basic human 
rights, inhuman treatment of prisoners, corruption etc.97  In Indian Council for 
Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India,98 the Supreme Court observed99:  
“The primary effort of the Court… is to see that the enforcement 
agencies, whether it be the State or any other authority, take effective 
steps for the enforcement of the law.  Even though it is not the function 
of the Court to see the day-to-day enforcement of the law, that being the 
function of the Executive, but because of the non-functioning of the 
enforcement agencies, the Courts as of necessity have had to pass orders 
directing the enforcement agencies to implement the law”. 
 
3.4.3  Appointment of Commissions of Inquiry 
Usually the Supreme Court or the High Courts do not take up the issues 
relating to disputed facts in writ proceedings.  They consider only the question of law. 
When a matter with disputed fact is placed before the Court for consideration the 
Court refuses to take up such issue and directs the petitioners to approach a civil court 
                                                 
96 D. K. Bhatt, “Judicial Activism Through Public Interest Litigation: Trends And Prospects” Ind. Bar 
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99  Ibid at 301. 
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for resolving the disputed question of fact. 100  But in cases of claiming remedy 
through public law under Art.32 the Supreme Court instead of this, invented the 
process of fact finding commissions to enquire and report to it about the correct facts, 
regarding infringement of right guaranteed by the Constitution.  
Although in a number of public interest litigations the litigators approach the 
Court with sufficient evidences and valuable data to substantiate their cases, many a 
time, still, further inquiry and investigation is required.  In such circumstances the 
Courts have departed from the adversarial system of pronouncing judgment on the 
given facts and appointed fact finding commissions to collect facts and data, relating 
to the matter before the Court.   
The shift from the earlier procedure is because, adversarial procedure 
“sometimes leads to injustice, where the parties are not evenly balanced in social and 
economic strength”,101 it would result is one of the party’s inability to produce 
relevant evidence before the Court.  Thus in public interest litigations the Court 
becomes “more assertive and it assumes a more positive attitude in determining the 
facts”.102  The Court appoints commissions to collect facts, data and evidence on its 
own.  The Court has, thus, sometimes appointed any responsible person as a 
commissioner, for the purpose of carrying out an inquiry or investigation and making 
a report to the Court.  
                                                 
100  Dr. G. Yethirajulu, “Art 32 And the Remedy of Compensation” AIR 2004 Jour 320. 
101  Per Bhagwati. J. in  supra n. 8, para 13.  
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 These commissions are appointed on the rationale that the petitioners in PIL 
cases are not able to produce enough evidence in support of their case; the PIL 
litigator cannot be expected to spend money from his own pocket to collect that 
evidence; impartial assessment of facts is needed swiftly; official machinery is 
unreliable, inefficient and probably biased, and the reporting in most cases has to be 
done against the state  machinery; the Court has no investigative machinery of its 
own, so the Court must do something about it lest the disadvantaged sections of the 
community have their petitions rejected and fundamental rights continued to be 
violated.103  In Khatri v. State of Bihar, Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra, Bandua 
Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, etc the Court appointed commissions to inquire and 
report to it. 
This deviation from adversarial to inquisitorial method finds authority in the 
power of the Courts under Art. 32 and 226 for enforcement of fundamental rights and 
other rights.   The power to appoint a commission or an investigating body for 
conducting inquiries is incidental or ancillary to power which the Court is called upon 
to exercise in proceedings under Art. 32. This is equally applicable to exercise of 
jurisdiction by High Court under Art. 226.104 
3.4.4 Monitoring Execution of Orders and Directions 
Keeping in view of the rampant bureaucratic inertia and indifference in 
executing directions and orders, even of the higher courts, the courts have evolved a 
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new device in monitoring the execution of court orders and directions issued to the 
executive authorities.  In observance of the constitutional obligation of protecting the 
rights of the people, the courts have taken upon themselves even the task of effective 
control and monitoring of law in select cases of non-functioning of the enforcement 
agencies.  State of Bihar v. Ranchi Zila Samta Party105 is an example of the court’s 
new strategy.   
 Judicial activism has in recent years led some judges to issue directions to the 
government not merely with regard to administration of jails but also with regard to 
functioning of local bodies and even other agencies of the state.  More importantly the 
courts have shown willingness to experiment with remedial strategies that require 
continuous supervision and that appear significantly to shift the line between 
adjudication and administration. 106  In the area of environment litigation the Supreme 
Court has shown willingness to assume wide powers that might otherwise be left to 
other rule making authorities or regulatory agencies,107 e.g. M.C. Mehta v. Union of 
India;108 M.C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu,109 and Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan.110  
The credibility of the higher courts depends not only upon giving relief but also upon 
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the fact that the relief granted by the court is actually made available. What happens if 
the direction of the court is not implemented?  The ultimate sanction of the non-
enforcement of the court directions lies, of course, in instituting proceedings for the 
contempt of court.111   The question also arises if the court can punish for contempt a 
person or body not party to the case. 112   
In a number of other cases, the directions issued by the apex court are of such 
nature normally in realm of political administration, but considered necessary to 
orient the governmental agencies to their duties under the Constitution. For instance, 
it has issued directions for protection of national monuments, and required authorities 
to take safety precautions when the Army conducts test firing in an area, has shown 
anxiety about jeopardising of interest of small depositors by big companies, has 
issued the directions in respect of rehabilitation of Chakma refugees and in several 
cases with regard to pollution, directed to take measures for protecting environment. It 
has propounded public trust doctrine which requires the Government to conserve and 
optimally use natural resources available in the country. The Supreme Court has dealt 
with most assertive posture the cases of misuse of and corruption among high ranking 
politicians.113  
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In the contemporary times the Court has issued directions even over-looking 
the lesson from Patric Devlin that enthusiasm is not and cannot be a judicial trait.114 
The court realized that it should act on matters of public concern and individual’s 
rights are of vital importance. Still, a feeling that its decisions may not be enforced is 
clearly evident from the following statement of the Court in Bandhua Mukti Morcha 
v. Union of India:  “If any of these directions is not properly carried out by the Central 
Government or the State of Haryana, we shall take a serious view of the matter”.115  A 
clear admission of impotence is writ large in the statement.116  Thus this strategy 
seems to be not as effective as the others are.  
3.4.5  Award of Compensation 
 The question of compensation for the infringement of fundamental rights by 
the state agency was raised before the Supreme Court for the fist time in Khatri v. 
State of Bihar,117 and again in Veena Sethi v. State of Bihar.118 However, the Court did 
not answer this in these two cases but did so only in Rudual Sah v. State of Bihar.119 
This case was for writ of habeas corpus under Article 32 of the Constitution, by the 
person affected and not a public interest litigation. The Court awarded compensation 
for the illegal detention of the petitioner by the jail authorities. The Court departed 
                                                 
114 Ibid. p.153. 
115 AIR 1984 SC 802 at 834.  
116 S.K. Agrawala supra n.2, p. 35 . 
117 AIR 1981 SC 928.  
118 AIR 1983 SC 339.  
119 AIR 1983 SC 1086. 
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from the earlier practice to order in habeas corpus petition, only immediate release of 
the detenue from unlawful or unjustified detention and not to order monitory relief in 
the nature of compensation.120 The approach adopted by the Supreme Court in the 
instant case involves a new judicial technique to vindicate violation of fundamental 
rights.121 The implication of the decision was far reading for the Court made it clear 
that it would create new  remedies in its original jurisdiction under Art 32 of the 
constitution, where such remedies are indispensable to the vindication of fundamental 
rights. 
 The language of clause (2) of Article 32 of the Constitution appears to be wide 
enough to permit the Court to undertake the task of adjusting the relief to the 
necessity for redressing the wrong done to the rights of the individual.122 More 
conclusive evidence of the wide powers conferred on the Supreme Court lies in the 
clause (1) of Article 142 which provides for the enforcement of any decree or order 
that the Supreme Court may pass so as to do complete justice between the parties in 
any cause or matter pending before it.  These two Articles read together empower the 
Supreme Court, to formulate new legal doctrines, forge new tools and devise new 
remedies to meet the ends of justice.123    
                                                 
120 K .I. Vibhute, “Compensatory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court – A Critique” (1986) 10 
C.U.L.R., at 83-84.  
121 Ibid at 85. 
122  Art. 32 (2): the Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions, orders or writs, including the 
writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorary, which 
ever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this part. 
123 K. I. Vibhute supra n. 118,  p.85. 
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 The rationale for awarding compensation under Article 32 for the violation of a 
fundamental right is that the right in question has been violated by the executive 
whose sworn duty it is to uphold the right. The duty of the Supreme Court here being 
to safeguard the fundamental right and effectively enforce it, the Court is bound to 
award compensation if no other effective remedy is available to the petitioner to 
adequately redress the invasion of his constitutional rights, and if the remedy sought is 
within the powers granted to it by clause (2) of Article 32.124  
 Exercise of this power by the Supreme Court is evident form the award of 
compensation in matters of public interest litigation, since 1984. Sebastine Hongray v. 
Union of India125, Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Police Commissioner 
Delhi,126 Saheli v. Police Commissioner Delhi,127 and Nilabati  Behera v. State of 
Orissa,128 provide some instances of such exercise of power. 
 Evolving judicial strategy and techniques in the process of dispensation of 
“social justice” is a constitutional imperative.129 The Indian judiciary, more so the 
Supreme Court has done yeoman service in the field of rendering justice to the 
people. A perusal of the facts and cases decided by the courts go to show that the 
judiciary was forced to act because of utter carelessness on the part of governmental 
                                                 
124 Krishnan Venugopal, “A New Dimension to the Liability of the State under Article 32”, (1984) II 
Ind. Bar Rev. 399.  
125 AIR 1984 SC 1026.  
126 (1989) 4 SCC 730.  
127 AIR 1990 SC 513. 
128 AIR 1993 SC 190. 
129 M. Krishna Prasad, “Public Interest Litigation: A New Juristic Horizon”, AIR 1984 Jour 1. 
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machinery which turned a blind eye to the problems of helpless masses.  Thus it is the 
gross violation of basic human rights which compelled the judiciary to discard its 
conservative cloak and come to the rescue of suffering masses.130 
 As a natural consequence of liberalisation of the rule of locus standi and 
increasing willingness of judiciary to render justice, public interest litigation proved to 
be a step forward in making rule of law, fundamental freedoms, the concept of social 
and economic justice meaningful to the downtrodden and also providing for greater 
accountability. The rule of “person aggrieved” or person with “sufficient interest” 
gave way to the concept of pro bono publico. Since then public interest litigation has 
invaded all spheres of our social, economic and political life. In short, it embraces 
humanism in its soul.131 Contrary to the past practices, today a person acting bonafide  
and having sufficient interest can move the courts for redressing public injury, 
enforcing public duty, protecting social and collective rights and interests and 
vindicating public interest.132  The Court’s judgements have covered a large number 
of subjects, such as issues relating to human rights of individuals, of the community, 
issues relating to public administration and public life and issues relating to economic 
policy etc. Thus public interest litigation has traversed much beyond the original 
object of providing access to the judicial process to the poor and disadvantaged. Often 
                                                 
130 Santosh Hegde, “Public Interest Litigation and Control of Government”, (1988) 15 Ind. Bar Rev., 
p. 2.  
131  Mamta Rao,   supra n.30,  pp. V-VI.  
132 S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 at 192; also see P. Leelakrishnan, “Access to 
Legal Service and Justice”, (1984) Cochin University Law Review,471 at  476-477 and                       
P. Leelakrishnan, Environmental Law In India, (New Delhi: Butterworths India,1999), p.139 
 114
enough it has been said that what started as a movement to secure better access for the 
underprivileged to the judicial system has crossed over into the realm of policy 
making and implementation.133  
 Dilution of procedural norms and public interest litigation have transcended its 
boundaries and provided for the Supreme Court arrogating the role of adjudicator, 
supervisor, investigator, administrator and sometimes a legislator. The greatest 
contribution of public interest litigation is that the superior courts are now regarded as 
institutions belonging to the people and the concerns of the vulnerable are given 
voice. The courts utilized the opportunity to enlarge the ambit of fundamental rights 
to realise the basic human rights and made the fundamental rights in general and right 
to life in particular more effective and meaningful by inclusion of many aspects of life 
into the right to life.   
 The lack of concern by the legislature to make suitable provisions for the 
protection of the basic rights of the people as per the need of the time and the 
violation of these rights by the state agencies as well as failure on part of the state to 
prevent such violations by individuals have compelled the courts to protect and 
enforce the rights of the citizens by innovative tools and devices to meet the need the 
times. The decline in the role played by the other two institutions of the state has 
inexorably changed the role of the court, from being a “sentinel on the qui vive” to a 
saviour on call. The Supreme Court, as the finial court of appeal, is know as “the 
                                                 
133  A.K. Ganguly,   supra n. 50,   p.2. 
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court of last resort”, but the wide writ jurisdiction enjoyed by it has often made it the 
court of first and only resort134. 
3.5 Conclusion 
 The effectiveness of human rights in any legal system depends upon the 
remedy available for their violations. In an adversarial system, such remedy may 
remain a distant dream to the victims of human rights violations due to the problem of 
access to justice. They may not be in a position to gain access to justice by reason of 
poverty, helplessness or disability, or socially or economically disadvantaged 
position. This problem is sought to be overcome through the institution of public 
interest litigation, wherein some public spirited individual or institution is accorded 
locus standi to file a case on behalf of those victims and espouse their cause. 
 Though accepted and nourished initially by few justices of the Apex Court as 
an act of judicial welfarism, the institution of public interest litigation has by now 
branched out to protect the human rights of millions of diverse spheres of life, be it 
the field of environment, sexual harassment or compensation to victims. The 
emergence of intensified human rights movement in post emergency period gave 
impetus to evolution of public interest litigation and courts started positively 
responding to the human rights violation situations. 
 In the quest to vindicate human rights the Supreme Court of India and various 
High Courts have forged new techniques like liberalisation of the traditional rule of 
                                                 
134 Raju Ramachandran, “Judicial Activism – II The Sentinel Turns Saviour” , (1998) 30, Ind. Bar 
Rev. 33 at 35. 
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locus standi, treating letters as writ petitions, adoption of inquisitorial process by way 
of appointment of commission at appropriate stages, issuing series of directions and 
monitoring their compliance, award of compensation in writ proceedings, etc. In all 
the Apex Court has effectively discharged its obligation of doing complete justice 
under Article 142 of the Constitution. 
 Moulding the procedure and remedy to suit public interest proceedings, 
wherein public spirited individual or institution is without resources and logistic 
support in ensuring even handed justice is the benchmark achievement of the higher 
judiciary. Because of this, the human rights of the oppressed and depressed, illiterate 
and incommunicado have come to be real and effective. Without public interest 
litigation as a strong measure of enforcement, human rights of millions would have 
remained only on paper.    
  
 
       
 
CHAPTER – IV 
RIGHT TO LIFE AS A HUMAN RIGHT 
 
 ‘Life’ is dear, precious, sacred and pregnant with divine potential and it is that 
a Hymn in the Rigveda recites:  
“Grant us a hundred autumns that we may see the 
many fold World.  
May we attain the long lives which have been ordained 
as from yore.”1 
 
 Preservation of human life is of paramount importance, because if one’s life is 
lost, the status quo ante can not be restored as resurrection is beyond the capacity of 
man.2 An appropriate connotation of the term ‘life’ was given by Field J., where he 
distinguished human life from animal existence and defined the concept with all that 
body and mind and soul could promote happiness and fulfilment, thus:  
“By the term “life” something more is meant than mere animal existence. The 
inhibitions against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which 
life is enjoyed. 3 
The plentitude of possibilities and the fullness of faculties, if life is enriched 
propitious circumstances, persuaded our founding fathers and the United Nations to 
                                                 
1 Krishan Iyer, J., The Dialectics and Dynamics of Human Rights in India, (Calcutta: Eastern Law 
House, 1999), p.282. 
2 Paramananda Katara v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 2039. 
3 B. L. Hansaria, “Right to Life and Liberty under the Constitution - A Critical Analysis of Article 
21”, (Bombay : N. M. Tripathi, Pvt. Ltd, 1993), p.25  
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accord the highest priority to the right to life.4 The fundamental right to life is the 
most precious human right and forms the arc of all other rights.5 
……Life in its expanded horizons today includes all that give meaning to a 
man’s life including his tradition, culture and heritage and protection of that heritage 
it in its full measure would certainly come within the encompass of an expanded 
concept of Article 21 of the Constitution.6 
To any civilized society, there can be no attributes more important than the life 
and personal liberty of its members. That is evident from the paramount position 
given by the courts to Article 21 of the Constitution. These twin attributes enjoy a 
fundamental ascendancy over all other attributes of the political and social order and 
consequently the legislative, the executive and the judiciary are more sensitive to 
these than to any other attributes of daily existence.7 
4.1 Right to life - A Primordial Right 
 Doctrine of right is a product of natural law theory, evolved since ancient 
times, which paved way for recognition of individual identity and autonomy. 
Advancement of civilizations and progress of societies was required to keep pace with 
the changing time and therefore, the doctrine of rights has also been changed and 
transformed with the changing time. Majority of the natural lawyers did incorporate 
rights as an integral part of their theories. Natural Law theory though underwent a 
                                                 
4 Krishan Iyer, J. supra n.1. 
5 Bhagwati .J., in Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 746. 
6 Per Sabyasachi Mukharjee .J., in Ramsaran v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 549 para 13.   
7 Per Pathak .J., in Keher Singh v. Union of India,  AIR 1989 SC 653 para 7.  
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change but few principles of it remain constant, inter alia inalienable rights of 
individual.8 Right to life is one such inalienable basic right of man. Right to life is the 
most important, human, fundamental, inalienable, transcendental right. Naturally and 
logically this right requires the highest protection.9  
 The right to life is, of course, the foremost human right….. ‘Life’ is more than 
mere animal existence and the inhibition against the deprivation or truncation of life 
extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed. A dynamic, as 
against a static, view of the quality of life makes it clear that life includes livelihood 
and opportunities for unfolding personality.10 Thus, the right to life, liberty and 
security of person as a basic human right finds very significant place in the various 
human rights instruments.  Denial of this basic right means denial of all other rights 
would have any utility and existence without it. So, this right has been stressed by 
international,11 Regional,12 and National13 documents.14 It is a primordial right, which 
one should possess in order to enjoy other rights. Primordial rights are those rights 
without which, the enjoyment of other rights is not possible…. (M)ost societies 
                                                 
8 Dr. Dilip Ukey and Tejaswini Malegaonkar, “Right to Life and Personal Liberty challenges and 
Judicial Responses”, Indian Bar Review, Vol XXX (4) 2003, p.539. 
9 Dr. Koteswar Rao, “Criminal Liability of the State for the violation of Life, Liberty and Dignity- 
Need for a Compensatory Legal Policy”, Indian Bar Review, Vol.XIX, 1992, p.100.  
10 Krishna Iyer .J., “Human Rights and Inhuman Wrongs”, (Delhi: B.R. Publications Corporation, 
1990), pp 4-5. 
11  Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. 
12  Article 2(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, 1950. 
13  Article 21 of the Constitution of India.  
14  Shailaja Chander, Justice V.R.Krishna Iyer on Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles, (New 
Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1992), p.159.  
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recognise right to life as the most basic right. For any human being to survive or exist 
this right is most essential,15 and all other rights depend upon this right. Without this 
right other rights have little or no meaning at all. The inviolability or sanctity of life is 
the basic value of modern civilization. Therefore, today, non deprivation of life is the 
core of the rights of person, recognised by almost every nation of the world.  Right to 
life is so basic in the sense that ‘it is regarded a necessary condition for enjoyment of 
other human rights”.16  
 Indian judiciary has always taken note of international instruments of Human 
Rights, while dealing with cases of violation of human rights in general and of right to 
life in particular. 
4.2 Right to life under International Human Rights Law 
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, says: “Everyone has the 
right to life, liberty and security of person”.17 
 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, says: 
1). “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by 
law.  No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life”.18  
 What Article 6 (1) proclaims is an “inherent right to life”. The right to life as 
“inherent” may be questioned on the ground that legal right never actually inhere in 
nature; they are always created within the framework of legal system. But framers of 
                                                 
15  Naikar, L.D., The Law Relating to Human Rights, (Bangalore: Puliani and Puliani, 2004), p.224.  
16  Ibid., p.225. 
17  Supra n. 11.  
18  Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.  
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Covenant regarded human rights as pre-existing in a moral order, and emphasised that 
it derives from the very fact of human being’s existence. Today many contemporary 
philosophers agree to the effect that human rights are possessed by virtue of being a 
member of human family.19 
 Under the Covenant, each state party is obliged to have within its internal legal 
system a law protecting the right to life, which may in the larger interest of the society 
be curtailed or regulated. Apart from the protection of life by the state, there needs to 
be met, certain other basic needs like food, shelter, clothing and medical care etc.20 
                                                 
19  Naikar, L.D., supra n.15, p.226.  
20  These social rights and recognised under Articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966.  
Article 11- (1) The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone to an adequate 
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the 
continuous improvement of living conditions.  The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the 
realisation of this right, recognising to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation 
based on free consent.  
(2) The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognising the fundamental right of everyone  to be free 
from hunger, shall take individually and through international cooperation, the measures including specific 
programmes, which are needed:   
(a)  To improve the methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by making full use of 
technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by 
developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficient development and 
utilization of natural resources; 
(b)  Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting countries, to ensure an 
equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need.  
Article 12 - (1) The State Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone to the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.  
(2) the steps to be taken by the State Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realisation of this 
right shall include those necessary for:  
(a) The provision for the reduction of the still birth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy 
development of the child;  
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; 
(c)  the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other  diseases; (d) The 
creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of 
sickness.  
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Under Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights an 
absolute right to life is not granted. Life may be deprived but it should not be arbitrary 
deprivation of life. What is “arbitrary” is difficult to define and is open for different 
interpretations. For some it can simply be “illegal” or “contrary to the national 
legislation”. For others it can be “unjust” and “all legislations must conform to 
principles of justice”,21 and standard of justice may again vary. If states are free to 
determine the scope of their own obligations, international human rights are liable to 
become empty shells. Only an international minimum standard, which operates 
independently of the vagaries of national legal systems can effectively protect human 
rights.22 It was the intention of the drafters to bring national legislations in line with 
an international minimum standard.23   
  It has been argued that the right to life under Article 6 of the International 
Covenant  on Civil and Political Rights is limited only to arbitrary deprivation of life, 
such as by homicide and thus ‘right to live’ is not ‘right to live as one wishes’.24 It is 
conceded that right to life is not right to an appropriate standard of living, as that right 
is recognised in Articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, 1966.   
 
                                                 
21  UN DOC A/2929, 35. 
22  Hassan, 10, Harvard International L.J. 1969, pp 241-242.  
23  Naikar, L.D., supra n.15, p.227. 
24  Yoram Dinstein, “The Right to Life, Physical Integrity and Liberty”, in L.Henkin (ed.) “The 
International Bill of Rights”, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p.115.  
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4.3.1 Right to Life: A Fundamental Right under the Indian Constitution 
 Though India ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
in 1979, thereby became obliged to protect and promote the human rights in her 
municipal system, the basic human rights including the right to life got expression in 
the Constitution prior to this. Under the Indian Constitution, Article 21 guarantees 
right to life and Supreme Court after initial narrow, technical interpretation became 
conscious of its own importance and the importance of the right and has given 
substance to this right by its interpretation after a quarter century of passing the 
Constitution in a series of judgements.25 
 Apart from this, as per the provisions of the Constitution, i.e., Article 51 (c), it 
is obligatory for the state to foster respect for international law and treaty 
obligations....26 No explanation is to be found-for separate mention of international 
law and treaty obligations as the latter forms part of the former, - in the Constituent 
Assembly debates also, as to the intent of Article 51. Prof. C. H. Alexandrowicz says 
that the expression ‘international law’ connotes customary international law and that 
‘treaty obligations’ stand for treaties. This interpretation would seem to be the most 
logical in the context of the Article as well as of attitude of the Indian Courts to 
                                                 
25  Dr.Koteswar Rao, supra n.9. 
26  Article 51 of Constitution of India: Promotion of International Peace and Security – The State shall 
endeavour to: 
(c) foster respect for International law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organised people with 
one another; and  
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questions of international law.27  Article 51 in so far as it requires various organs of 
state to foster respect for international law and treaties would seem to strengthen 
rather than weaken the principle that intentional law is part of the law of the land. 
This is so not with standing the imprecise formulation of Article 51.28   
 This goes to show that, apart from India being member of the United Nations 
since 1945, signing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, signing the 
Covenants in 1966 and ratifying them in 1979 and the other instruments on Human 
Rights, the basic human right to life, liberty and security of person was recognised in 
India prior to making of these instruments. Demand for the recognition of this right 
was made during the British rule in India; this right to life was recognised during the 
framing of the Constitution and ultimately found expression in Part III under Article 
21 of the Constitution as an enforceable, fundamental right guaranteed to all persons. 
 The national struggle for freedom was largely directed against racial 
discrimination and to secure basic human rights for all individuals. The Indian 
National Congress at its special session held in Bombay in 1928… made demand for 
writing into the Government of India Bill “a declaration of rights of the people of 
India as British citizens”, including therein among other things guarantee in regard to 
equality before law, protection in respect of liberty,  life and property.29  
                                                 
27  M.K.Nawaz, “International Law on the contemporary practice in India; some perspectives”, Proc. 
ASIL, April 25-27, (1963), p.275 at 278, cited in S.K.Kapoor, “International Law”, 11th ed., 
(Allahabad: Central Law Agency, 1996), pp 100-101.  
28  S.K.Kapoor, supra n.27, pp 101-102. 
29  Subhash C.Kashyap, “Human Rights and Parliament”, 20 -22 (1978) cited in Shailaja Chander, 
supra n.14, p.159.  
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 Provisions pertaining to protection of life and liberty were debated in the 
Constituent Assembly. Clause (9) of the Interim Report on Fundamental Rights 
provided that “no person shall be deprived of his life or liberty without due process of 
law”.30 The Drafting Committee substituted the word “procedure established by law” 
for the words “due process of law” and added the qualifying word ‘personal’ before 
‘liberty’, for without the qualifying word ‘personal’ the word ‘liberty’ might be 
construed very widely so as to include even the freedoms already dealt with….31 
Several members objected to the change from ‘due process’ to ‘procedure established 
by law’32, while others33 justified the change. An important advice in favour of such 
change was from Justice Frankfurter of Supreme Court of the U.S.A. who said that 
the ‘due process’ clause would not be helpful and that it had created many 
complications in the U.S.A.34 Justice Frankfurter considered that the power of judicial 
review implied in the due process clause…. was not only undemocratic (because it 
gave a few judges a power of vetoing legislation enacted by the representatives of the 
nation) but also threw an unfair burden on the judiciary.35  Thus, during the 
deliberations of the Assembly, the due process clause was watered down in the light 
                                                 
30  Advisory Committee, Fundamental Rights: Interim Report, (Delhi, 1948), Cl (9).  
31  P.Sarojini Reddy, Judicial Review of Fundamental Rights, (New Delhi: National Publishing 
House, 1976), pp 111-112.  
32  Eg.K.M.Munshi supported the ‘due process’ clause, see CAD Vol.VII, 851-3; Pandit Thakur Das 
Bhargava also supported it, see, CAD Vol.VII 848.  
33  Eg. Sir, A.Krishnaswami Iyer, CAD Vol.VII, 853-4; Dr.B.R.Ambedkar, CAD Vol.VII 1000-1.  
34  P.Sarojini Reddy, supra n.31, p.112.  
35  B.Shiva Rao, The forming of India’s Constitution, selects Documents, Vol.II, 1996, quoted in B.L. 
Hansaria, supra n.3, p.7.  
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of American warnings. In its place, the Assembly approved an “any procedure” clause 
so that the life and liberty of a person could be restrained by “any procedure 
established by law”.36 The Constituent Assembly accepted by a majority vote, the 
clause ‘procedure established by law’, and the Art. 21 of the Constitution of India 
guaranteeing protection of life and liberty was formulated as”, No person shall be 
deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by 
law”. 
 The right to life is not merely a fundamental right, but a basic human right is 
well expressed by Justice H.R. Khanna, when he observed that “sanctity of life and 
liberty was not something new when Constitution was drafted. It represented a fact of 
higher values which mankind began to cherish in its evolution from a state of truth 
and law to a civilized existence. Likewise the principle that no one shall be deprived 
of his life arbitrarily without the authority of law was not the gift of the Constitution. 
It was the necessary corollary of the concept relating the sanctity of life and liberty, it 
existed and was in force before the coming into force of the Constitution.37 For right 
to life like the other human rights guaranteed as fundamental rights under the 
Constitution existed even prior to their recognition as such, as they are natural rights 
and law simply declares them as is done by the Constitution.  
                                                 
36  B.P. Jeevan reddy and Rajeev Dhavan, “The Jurisprudence of Human Rights”, in D.M.Beaty (ed.), 
“Human Rights and Judicial Review – A Contemporary Perspective”, (London: Martinus –Nijholff 
Publishers, 1994), p.179.  
37  A.D.M. Jabalpour v. Shivkant Shukla,  AIR 1976 SC 1254.  
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 The above statements can be accepted in the light of the fact that a number of 
civil rights were enjoyed by the individuals in ancient India, though the rights of the 
individuals are to be inferred from the duties of the state. (F)or the first time the 
formation of what may be termed rights even in the modern sense can be found from 
the times of Kautilya, who classified them as “civil rights”, “economic rights” and 
“legal rights”.38  
 In Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala.39 Justice Mathew subscribed to 
the view that the fundamental rights are natural rights and are pre-existent and dealt 
with the concept of natural rights elaborately. He observed that natural rights are those 
“rights which are appropriate to man as a rational and moral being and which are 
necessary for a good life”.40 They owe nothing to their recognition in the Constitution 
- such recognition was necessary if the Constitution was to be regarded as 
complete”.40a Hence the fundamental rights are natural rights and the Indian 
Constitution recognises and declares them, to make itself a complete code. The effect 
of this natural rights theory will be that the rights can only be restricted, but they can 
not be abrogated.40b This holds perfectly good with right to life under the Constitution 
Article 21 provides: 
                                                 
38 B.A.Selator, “Ancient Indian Political Thought and Institutions”, 249-266, (1963) cited by 
S.Sundar Rami Reddy, “Fundamentalness of Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles in Indian 
Constitution, `1980 JI.L.I.., vol.22:1, p.400.  
39  AIR 1973 SC 1461, see at 1938-1944.  
40  Ibid., at 1939.  
40a  Corwin, “The Higher Background of the American Constitutional Law” quoted by Mathew, J., 
ibid. 
40b  S.Sundara Rami Reddy, supra n.38, p.402.  
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 “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to 
procedure established by law”.40c 
 This provision is in tune with the object of Article 3 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 1948, and a similar provision is formed in Article 6 of 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.   
 Too much content is poured in this short provision of Article 21 guaranteeing 
right to life by the judicial interpretation received at the hands of Judges of the Apex 
Court. Judicial activism has played a great role in moulding the law to meet the need 
of the hour. Regarding interpreting the provisions of law by the judges Lord Denning 
made the historical observation in Seaford Court Estates Ltd v. Asher,41 as follows: 
 “When a defect appears, a Judge can not simply fold his hands and 
blame the draftsmen. He must set to work on the constructive task of 
finding the intention of the Parliament….. and then he must supplement 
the written word so as to give  “force and life” to the intention of the 
legislature… A Judge should ask himself the question how, if the 
makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of 
it, they should have straightened it out? The must then do as they would 
have done. A Judge must not alter the material of which the Act is 
woven, but he can and should iron out the creases”.42 
 
 The above view of Lord Denning was described by the House of Lords as “a 
naked usurpation of the legislative function”. Same principle was re-stated by him 
                                                 
40c  Article 21 of the Constitution of India.  
41 (1949) 2 All.  E.R. 155.  
42  Ibid, at 164, cited in B.L. Hansania , supra n.3, p.19. 
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after 30 years, in Nothman v. Barnet, London Borough Council.43 In similar way 
ironing out the creases is done by higher judiciary in India. In the same vein Bhagwati 
J., held that Constitutional provisional must be construed not in a narrow or 
constricted sense but in a wide and liberal manner so as to anticipate and take account 
of changed conditions and purposes, so that the Constitutional provision does not get 
atrophied or fossilized, but remains flexile enough to meet the newly emerging 
problems and challenges. The learned judge observed that this applies with greater 
force in relation to a fundamental right.44 
 The right to life which is the most fundamental of all is also the most difficult 
to define. Certainly it can not be confined to a guarantee against taking away life; it 
must have a wider application.45  The term ‘life’ has not been defined in the 
Constitution, hence one has to turn to the judicial interpretation for its meaning. The 
Supreme Court has held that the word ‘life’ as it occurs in the 5th and 14th amendments 
of the U.S. Constitution correspond to Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. It means 
not only continuance of person’s animal existence, but a right to the possession of 
each of his organs, his arms, legs etc.46  Life is beyond price. Freedom and liberties 
are only for the living. Hence right to life ….. “forms the arc of all other rights.47 
(P)reservation of human life is of paramount importance, because if one’s life is lost, 
                                                 
43  (1978) 1 W.L.R. 220 cited in B.L. Hansaria, supra, no.3, pp.19-20. 
44  See Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 746.  
45 V.N.Shukla, Constitution of India, 10th ed., M.P.Singh, (Lucknow: Eastern Book Company 200), 
pp 164-165.  
46  Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1963  SC 1295.  
47  Supra n.44,  para  5.  
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the status quo ante, can not be restored as resurrection is beyond the capacity of 
man.48  
 The word ‘life’, however does not mean mere animal existence. The 
observations of Field J., in Munn v. Illinois,49 have been time and again, accepted by 
the Supreme Court of India.50 Field, J., spoke of the right to life as follows: 
 “By the term ‘life’ as here used something more is meant than mere 
animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all 
those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed. The provision equally 
prohibits the mutilation of the body by the amputation of an arm or leg, 
or the cutting out of an eye or the destruction of any other organ of the 
body through which the soul communicates with the outer world. The 
deprivation not only of life, but whatever God has given to everyone 
with life, for its growth and enjoyment is prohibited by the provision in 
question, if its efficacy be not fittered away by judicial decision”.    
 
 This statement of Field, J., has been repeatedly quoted with approval by the 
Supreme Court of India.51 The same has been further extended in Francis Coralie v. 
Union of India,52 when it was held that “any act which damages or injures or 
interferes with the use of any limb or faculty of a person, either permanently or even 
temporarily, would be within the inhibition of Article 21”. Bhagwati J., observed:  
                                                 
48  Paramanada Katara v. Union of India, AIR 1989  SC 2039. 
49  1876, 94  US 113  at 142.  
50  First accepted by the Supreme Court in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., supra n.46; same view was 
taken in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1978 SC 1675 ; (1978) 4 SCC 494.  
51  Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, supra n.50; Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation 
(1985) 3 SCC 545; AIR 1986 SC 180, at 194 etc.  
52  Supra  n.44.  
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 “…..The question which arises is whether the right to life is limited only 
to protection of limb or faculty, or does it go further and embrace 
something more. We think that the right to life includes the right to live 
with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare 
necessities of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter over 
the head and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in 
diverse forms with fellow human beings. Of course, the magnitude and 
contents of the components of this right would depend upon the extent 
of the economic development of the country but it must, in any view of 
the matter include the right to basic necessities of life, and also the right 
to carry on such functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum 
expression of human self”.53 
 
 As Krishna Iyer, J. aptly observed: ‘life is not vegetable existence, nor ascentic 
isolation, but vigorous social life and the enjoyment of basic minima of creature 
comforts which make life liveable’.54 This new approach to right to life is witnessed 
specifically, since the latter half of the 1970’s.  
 The post Emergency India witnessed a great change in all walks of life and 
judiciary was no exception to this. Concerned as it was with the aftermath of the 
Emergency and, aided by its own conscience coupled with an atmosphere of freedom, 
the judiciary construed Article 21 in the most liberal manner to uphold the ‘rule and 
spirit of law’. This was done by requiring the laws bearing on life and personal liberty 
to pass the tests of Articles 14 and 19. This certainly introduced the ‘due process’ 
                                                 
53  Ibid., p.753. 
54  Justice Krishna Iyer, Human Rights and the Law, (Indore: Vedpal Law House, 1986), p.69. 
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clause in the Indian Constitution,55 and also interpreted right to life and personal 
liberty in such a manner as to cover various facets of life which were hither to 
unheeded. 
 In the beginning Article 21 was very narrowly construed, though the term right 
to life was not expressly so construed. However, it was, sort of eclipsed by the 
narrower interpretation of Article 21 as a whole. But the new approach adopted by the 
Court since the last quarter of the 20th century the right to life received a further boast.   
 The early approach to Article 21 was circumscribed by literal interpretation. 
Right from the inception till the revoking of Emergency, Article 21 was construed in a 
very narrow manner.56 But in the course of time the scope of application of the Article 
against arbitrary encroachment by the executive has been expanded by liberal 
interpretation of each of the components of the Article, in tune with relevant 
international understanding. For Article 5157 of the Constitution of India makes it 
obligatory for the state to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations. 
India is founder member of United Nations Organisation and signatory to Human 
Rights instruments. Though Article 51 being Directive Principle of State Policy is not 
enforceable by court of law, it reflects the spirit of Constitution and persuades the 
                                                 
55  Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978  SC 597; Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, supra 
n.50; Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi: supra n.44. 
56  For example in A.K.Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1951  SC 27;  Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., 
AIR 1963 SC 1295; ADM Jabalpur v. Sivakant Shukla, AIR 1976  SC 1207. 
57  Article 51 of Constitution of India, supra n.26.  
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courts to take note of it.58 The Supreme Court of India has often referred to the 
provisions of the International Covenants while dealing with violations of human 
rights in general and right to life in particular. Prem shankar v. Delhi 
Adminiistration59 and Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration60 are instances where the 
Supreme Court extensively quoted from international instruments on human rights 
while giving expended meaning and scope to right to life. 
 In Board of Trusties, Port of Bombay v. Dillip Kumar,61 the Court said that the 
expression ‘Life’ does not merely connote animal existence or a continued drudgery 
through life; it has a much wider meaning and takes within its fold “some of the finer 
graces of human civilization which makes life worth living”, which would be 
jeopardised if reputation is adversely affected. Further, in Vikram Deo Singh v. State 
of Bihar,62 Pathak C.J., opined thus: 
 “We live in an age when Court has demonstrated while interpreting 
Article 21 of the Constitution, that every person is entitled to a quality 
of life consistent with his human personality. The right to live with 
human dignity is the fundamental right of every Indian citizen, and so, 
… the State recognises the need for maintaining establishments for the 
care of those unfortunates, both  women and children, who are the 
                                                 
58 Justice R.P.Sethi, Human Rights and Judicial Activities, (Dharwad : Jagrut Bharat 1997), p.9 
(Lecture delivered at Hubli Bar Association on 16.8.1997).  
59  AIR  1980  SC 1535.  
60  AIR 1983  SC 1578 pp 1601-1603.  
61  AIR  1983  SC 109, para 13.  
62  AIR 1988  SC 1782  para  5.  
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castaways of any imperfect social order for whom therefore, of 
necessity, provision must be made for their protection and welfare”. 
 
 In Keher Singh v. Union of India,63 he further went to say that “to any civilized 
society, there can be no attributes more important than the life and persona liberty”. In 
its expanded horizon, life would include all that give meaning to a man’s life 
including his tradition, culture and heritage, and protection of that heritage in its full 
measure would certainly come within the encompass of an expanded concept of 
Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court took much extended view of right to life and 
liberty to include every aspect of it which makes the life meaningful and worthwhile. 
 Same view was held by K. Ramaswamy, J.,  He says: Right to life entrained in 
Article 21 means something more than survival of animal existence. The right to live 
with human dignity with minimum of sustenances and shelter and those rights and 
aspects of life which would go to make a man’s life complete and worth living would 
form part of right to life.64     
 In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation,65 Court emphasised that the 
term ‘life’ in Article 21 is not only restricted to the mere animal existence of a person. 
It means something more and “the inhibition against the deprivation of life extends to 
all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed.66 Further, the right to life would 
include the right to food, clothing, decent environment and reasonable 
                                                 
63  AIR 1989 SC 653  para 7.  
64  Samatha v. State of A.P., AIR 1997 SC 3297  at 3330.  
65  AIR 1986  SC 180; (1985) 3  SCC 545.  
66  Ibid., at 194. 
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accommodation to live in. The difference between the need of an animal and a human 
being for shelter has to be kept in view.  For animal, it is the bare protection of the 
body, for a human being, it has to be suitable accommodation which allows him to 
grow in all aspects-physical, mental and intellectual”.67 
 In P. Rathinam v. Union of India,68 the Supreme Court interpreted right to life 
as: “right to live with human dignity. It takes within its fold some of the fine graces of 
civilization which makes life worth living and that the expanded concept of life would 
mean the tradition, culture and heritage of the person concerned”.  
 The concept of ‘life’ has been expansively interpreted in recent years implying 
a host of fundamental rights therefrom.69 Thus, the protection against arbitrary 
privation of life no longer means mere protection from death or physical injury, but 
also from invasion of right to live with human dignity and includes all aspects of life 
necessary to make one’s life meaningful and worth living. It now includes right to 
livelihood,70 right to work under fair conditions of labour,71 rights of prisoners,72 and 
right to enjoyment of pollution free water and air for full enjoyment of life,73 etc. 
                                                 
67  Shantistar Bulders v. N.K.Totame (1990) 1  SCC 520; AIR 1990  SC 630.  
68  AIR  1994  SC  1844 ; (1994) 3 SCC 394. 
69  M.P.Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 5th ed., (Nagpur: Wadhwa and Company, 2003), p.1272. 
70  Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, supra n.51;  Animal and Environment Legal 
Defence Fund v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 1071; (1997) 3 SCC  549;  Chameli Singh v. State of 
U.P., AIR 1996  SC1051; (1996) 2 SCC 549;  Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar, AIR  1996  SC 1864  
; (1996) 5 SCC 125  Etc.  
71  Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, AIR 1982  SC 1473;  Bandhua Mukti 
Morcha v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 802; Mukesh Advani v. State of M.P., AIR 1985  SC 2363. 
72  Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, supra n.50;  A.K.Roy v. union of India AIR 1982 SC  710 para 
108 etc.  
73   Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1991  SC 420;  M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 2004  
SC 4016  at 4044.  
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 As to the procedure for deprivation of life or liberty it is now settled that the 
expression “procedure established by law” implicitly requires a procedure which is 
“fair, just and reasonable”, including the right to fair hearing, according to natural 
justice,74 a speedy trial,75 etc. Provisions of speedy trial have been interpreted by 
implication of speedy justice as an obligation of the state.76 For otherwise the 
operation of the legal system would not promote justice which is assured in the 
Constitution.77 
4.3.2 Personal Liberty 
The expression ‘personal liberty’ got its full meaning in Maneka Gandhi v. 
Union of India.78   In this case the court has given the widest possible interpretation to 
personal liberty. It is only with the decision in Maneka’s case that a new era of 
development has been ushered in. The decision stands as a beacon- light adding new 
dimensions to the interpretation of the fundamental rights. 
If Article 21 is expanded in accordance with interpretative principle indicated 
in Maneka Gandhi, it will read as follows: 
                                                 
74 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, supra n.55.  
75  Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1360; Madhu v. Union of India, AIR 1989  
SC para 3.  
76  Supreme Court advocates on Record Association v. Union of India, AIR 1994  SC 268; (1993) 4  
SCC 441;  Ankul Chandra Pradhan v. Union of India AIR 1997 SC 2814; (1997) 6 SCC 1. 
77  D.D. Basu, Human Rights in Constitutional Law, 2nd ed., (Nagpur: Wadhwa and Company, 2003), 
p.292.  
78 Supra  n.55. 
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“No person shall be deprived of his life and personal liberty except according 
to fair, just and reasonable procedure established by valid law”. 79    
Maneka Gandhi has paved the way for realising new vistas of personal 
freedoms like right to speedy trial, right to bail, right to appeal, right to humane 
treatment inside prison, right against torture, right to live with basic human dignity 
and right to compensation to the victims.80 This was done by reading Directive 
Principles into Article 21. The impact of the decision in Maneka’s Case is very 
significant for introducing the concept of reasonableness into procedure established 
by law in Article 21. It brought “due process” into the Article 21 by projecting natural 
law in right to life and personal liberty. 
4.3.3 Procedure Established by Law 
 Article 21 makes it clear that a person can be deprived of his life and personal 
liberty only according to ‘procedure established by law’. This expression in Article 21 
is the result of deliberate choice by the Constituent Assembly in place of the phrase 
‘due process of law’. 
 Initial set back to the judicial protection of right to life and personal liberty as a 
human right was suffered by the interpretation of Article 21 by the Supreme Court in 
A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras. 81  In Gopalan the Supreme Court was divided on 
the meaning of the phrase “procedure established bylaw”. In that case the Attorney 
                                                 
79 Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980  SC 898  at 930. 
80  Shailaja Chander, supra n.14, pp 164-165. 
81  AIR 1950 SC 27; 1950 SCR 88.  
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General had reminded the Judges that the Constituent Assembly had consciously 
rejected ‘due process’ in Article 21 and therefore the unreasonableness of law (of 
Preventive Detention) could not be examined by the court, whatever the procedure 
prescribed by enacted law (even if unfair or unreasonable), that itself was sufficient 
justification for deprivation of life or liberty.82 The majority held that it must mean 
that the procedure prescribed or enacted by the state-either Parliament or state 
legislations. That means any procedure that has legislative sanction. Thus, Article 21 
was to guarantee protection against executive action and possibly against judicial 
action and not against the legislative action, unless legislature transgressed any other 
provisions of the Constitution. Minority opinion was in favour of making principles of 
natural justice applicable as under American Constitutional provisions of due process. 
 The decision of Gopalans case considerably inhibited judicial protection of 
human rights in its first two decades of the working of the Constitution of India. It 
took the Supreme Court more than twenty-five years to free itself from the shackles of 
Gopalan which it ultimately did in Maneka Gandhi’s case in 1978.83 Till then 
Supreme Court did not include principles of natural justice or implications of due 
process clause in Article 21 of the Constitution. In Maneka the majority held that the 
mere prescribing of some procedure can not even meet the mandate of Article 21. The 
procedure prescribed by law has to be fair, just and reasonable and not fanciful, 
                                                 
82  Fali S.Nariman, “Protection of Personal Liberty in India”, in Reflections on Emerging 
International Law - Essays in Memory of Late Subrata Roy Chowdhury, (Bangalore: National Law 
School of India University), p.5.  
83  Ibid., p.6.  
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oppressive or arbitrary,84 thus substantially introducing the principles of natural 
justice in procedural protection of right to life (and personal liberty). Now procedure 
under Article 21 is fair procedure, and law, reasonable law, not any procedure under 
any enacted piece.85        
 The decision in Maneka became the starting point, the spring board for a 
spectacular evolution of law relating to judicial intervention of individuals human 
rights cases. This fresh look at Article 21 has helped the Apex Court in its new role as 
the institutional ombudsman of Human Rights in India.86  
 The trend initiated in Maneka of reading “due process” in right to life and 
personal liberty is further continued in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration,87 wherein 
it was observed that: “The word ‘law’ in the expression ‘procedure established by 
law’ in Article 21 has been interpreted in Maneka Gandhi’s case that the ‘law’ must 
be right just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. Otherwise it would be 
no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied. If it is 
arbitrary it would be violative of Article 14.”88  
 It was again reiterated in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab,89 where the court by 
majority took the view that Article 21 after Maneka would read to say that: “No 
                                                 
84 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, supra n.55, at.613.  
85  Ibid, per Krishna Iyer J., p.659.  
86  Supra n.82, p.6.  
87  Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, supra n.51. 
88  Ibid., p.498, per Desai. J.  
89  Supra n.79. 
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person shall be deprived of his life of personal liberty except according to fair, just 
and reasonable procedure established by valid law”.90  This view makes it clear that 
reasonableness under Article 21 is of procedure as well as of law, and this was 
followed by the courts in Mithu v. State of Punjab91 and T. Sareetha v. T.Venkata 
Subbaiah.92 Now Article 21 is not confined to procedural protection only but also 
covers substantive laws.  
 It has been argued that modern concept of right to life encompasses not merely 
protection against arbitrary deprivation of life, but it also places a duty on the part of 
each government to pursue policies which are designed to ensure access to the means 
of survival of every individual. This is because there are two main ways of depriving 
the right to life, firstly by execution, torture and other various forms of killing and 
secondly, by starvation and lack of fulfilment of basic needs such as food, basic health 
care facilities and medical care.93  Hence, the right to life now is taken to guarantee 
protection against deprivation of life by means direct or indirect. The state shall not 
deprive life arbitrarily and it has a positive obligation to protect a person against 
anything that would amount to deprivation of life. 
 Now, this right is not confined to mere physical or animal existence. It 
signifies the right to live with basic human dignity, the right to livelihood, the right to 
                                                 
90  Ibid., p.930. 
91  AIR 1983 SC 473; (1983) 2 SCC 277.  
92  AIR 1983 AP 356.  
93  F.Menghistu, “The Satisfaction of Survival Requirements”, in B.G.Ramcharan (ed.), The Right to 
Life in International Law, (Dordrecht: Martinus-Nijhoff, 1985), p.63.  
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a habitation or home, the right to education and the right to a clean, healthy 
environment for, without these there can be no real and effective exercise or 
enjoyment of the right to life. The State must also take all possible measures to 
prevent infant mortality, eliminate malnutrition and epidemics, and increase life 
expectancy through a clean and healthy environment and adequate preventive and 
curative medical facilities. It must make primary education free and compulsory.94 All 
the above mentioned rights which emanated from the right to life are human rights 
enumerated in major international instruments on human rights and which were 
incorporated as Directive Policies under the Indian Constitution. The right to life 
under Article 21 of the Constitution is the heart of the human rights and it has rightly 
received extensive interpretations.  
When occasions arose, courts in India have adopted a dynamic posture and 
resorted to activist role in the implementation and enforcement of these human rights, 
because of the non-enforceability of Directive Principles contained in the Part IV of 
the Constitution. Of late, and rightly so, the approach of the Courts in India has been 
one of social justice. It is a pro-active and goal oriented approach. It penetrates and 
destroys all inequalities of race, sex, power, position, wealth and it seeks to bring 
about equitable distribution of social, economic and political resources of the 
community.95    
 
                                                 
94  V.Vijayabalan, “New Dimensions of Human Rights”, (2000) C.U,L.R. ,Vol.XXIV, p.11.  
95  Justice R.P. Sethi, supra n.58, p.11.  
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The concept of public interest litigation with public spirited persons and 
organisations, and also fostered by judicial activism has been increasingly important 
in setting up very valuable records in the sphere of enforcing human rights, especially 
in making the life of man meaningful and worthwhile for those vulnerable, aggrieved 
and oppressed. Entertaining public interest litigation is also an instance of social 
justice approach of the courts.  Cases of violation of human rights are brought to the 
courts in the form of public interest litigations by public spirited persons or 
organisations.  Whenever the Court entertains any public interest litigation relating to 
human rights violation – it is enforcing the provisions of Constitution or the 
Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, under which human rights are guaranteed, 
protected and enforced in India. 
4.4 Conclusion 
Right to life has enjoyed the status of being a primordial right through out the 
ages. Different civilisations, repeated by time and geography have acknowledged the 
intrinsic worth of this right. Over a period this right has transcended all the contours 
of any definition, and has come to mean more than animal existence. It has come to 
include many attributes that make a life with human dignity possible. Even to day the 
process of expanding the horizons of ‘life’ is in continuous action. 
International human rights instruments had no alternative but to accord a prime 
place to right to life because of its very inherent nature. In addition, these instruments 
have recognised certain other needs like food, shelter, medical care, etc., which make 
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the right to life wholesome. Member nations are ordained to prevent arbitrary 
transgressions in to these rights at domestic levels. 
As a responsible member of community of nations India has aptly provided for 
a constitutionally entrenched right to life under Article 21, apart for pledging respect 
for international law under Article 51(c). 
The judiciary has played a significant role in creatively interpreting right to 
life. it has poured much positive content in to this right in a responsive and 
responsible manner. Now it has come to include right to livelihood, right to work 
under fair conditions, right to unpolluted environment and many more rights. 
Similarly the procedure for deprivation of life or liberty has also undergone a 
metamorphosis at the hands of judiciary. Now the procedural aspect is tampered with 
reasonableness. Any procedure adopted to deprive life or personal liberty should be a 
just, fair and reasonable procedure. 
The expression ‘life’, ‘personal liberty’ and ‘procedure established by law’ 
which received a definite and limited interpretation at the inception of the 
Constitution, are now very expansively interpreted. Article 21 has been a repository of 
human rights. This sea change in comprehending different dimensions of Article 21 
was possible because of the series of public interest litigations involving human rights 
brought before the courts in peculiar circumstances and the cogent judgements 
delivered in them. The public interest litigation movement has made a great impact on 
the liberal interpretation of right to life and personal liberty. 
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CHAPTER V 
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH 
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION 
 
 The onset of the democratic movements all over the world and emergence of 
the idea of Human Rights led to the trend of guaranteeing basic human rights in the 
basic laws1 namely the Constitutions. Soon it was witnessed that mere incorporation 
of these rights would not suffice, as, every country in the world faces the problem of 
human rights violation in some form or the other. Most of the world’s population has 
been suffering from violation of human rights.2  India is no exception. Statistically 
speaking, the Supreme Court or a High Court in the country delivers at least one 
judgement everyday touching upon the human rights of the people. The performance 
of the courts matches the rise in the violations of human rights.3 When there is any 
discussion on human rights in the country, the role of judiciary in giving a new 
dimension to these rights through its activism cannot be ignored.  
The Herculean effort of the founding fathers of Indian Constitution of breaking 
ground with the traditions and providing for reaching rights and freedoms to all Indian 
citizens were further strengthened and added to by a vivacious and dynamic judicial 
                                                 
1 A.P.Singh, “Human Rights: The Indian Context” AIR 2000 Jour, p.8. 
2 N.V.Anandram, “Situating Human Rights in the Media”, in Human Rights in India Historical Social 
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“Compensation for Arbitrary Arrest and Custodial Death; A Basic Human Right” (2000) C.U.L.R. 
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system with Supreme Court at the apex. It opened new vistas of human rights 
movement by liberally interpreting and expanding the meaning of basic human 
rights.4 An independent judiciary is the live wire of any judicial system is an essential 
institution to maintain the equilibrium between the liberty of the individual and the 
power of the state. In India the independent judiciary is the custodian of the 
Constitution. It is contributing to the protection of human rights by performing a 
positive and creative function in securing and promoting human rights of the people. 
The Supreme Court of India in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 (1) 
may pass – such decree, or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice 
in any cause or matter pending before it. On the basis of the power conferred on the 
Supreme Court under Articles 32 and 142 and the High Courts under Article 226, they 
have forged new tools and devised new strategies and also liberally interpreted the 
provisions of the Constitution relating human rights – in the form of rights guaranteed 
as well as directive principles – to ensure protection of human rights.  
Human rights whether civil and political or economic, social and cultural, are 
important rights of individuals. Indian Constitution thus, has incorporated under Part 
III and Part IV. As Krishna Iyer, J., remarks, in socialist countries like India it has 
always been regarded that economic rights are as important as, if not more than, 
political rights. The Indian Constitution acts upon this synthesis and philosophy and 
describes in Parts III and IV, both classes of human rights as “fundamental”.5 
                                                 
4 A.P. Singh, supra n.1, p.9. 
5 V.R. Krishna Iyer, Human Rights and the Law, (Indore: Vedpal House, 1986), p.11. 
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The highest judiciary has allowed the public-spirited persons and groups to 
come forward for the protection of human rights of the poor and ignorant. Due to such 
public spirited people many violations of human rights were brought before the court 
to vindicate the human rights of the persons aggrieved. The Courts, at the same time 
have cautiously entertained the public interest litigations, and any frivolous or 
vexatious litigations or petitions filed with malafide or personal enemity are not 
entertained. The court has from case to case evolved various principles for protection 
of the human rights and the court, as such, is also protecting the society from so called 
protectors.6 
In its recent decisions, one finds extensive references of the human rights by 
the Supreme Court particularly for protecting the rights of peoples from violations. 
This made Krishna Iyer, J., to say, “Today human rights jurisprudence in India has 
constitutional status”.7 India is signatory to Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and is also a party to International Covenants of 1966. Hence court could not forget 
the core principles of international human rights law in interpreting the rights under 
the municipal law. This is a welcome trend. It would certainly be able to inculcate a 
sense of accountability in public authorities discharging public duties towards the 
people and particularly towards the weaker sections of the society. Parts III and IV of 
the Constitution have been interpreted in this manner. 
                                                 
6 Chhetriya Pradushan Mukti Sangharsha Samiti v. State of A.P., AIR 1990 SC 2068; (1990) 4 SCC 
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State of Bihar (1993) 2 SCC 597; Yogesh K. Bhatia v. State of U.P. (1995) Supp (3) SCC 741; Daljit 
Singh Dalal v. Union of India, (1997) 4 SCC 62.etc. 
7 Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1980 SC 1579. 
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 Many of the human rights recognized under the International Covenants are 
covered under the Indian Constitution. But not all the rights. Few are covered under 
Part III and few others under Part IV. The human rights finding place under Part III as 
fundamental rights are: Right to equality (Articles 14-18); Right to freedom (Articles 
19-22); Right against exploitation (Articles 23-24) Right to freedom of religion 
(Articles 25-28); Cultural and educational rights (Articles 29-30) and Right to 
constitutional remedies (Articles 32-35). The other human rights incorporated in Part 
IV as the Directive Principles of State Policy, addressed to the State as non justiciable 
rights are: Right to work and favourable condition of work (Article 42), Right to equal 
pay for equal work [Article 39(d)], Right to just and favourable remuneration (Article 
43), Right to a standard of living adequate for his and his family (Articles 39(a) and 
47) etc. 
 Fundamental rights may be violated by the State as much directly as indirectly. 
While in the former case its officials or agencies violate them, in the latter it may let 
them be violated by others either through its inaction or active connivance. The latter 
violation may be as injurious as the former. In such cases State cannot escape its 
responsibility or liability towards the protection of fundamental rights on the plea that 
they are the actions of private individuals and not of the State8. Court also has given 
                                                 
8 V.N. Shukla, The Constitution of India, 10th ed., by M.P. Singh, (Lucknow: Eastern Book 
Company,2001), p. 20. 
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relief to the petitioner without going into the question whether the violator of the 
fundamental right was the State9 
 Judicial enforcement of any right basically depends on how well articulated or 
defined are the rights by the legislature, and how well the corresponding duties are 
imposed. Where the constitutional provisions or for that matter any statutory 
provisions are clearly defined and their scope demarcated, scope for violation is less, 
thus need for judicial interference, in consequence will also be less. This is evident 
from the fact that justiciable fundamental rights in Part III, where in many of the 
human rights find expression have been less subject to judicial enforcement, more so 
to public interest litigations. This can be attributed to the clear articulation of these 
rights by the framers of the Constitution.  
5.1 Right to Equality 
 Every instrument on human rights treats equality as a basic political and legal 
concept, proclaiming that all men are created equally and that all are equal in their 
rights and dignity. To recognize the equality of human beings is to recognize the 
prominence of persons in a world of things, if it is to draw the line between the human 
and non-human. To insist on the equality of man is to affirm humanity.10 Equality 
does not exclude anybody. To be equally members of human race is to have all the 
rights and privileges. Since the equality is a non-excluding principle, then, it follows 
that the right to recognition as a human is not subject to forfeit. Equality is the 
                                                 
9 For eg., M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, AIR 2000 SC1997; (2000) 6 SCC 213. 
10 Robert Ginsberg, Equal Worth of Persons, in Equality and Freedom and Comparative 
Jurisprudence, vol. I, (New York: Oceana), p.169. 
 149
inalienability and undeniability of being human.11 Equality does not mean uniforms. It 
means differences may have the same worth. 
 Right to equality is recognized under Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Article 7 provides that ‘all are equal before the law and are entitled 
without any discrimination to equal protection of laws’. Equality before the law is 
also recognized under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The 
opening sentence of Article 14 says: “All persons shall be equal before the courts and 
tribunals”. Indian Constitution guarantees this right to equality in its different aspects 
such as “equality before law and equal treatment of laws”; “Prohibition of 
discrimination on certain grounds” and “Enabling weaker sections of the society by 
providing special provisions”. Article 14 of the Constitution of India is similar to 
Article 7 of the Universal Declaration. It says, “The State shall not deny to any person 
equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of 
India”. 
 The underlying principle of equality under Article 14 is that all persons 
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities. Thus 
Article 14 is held to prohibit class legislation and not reasonable classification. That 
class legislation means conferring special privileges upon a class of persons selected 
arbitrarily. Reasonable classification is based on some real and substantial distinction 
capable of sustaining a reasonable relation with the object sought to be promoted by 
                                                 
11 Ibid  p.170. 
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the law,12 provided it is not arbitrary, artificial or evasive.13 The principle of 
reasonableness of classification under Article 14 was explained by Bhagwati J., as 
follows: Article 14 strikes out arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and 
equality of treatment. The principle of reasonableness, which logically as well as 
philosophically, is an element of equality and non-arbitrariness, pervades Article 14 
like a brooding omnipresence.14 The decisions of the Supreme Court repeatedly 
affirmed that equality means absence of arbitrariness and any action of the State that 
is arbitrary or unreasonable is violative of Article 14.The requirement of natural 
justice has thus come to be regarded as an integral part of the guarantee of equality in 
Article 14, because violation of a rule of natural justice results in arbitrariness which 
is the same as discrimination.15 For instance, in D.S Nakara v. Union of India,16 a 
voluntary organization which was non political, non profit making registered society 
espoused the cause of old pensioners who were denied benefits of liberalized pension. 
The Government had arbitrarily liberalized the pensions for employees retiring after 
31, March 1979 but withheld the benefits of those who retired prior to that date. The 
court held it violative of Article 14. The Court invalidated the classification of 
pensioners into two classes as arbitrary and made the liberalized pension scheme 
applicable to all pensioners without discrimination. In the context of another public 
                                                 
12 Monoponier Co. v. City of Los Angelis, 33 Cal. App. 675 
13 The Supreme Court has followed this principle in examining the violation of right to equality. 
14 In E.P.Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555; and also quoted in Maneka Gandhi v. 
Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597. 
15 Delhi Transport Corporation  v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, (1991) Supp 600. para 299. 
16 (1983) I SCC 305. 
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interest litigation17 challenging arbitrary award of contracts by the government, Court 
observed: ‘when arbitrariness and perversion are writ large and brought out clearly, 
the Court cannot shrink its duty and refuse its writ’. 
 In Indian Council of Legal Aid and Advice v. Bar Council of India,18 the 
Supreme Court invalidated Rule 9 of the Bar Council Rules, which was added to 
debar entry of persons above the age of 45 years for enrollment as advocates. The said 
rule 9 was challenged as arbitrary and unreasonable and thus violative of right to 
equality. The Court held that the age limit to debar certain specific group of persons 
from entering into the legal profession had no discernible reasons behind it and hence 
the rule was unreasonable and arbitrary.  
 Arbitrary allocation of petrol pumps and gas agencies by the petroleum 
minister to friends, relatives, employees and servants, was challenged in Common 
Cause v. Union of India.19 Acting on the public interest litigation by Mr. H.D. 
Shourie, of Common Cause, the Court set aside the allotment order as it held them to 
be wholly malafide, arbitrary and in nepotic manner. The court held that discretionary 
power must be exercised in accordance with Article 14, which does not allow the 
power to pick and choose arbitrarily. A transparent and objective criteria or procedure 
has been evolved so that the choice is based on reason, fair play and non-arbitrariness. 
                                                 
17 Chaitanya Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (1986) 2 SCC 594; AIR 1986 SC 825. 
18 (1995) 1 SCC 732. 
19 (1996) 6 SCC 530. 
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 A right against discrimination on certain grounds is guaranteed by Article 15. 
It provides that State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of 
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.20 As this provision is in 
absolute terms no classification can be validly made on grounds mentioned therein. 
 It is further provided that “no citizen shall on grounds only of religion, race, 
caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subjected to any disability, liability, 
restriction or condition with regard to access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and 
places of public entertainment, or with regard to the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, 
roads, and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or 
dedicated to the use of general public”.21 The prohibition being general in nature 
restrains the state as well as private individuals from making discrimination on the 
grounds prohibited therein. This entails that the practice of untouchabilities is 
prohibited under this provision as well as under Article 17. 
 Right to equality includes a right against discrimination in matters of public 
employment. Equality of opportunity in matters relating to employment to any office 
under the State is guaranteed and also there is prohibition against discrimination in 
matters of public employment on grounds of religion, race, sex, descent, place of 
birth, residence or any of them.22 
                                                 
20 Article 15 (1) of the Constitution. 
21 Article 15 (2) ibid. 
22 Article 16 (1) and (2) ibid. 
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 Equality of opportunity in public employment envisages gender equality 
including equal pay for equal work. Gender equality includes protection from sexual 
harassment and right to work with dignity, which is universally recognized as a basic 
human right. Equality in employment can be seriously impaired when women are 
subjected to gender specific violence, such as sexual harassment at workplace. Such 
conduct can be humiliating and may constitute a health and safety problem: It is 
discriminatory when the woman has reasonable grounds to believe that her objections 
would disadvantage her in connection with her employment, including recruiting or 
promotion or when it creates a hostile working environment. 
 Public interest litigation was brought by certain social activists and Non-
governmental organization with the aim of focusing attention towards societal 
aberrations, and assisting the finding of suitable methods for realizing the true concept 
of ‘gender equality’ in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan.23  It sought to prevent sexual 
harassment of workingwomen in all workplaces through judicial process, to fill the 
vacuum in existing legislation. The immediate cause for filing of this writ petition was 
an incident of alleged brutal gang rape of a social worker in a village in Rajasthan. 
The incident revealed the hazards to which a working woman may be exposed and the 
depravity to which sexual harassment can degenerate; and the urgency for safeguards 
by an alternative mechanism until any legislative measures are found. 
                                                 
23 AIR 1997 SC 241. 
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 The Court held that such incident results in violation of fundamental right of 
‘gender-equality’ and the ‘right to life and liberty’. It is a clear violation of the rights 
under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. 
 In the absence of domestic law occupying the field to formulate effective 
measures to check the evil of sexual harassment of working women at all workplaces, 
the contents of the International Conventions such as the Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and other norms 
are significant for the purpose of interpreting the right guaranteeing gender equality, 
right to work with human dignity, in Articles 14, 15, 19 (1) (g) and 21 of the 
Constitution and the safeguards against sexual harassments implicit therein. The 
Court further held that any international convention not inconsistent with the 
fundamental rights and in harmony with its spirit must be read into these provisions to 
enlarge the meaning and content thereof, to promote the object of the constitutional 
guarantee. This is implicit from Article 51 (c) of the Constitution and the enabling 
power of the Parliament to enact laws implementing the International Conventions 
and norms laid down thereunder by virtue of Article 253 read with entry 14 of the 
Union list in VII Schedule of the Constitution.  
 The court also held that in view of Article 10 of the Beijing Statement, Articles 
11, 22, 23 and 24 of CEDAW and the absence of enacted law to provide for the 
effective enforcement of the basic human rights of gender equality and guarantee 
against sexual harassment and abuse more particularly against sexual harassment at 
workplaces, the court laid down the guidelines and norms for due observance at all 
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workplaces or other institutions, until a legislation is enacted for the purpose. This is 
done in exercise of the power available under Article 32 of the Constitution for 
enforcement of the fundamental rights and it is further emphasized that this would be 
treated as the law declared by the Court under Article 141 of the Constitution. 
 Article 39 (d) of the Constitution lays down that the state shall direct its policy 
towards securing that there is equal pay for equal work for both men and women. This 
has also been given effect through the right to equality of opportunity in public 
employment. Court has taken Articles 14, 16 and 39(d) together to enforce equal pay 
for equal work as a constitutional imperative. In Karnataka State Private Colleges 
Stop Gap Lecturers Association v. State of Karnataka,24 where the issue related to 
discrimination in payment of salary between regular teachers and those appointed ad 
hoc, the Supreme Court held it to be arbitrary because it was against the rule of equal 
pay for equal work. 
 Uttarkhand Mahila Kalyan Parishad v. State of Uttar Pradesh25 was another 
decision against discrimination in payment for equal work. A  public interest litigation 
was brought by the Uttar Khand Mahila Kalyan Parishad alleging that lady teachers in 
the education department were discriminated against in matters of salary scales and 
availability of promotional opportunities. The court reaffirming ‘equal pay for equal 
work’ held preferential treatment of male teachers as against the lady teachers 
                                                 
24 AIR 1992 SC 677. 
25 (1993) Supp. (1) SCC 480. 
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constitutionally impermissible. Court also directed the State government to equate the 
pay scales of the teachers and examine the promotional avenues. 
5.2 Freedom of Opinion and Expression 
 Freedom of opinion and expression is a fundamental right and is the touchstone 
of all the freedoms with which the United Nations is deeply concerned. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, under Article 19 provides that everyone has the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression. This right includes freedom to hold opinions, 
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through 
any media and regardless of frontiers. In short, right to freedom of opinion and 
expression includes right to freedom of information.  
 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also incorporates 
similar provisions. Article 19 provides that ‘everyone shall have the right to hold 
opinions without interference and also have the right of expression. The right of 
expression shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and idea of 
all kinds, regardless of   frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of 
art, or through any other media of his choice’.26 However, this right carries with it 
certain duties and responsibilities and thus, may be subjected to certain restrictions 
necessary -   
(a) For respect of rights or reputation of others: 
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or 
morals. 
                                                 
26 Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
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However, these restrictions can only be imposed by law. 
 Clause (1) (a) of Article 19 of the Indian Constitution guarantees the right to 
freedom of speech and expression27 to all citizens of India. Reasonable restrictions 
may be imposed under Clause (2) of Article 19 on exercise of the right to freedom of 
speech and expression in the interest of “the sovereignty and integrity of India; the 
security of State; friendly relations with foreign states; public order; decency and 
morality; in relation to Contempt of Court; in relation to defamation; or in relation to 
incitement of an offence”.28  The restrictions in order to be reasonable must satisfy 
following conditions: (1) the restriction being imposed on the freedom of speech and 
expression must be in the interest of various objects mentioned in Article 19 (2); (2) 
the restrictions must be reasonable in the sense that it strikes a balance between the 
right to freedom of speech and expression and the purpose to be attained under Article 
19 (2). 
 This right implies a right to express one’s opinion and conviction orally or in 
writing or in print and it includes many other rights and freedoms like, the freedom of 
press, right to listen and the right to know. The freedom of expression has great 
significance in democratic societies. 
 The freedom of speech and expression includes the liberty of press within its 
scope and ambit because in the absence of free press the citizens may not be able to 
form enlightened opinion regarding the affairs of the State. The freedom of press also 
                                                 
27 Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution. 
28 Article 19 (2) of the Constitution. 
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implies propagation of ideas and freedom of circulation. Thus, imposition of pre-
censorship on publication is a restriction on the freedom of press, which is an 
essential part of the freedom of speech and expression; unless it is justified under 
clause (2) of Article19. 
 The fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression includes the right 
to communicate effectively and to large population not only in India but also abroad. 
A citizen has fundamental right to the best means of imparting and receiving the 
communication and as such has an access to the means of communication for that 
purpose like access to broadcasting or telecasting. The Court has held that a monopoly 
over the electronic media is inconsistent with the right to freedom of speech and 
expression.29   
 The right to strike is not an essential part of the freedom of association, 
expression or assembly. In Ranchi Bar Association v. State of Bihar30 the court has 
observed that state is duty bound to protect life, liberty and property from unlawful 
bandh and is liable to pay compensation for its failure to provide adequate protection. 
Further in B.L .Wadehra (Dr.) v. State (NCT of Delhi)31 it was propounded that 
lawyers cannot go on strike infringing the fundamental right of the litigants for speedy 
trial. Indulging in destructions of public or private property and causing loss of 
production and holding the society to ransom in the name of strike cannot be 
                                                 
29 Naikar. L.D, The Law Relating to Human Rights, (Bangalore: Puliani and Puliani, 2004), p.464. 
30 AIR 1999 Pat.169 at 180. 
31 AIR 2000 Del 266 at 287. 
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considered constitutional act based on the rights conferred by the Constitution under 
Article 19 (1) (C).32 
5.3 Right to Freedom of Association and Assembly 
 Right to assemble and associate, is a recognized human right in every state that 
adheres to democratic principles. This right comprises of two rights namely, the right 
to assemble and the right to associate. These two rights however, have close 
interrelation and interdependence to each other. Hence they are often said to be one 
right as is found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The provision of the 
Universal Declaration recognizing this right provides as follows: (1) Everyone has the 
right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. (2) No one may be compelled 
to belong to an association. 
 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees the right 
to assemble and associate in Articles 21 and 22 and also provide the circumstances in 
which these rights may be curtailed.33 The Articles provide that: “The right of 
peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise 
of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, 
public order (ordre public) the protection of public health or morals or the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others.”34 Further, everyone shall have the right to 
                                                 
32 Kerala Vyapari Vavasayi Ekopan Samithi v. State of Kerala, AIR 2000 Ker 389 at 400.  
33 Article.21and 22 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
34 Article 21 ibid. 
 160
freedom of association with others including the right to form and join trade unions 
for the protection of his interests.35 
 Since Article 22 deals with right to association, which includes trade unions, it 
lays down that this Article shall in no way prejudice the International Labour 
Organisation Convention, 1948.36 
 The Constitution of India in Article 19 (1) (b) guarantees to all its citizens the 
right to assemble peacefully and without arms. This right is, however, not absolute. It 
is subject to the restrictions imposed by Article 19 (3) in the interest of public order or 
the sovereignty and integrity of India. Thus, on analysis, the right to assemble is 
subject to following restrictions: (i) the assembly must be peaceful; (ii) the assembly 
must be unarmed; (iii) restrictions can be imposed under .Clause (3) of Article 19. 
 To some extent there is a common ground between Article 19 (1) which 
guarantees the right to freedom of speech and expression and Article 19 (1) (b) which 
guarantees the right to assemble. 
 The right to association is guaranteed under Indian Constitution under Article 
19 (1) (c). It provides that all citizens shall have the right to form associations and 
Unions.37 This right to association presupposes organization or permanent 
relationships between its members in matters of common concern. It thus includes the 
right to form companies, societies, partnership, and trade unions. This freedom to 
                                                 
35 Article. 22 (1) ibid. 
36 Article. 22 (3) ibid. 
37 Article 19 (1) (c) of the Constitution. 
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form association also implies the freedom to form or not to form, to join or not to join 
an association. 
 The right to form association becomes most vital to the functioning of any 
democracy, because without this right political parties can also not be formed, which 
are essential in parliamentary form of government.  
 The right to association guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (c) ensures the right of 
workers to form trade unions or labour unions. The objects of the trade unions are 
brought into being for collective bargaining and other related matters. The right to 
form trade union under this Article does not carry with it the fundamental right in the 
union to achieve every object for which it was formed. The existing Indian laws allow 
complete liberty of association so long as no particular statutory provision is 
infringed. 
5.4  Rights of the Accused: Right against Ex Post Facto Criminal Law and Self 
Incrimination 
 
 One of the basic principles of criminal law is that no person can be convicted 
of an offence for an act, which was not an offence under the law in force at the time it 
was committed, and an act cannot be made an offence by enacting legislation with 
retrospective effect. A person cannot be subjected to greater penalty for an offence 
than was provided under the law in force when the offence was committed. The right 
against self-incrimination is another important right conferred on the person accused 
of criminal offence. A person accused of an offence is presumed to be innocent till 
proved guilty and he need not make any statement against his will which is prejudicial 
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to his interests. These principles of criminal jurisprudence are recognized under 
international instruments and national legislations. 
 Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that 
‘Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty according to law in public trial at which he has had all the guarantees 
necessary for his defence.38 Further it provides that no one shall be held guilty of any 
penal offence on account of any act or omission, which did not constitute penal 
offence, under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor 
shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the 
penal offence was committed.39 
 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that ‘no one 
shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which 
did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time 
when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was 
applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. If subsequent to the 
commission of the offence, provision is made by law for imposition of lighter penalty, 
the offender shall benefit there by’.40 Under Article 14 (3) the covenant obliges the 
states parties to provide some minimum guarantees to persons who are charged with 
criminal offences. It specifically provides that in the determination of any criminal 
                                                 
38 Article 11 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
39 Article 11 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
40 Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
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charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the minimum guarantees, in full 
equality,41 not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.42 
 These above mentioned human rights of the person accused of an offence are 
guaranteed under the Constitution of India as fundamental rights under Article 20. 
The Article provides “ no person shall be convicted of any offence except for 
violation of a law in force at the time of commission of the act charged as an offence, 
nor be subjected to penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under 
the law in force at the time of commission of the offence”.43 
 First part of the provision guarantees protection against ex post facto operation 
of criminal law, and the second part guarantees that no penalty higher than that, which 
might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the 
offence, be imposed. The right against self-incrimination is guaranteed under Article 
20 (3) of the Constitution. It reads: “No person accused of any offence shall be 
compelled to be witness against himself”.44 
 The right against self incrimination recognizes the fundamental principle of 
criminal law that the accused must be presumed innocent, and it is for the prosecution 
to establish his guilt. The accused cannot be compelled to make any statement against 
his will. These propositions emanate from an apprehension that if the statements of 
the accused were admitted as evidence, then force or torture may be used by the 
                                                 
41 Article 14 (3) ibid. 
42 Article 14 (3) (g)  ibid. 
43 Article 20 (1) of the Constitution. 
44 Article 20 (3) ibid. 
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investigating authorities to trap the accused. This may be prejudicial or against the 
interest of the accused person. This right seeks to enable him to preserve his privacy, 
dignity and inviolability of his person from torture.45 
 These rights of the accused, recognised as human rights are given 
constitutional status in India, and are given due effect to. However, these have not 
been subject of public interest litigations. 
 The importance of the rights guaranteed under Article 20 is further evident 
from the fact that it has been treated on par with Article 21 dealing with right to life 
and liberty – which is the most basic right under Article 359 by the 44th Amendment 
to the Constitution. The said amendment made these rights absolute. Article 359 
empowers the President to suspend the right to enforce fundamental rights guaranteed 
under Part III of the Constitution. It now provides that where a Proclamation of 
Emergency is in operation, the President may by order declare that the right to move 
any Court for enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Part III except Articles 
20 and 21, as may be mentioned in the order and all proceedings pending in any court 
for the enforcement of the rights so mentioned shall remain suspended for the period 
during which the Proclamation is in force or for such shorter period as may be 
specified in the order.46 Thus the rights against ex post facto law and self-
incrimination are made absolute and non-derogable even during emergency. 
                                                 
45 See, Chapter VI Infra. 
46 Article 359 (1) of the Constitution.  
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5.5 Rights of the Arrested: Protection against Arbitrary Arrest and Detention in 
Certain Cases 
 
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in Article 9 exhaustively 
deals with the rights of the arrested person. It provides: ‘Anyone who is arrested shall 
be informed at the time of arrest, of reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly 
informed of any charges against him’. It further declares that ‘anyone arrested or 
detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a Judge or other 
officer authorized by a law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial 
within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be general rule that persons 
awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to 
appear for trial at any other stage of the judicial proceedings and, should occasion 
arise, for execution of the judgement’.47 Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by 
arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that 
court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his 
release if the detention is not lawful.48 
 Thus under this provision different rights of the person arrested are guaranteed. 
The same are conferred by the Constitution under Article 22 on person arrested. This 
Article reads: No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being 
informed, as soon as may be of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the 
right to consult and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice. Every person 
                                                 
47 Article9 (3) of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
48 Article 9 (4) ibid. 
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who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest 
magistrate, within a period of twenty four hours of such arrest excluding the time 
necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate and no 
such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority 
of magistrate. A person who is arrested for any offence has the following four rights 
protected under Article 22:  
(1) the right to be informed of ground of arrest ; 
(2) the right to consult and to be represented by a lawyer of his own choice. 
(3)  the right to be produced before magistrate within 24 hours ; and  
(4) the right not to be detained beyond 24 hours except by order of the magistrate. 
However these rights are not equally available to enemy aliens as well as 
persons arrested or detained under preventive detention laws.49 
The right of information of the grounds of arrest would enable the person 
arrested to prepare for his defence and also to move the court for bail, or writ of 
habeas corpus. Failure of communication of the grounds of arrest would entitle the 
person arrested to release. This right is also ensured under Section 50 of Criminal 
Procedure Code, which imposes the duty on the police officer who causes the arrest 
to inform the grounds of arrest.  
 The other right conferred; ‘the right to be represented by a lawyer’ has been 
liberally interpreted by the Court since the decision in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of 
                                                 
49 Article 22 (3) of the Constitution.  
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India.50 In this case as well as many other later cases, many public interest 
litigations,51 the court has held that it is an essential procedural requirement and no 
procedure can be fair and just which does not make available legal services to the 
accused, who is poor. Every person has a right to be represented by a lawyer and 
where he is poor and indigent, he is to be provided with lawyer for his defence at the 
cost of the State. The absence of legal representation would vitiate the trial and 
conviction would be set aside.52 Similar right is available to the accused under 
sections 303 and 304 of the Criminal Procedure Code.  
5.6 Right to Life and Personal Liberty 
 The rights to life, liberty and security of a person have acquired very 
significant place in various international human rights instruments. All the major 
international instruments53 dealing with human rights recognized the right to life and 
personal liberty. The scope of the right to life and liberty under these instruments is 
very wide too. 
Under the Indian Constitution Article 21 guarantees the right to life and personal 
liberty. The state is under a duty to protect life and liberty of every human being. 
Right to life under the Constitution of India is interpreted to include all the many 
aspects necessary to make the life worth living with dignity. As such it is held to 
                                                 
50 AIR 1978 SC 597. 
51 See Chapter VI infra. 
52 Sukdas v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh, AIR 1986. SC 991. 
53 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of  the Crime of Genocide and the 
International Covenant on Suppression and Punishment of Crime of Apartheid. 
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include a number of other rights basic to every human being but not yet included as 
fundamental rights, enforceable under the Constitution by the Courts of law. The 
rights to life with other rights found to emanate from it have been subjects of many 
public interest litigations. A detailed study of the enforcement of these rights through 
public interest litigations is being undertaken in the next chapter.54 As the present 
Article 21-A is also interpreted by the Courts as emanating from right to life, it is also 
discussed in the same chapter.55 
5.7 Right against Exploitation 
 Slavery in every form of its manifestation is a serious violation of human 
rights. It amounts to abuse of human power and a disgrace to the human rights 
standards accepted internationally by States. Slavery Convention of 1926 defined 
slavery as the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers 
attaching to the right of ownership are exercised. 
 In traditional sense, slavery meant “a status or condition of a person over 
whom the rights of ownership and absolute control are exercised”. It means “persons 
who are not free and are owned by their masters. – This was chattel slavery”. 
However, in the modern world slavery includes the destruction of the judicial 
personality of a person. Every person has the right to recognition as a person before 
                                                 
54 Infra  Chapter VI. 
55 Ibid. 
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the law,56 and deprivation of judicial personality of a person amounts to slavery or 
enslavement.  
 Servitude means subjection to compulsory labour and includes slavery also.57 
Practices of debt-bondage, serfdom, any institution or practice of exploitation of 
women and children are considered slavery like practices.58 The system of 
compulsory or forced labour is one of recent origin. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, though, under Article 4 refers to slavery and servitude, does not 
specifically refer to compulsory or forced labour. It can be argued that it is covered 
under the practices prohibited under Article 4, as it lays down: “No one shall be held 
in slavery or servitude: Slavery and slave trade shall be prohibited in all their 
forms”.59 International Labour Organisation also has shown concern for prohibiting 
forced labour.60  
 Article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, in 
para (3) provides that no one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory 
labour. Article 8 reads as follows:  
                                                 
56 Article 6 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
57 Slavery refers to the worst form of bondages; Servitude covers all forms of man’s dominance of 
man including slavery. 
58 Article 6 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
provides that States parties shall take all appropriate means to suppress all forms of traffic in women 
and exploitation of prostitution of women. 
59 Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
60 ILO adopted Forced Labour Convention, 1930 for suppression of forced labour. Further, Abolition 
of Forced Labour Convention was adopted in 1957. Under Art.2 State Parties undertook to initiate 
effective measures to immediate and complete abolition of forced or compulsory labour. 
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“(1) No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and slave trade in all their forms shall 
be prohibited. 
   (2) No one shall be held in servitude. 
   (3) No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour …”61 
Article 23 of Constitution of India also guarantees protection against slavery 
and forced labour. Article 23, which provides for prohibition of traffic in human 
beings and forced labour reads:  
(1) Traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced 
labour are prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be 
offence punishable in accordance with law. 
The institution of slavery in its traditional form had never been prevalent in 
India; therefore, no specific provisions are incorporated in the Constitution of India in 
this regard. However, Clause (1) of Article 23 prohibits inter alia, “traffic in human 
beings”62 and recognizes it as an offence punishable in accordance with law.  
The expression “traffic in human beings” is of very wide amplitude and covers 
slavery in every form of its manifestation, be it in traditional form, like chattel slavery 
or in contemporary forms, such as, the sale of children, the sexual abuse of female 
children, debt bondage, or the exploitation or the prostitution of others.63 In India, 
                                                 
61 Article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil Political Rights, 1966. 
62 Which means buying, selling, disposing of human beings in the same way as the goods and chattels 
is dealt with. 
63 Sections 370 to 375 of Indian Penal Code prohibit slavery and make it punishable; further. Article 
35 authorises the Parliament to make laws to punish act prohibited under Article 23. The Immoral 
Traffic (Prevention) Act 1956 is passed to prevent and punish traffic in human beings. 
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begar and other similar forms of labour are prohibited subject to the exception of 
compulsory service for public purposes, provided the state does not discriminate on 
grounds only of religion, race, caste or class or any of them.64 
Begar is involuntary work without remuneration. Not only begar but every 
form of forced labour, begar or other forms – is prohibited by Article 23 and it makes 
no difference whether the person is forced to give his labour or service to another is 
paid remuneration or not. Even if remuneration is paid, labour or services supplied by 
a person would be hit by this Article, if it is forced labour, e.g., labour supplied not 
willingly but as a result of force or compulsion. No one shall be forced to provide 
labour or service against his will even though it be under a contract of service.65 
In Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India,66 the court 
interpreted the term ‘force’ very widely to include ‘not only physical or legal force 
but also force arising from the compulsion of economic circumstances which leaves 
no choice of alternatives to a person in want and compels him to provide labour or 
service even though the remuneration received for it is less than minimum wages.67 
Thus, remuneration less than minimum wage for service rendered amounts to forced 
labour. In this case, Re.1 each was deducted from the wages of workers employed by 
contractors, as a result of which workers got less than minimum wages. The Court 
held that it was violative of fundamental right. 
                                                 
64 U. Chandra, Human Rights, (Allahabad: Allahabad Law Agency Publications, 1999), p. 90. 
65 Article 23 (2) of  the Constitution of India. 
66 (1982) 2 SCC 494; AIR 1982 SC 1943. 
67 J.N. Pandey, Constitutional Law of India, 37th ed. (Allahabad: Central Law Agency, 2001), p.273. 
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In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India,68 where action was initiated 
through public interest litigation alleging practice of bonded labour, the court held 
that the government should welcome it, as it may give the government an opportunity 
to examine whether bonded labour system still exists as well as to take appropriate 
steps to eradicate that, as it is the Constitutional obligation of government to prohibit 
such forced labour. Court observed that bonded labour is a form of forced labour 
which is prohibited under Article 23 of the Constitution and Section 12 of the Bonded 
Labour (Abolition) Act, 1976, recognizes this proposition. A bonded labour means a 
labourer who incurs or has or is presumed to have incurred a bonded debt and bonded 
debt means an advance obtained or presumed to have been obtained by a bonded 
labourer under or in pursuance of the bonded labour system.... unless he is made to 
provide such labour in pursuance of any custom or social obligation, or by reason of 
his birth in any particular caste or community. Therefore, wherever it is shown that a 
labourer is made to provide forced labour court would raise a presumption that he is 
required to do so in consideration of an advance or other economic consideration 
received by him and he is therefore a bonded labourer.69 
 
In Neeraja Chaudhary v. State of Madhya Pradesh,70 a journalist addressed a 
letter to a Judge of the Supreme Court complaining that 135 bonded labourers within 
                                                 
68 AIR 1984 SC 802. 
69 K. Gururajachar, Supreme Court Selected Leading Cases, (Allahabad: Wadhwa and Company, 
1999), pp.199-200. 
70 (1984) 3 SCC 243. 
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the meaning of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 working in the stone 
quarries in Faridabad, who had been released from bondage in pursuance of an order 
made by the Supreme Court and had been brought back to their respective villages in 
Madhya Pradesh with a promise of rehabilitation by the Chief Minister of the state, 
had not been rehabilitated even after a lapse of six months since their release and as a 
result of that they were almost on the verge of starvation. The Court held that it is the 
plainest requirement of Articles 21 and 23 that bonded labourers must be identified 
and released and on release, they must be suitably rehabilitated. The Bonded Labour 
System (Abolition) Act, 1976 has been enacted pursuant to the Directive Principles of 
State Policy with a view to ensuring basic human dignity to the bonded labourer and 
any failure of action on part of the State Government in implementing the provisions 
of this legislation would be the clearest violation of Article 21 apart from Article 23. 
The Court added that freedom from bondage without effective rehabilitation neglects 
such freedom and would frustrate the entire process of the Act, for, in that event the 
freed labourer in all probability will have to slide back into bondage again to keep his 
body and soul together. 
Further, a number of directions were given to the state government also 
regarding adequate payment and taking care to protect workmen from the hands of the 
employers.71 The Court also held that the state was under a duty to rehabilitate freed 
                                                 
71 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, supra n. 68; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. State of Tamil 
Nadu AIR 1986 (Supp) SCC 541; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1991) 4 SCC 174 etc. 
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bonded labourer.72 Court observed that not only identifying and releasing of bonded 
labourers, but their rehabilitation is equally important and state governments were 
directed to take steps to rehabilitate the bonded labour.73 
5.8 Right to Religion 
Religious tolerance and equal treatment of all religious groups are essential 
parts of secularism. Secularism in India does not mean irreligion. It means respect for 
all faiths and religions. The State does not identify itself with any particular religion.74 
India being a secular state, there is no State religion or preferred religion as such and 
all religious groups enjoy the same constitutional protection without any favour or 
discrimination.75 The right to religion in India is in tune with the right recognized 
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is also found incorporated 
in International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights under Article 18 provides that 
everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship and observance. 
                                                 
72 Neeraja Chowdhary v. State of Madhya Pradesh. AIR 1984 SC 1099; (1984) 3 SCC 243. 
73 Upendra Baxi v. State of Madhya Pradesh. (1986) Supp. SCC 558; Santhal Pargana Antyodaya 
Ashram v. State of Bihar (1986) Supp SCC. 541; Santhal Pargana Antyodaya Ashram v. State of 
Bihar, (1987) Supp. SCC 141 ; Balram v. State of M.P. (1992) Supp. 2 SCC 93; and Rajangam, 
Secretary District Beedi workers Union v. State of Tamil Nadu. (1992) 1 SCC 221. 
74 Dr.S. RadhaKrishnan, in “Secularism in India”, (Ed.V.K.Sinha), 127 (1968) cited in M.P. Jain, 
Indian Constitutional Law 5th ed. (New Delhi: Wadhwa and Company, Nagpur, 2003), p.1405. 
75 M.P. Jain. ibid. 
 175
Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights makes 
similar provisions guaranteeing freedom of thought, conscience and religion includes 
– (1) the right to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice; and (2) the right to 
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, and teaching either 
individually or in community with others and in public or private. 
It may be mentioned that no restrictions of any kind can be imposed upon 
man’s inner thoughts, moral consciousness or his belief towards God. But reasonable 
restrictions may be imposed upon the external manifestation of thought, conscience, 
religion or belief.76 Thus Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights provides that such limitations may be imposed upon the manifestation 
that may be prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health 
or morals or fundamental rights or freedoms of others. Further no one shall be coerced 
to impair his freedom to have or adopt a religion of his choice. 
Articles 25 to 28 of the Indian Constitution seek to protect religion and 
religious practices from state interference. They confer certain rights relating to 
freedom of religion. These rights are conferred not only on citizens but also on all 
persons in India; not only to individuals but also religious groups. The Indian 
Constitution establishes a secular state. The concept of secularism is implicit in the 
Preamble, which declares to secure to all its citizens, ‘liberty of thought, faith and 
worship’. 
                                                 
76 Dr.U.Chandra, Supra n. 64, p.158. 
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Explaining the secular character of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has 
said, “there is no mysticism in the secular character of the State. Secularism is neither 
anti-God nor pro-God; it treats alike the devout, the agnostic and atheistic. It 
eliminates Gods from the matters of State, ensures that no one shall be discriminated 
against on the ground of religion”.77  
The Supreme Court has interpreted the provision relating right to religion with 
a view to promote religious harmony. It has on the whole, leaned towards the minority 
groups and has conceded to them certain rights above the majority rights.78 So it has 
asserted that it is clear from the constitutional scheme that it guarantees equality in the 
matter of all individuals and groups irrespective of their faith emphasising that there is 
no religion of the State itself. 
Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of conscience and free 
profession, practice and propagation of religion. It provides that ‘subject to public 
order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are 
equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and 
propagate religion.79 Thus, Article 25 protects two freedoms namely: (1) freedom of 
conscience; (2) freedom to profess, practice and propagate religion. 
Article 26 gives special protection to religious denominations. It lays down that 
every religious denomination or a section thereof has the right – (a) to establish and 
                                                 
77 The Ahmedabad St .Xavier’s College Society  v.  State of  Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1389. 
78 M.P. Jain, supra n.74,  p.1406. 
79 Article 25 (1) of the Constitution. 
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maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) to manage its own 
affairs in matters of religion; (c) to own and acquire moveable and immoveable 
property; and (d) to administer such property in accordance with law. 
This right is subject to public order, morality and health as in case of right 
under Article 25. While Article 25 confers particular rights on all persons, Article 26 
is confined to religious denominations or any section thereof. A collective right of 
religion is, thus, guaranteed under Article 26. The expression “religious 
denomination” here means a religious sect having a common faith and organization 
and designated by a distinctive name. The words ‘religious denomination’ take their 
colour from the word ‘religion’. Therefore, in case of denomination, there must be a 
common faith of the community based on religion and the community members must 
have common religious tenets, peculiar to themselves. 
As noted earlier in the context of certain freedoms under Article 19 and also 
rights of the accused persons under Article 20, in the case of rights relating to religion 
also there are no public interest litigations. However, it is to be noted that, whereas the 
right to religion as a human right is recognized under the Declaration of Human 
Rights as well as the Covenants, the scope of right to religion as a fundamental right 
under Indian Constitution is much wider than former. 
A person can exercise his religious freedom so long as it does not come into 
conflict with the fundamental rights of others. The Supreme Court has observed that 
“no rights in an organized society can be absolute. Enjoyment of one’s rights must be 
consistent with the enjoyment of rights also by others. Wherein a free play of social 
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forces it is not possible to bring about a voluntary harmony, the State has to step in to 
set right the imbalance between competing rights”.80 
The Court has further observed that a particular fundamental right cannot exist 
in isolation in a watertight compartment. One fundamental right of a person may have 
to co-exist in harmony with the exercise of another fundamental right by others also, 
with reasonable and valid exercise of power by the state in light of the directive 
principles in the interest of social welfare as a whole.  
The Supreme Court has ruled that the use of loudspeakers by a particular 
community at the time of prayers is subject to the provisions of the Environment 
(Protection) Act, 1986. No religion prescribes or preaches that prayers are to be 
performed through loudspeakers. Any such practice should not affect the rights of 
others.81 In Aruna Roy v. Union of India,82 the Supreme Court has ruled that the 
concept of secularism is not endangered if the basic tenets of all religions all over the 
world are studied and learnt. 
The State is empowered to regulate secular activities associated with religious 
practices. The State is not entitled to regulate religious practices as such. What the 
State can regulate under Article 25 (2) (a) are the activities, which are really of an 
economic, commercial or political character though these may be associated with 
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religious practices. In Dr. Ismail Faroqui v. Union of India,83 the Supreme Court has 
considered the question of acquisition of religious place by state. A temple, church or 
a mosque, etc are essentially immovable properties and subject to protection under 
Articles 25 and 26. Every immoveable property is liable to be acquired. While offer of 
prayer or worship is a religious practice, its offering at every location where such 
prayers can be offered would not be essential or integral part of such religious practice 
unless the place has a particular   significance for that religion so as to form an 
essential or integral part thereof. The Court here tried to differentiate between 
“essential parts” of religious practice. It has held that offer of prayer or worship is a 
religious practice; its offering at every location would not be essential religious 
practice. What is protected under Articles 25 and 26 is a religious practice, which 
forms an essential part of religious practice. 
5.9 Cultural and Educational Rights 
Article 29 of the Constitution of India guarantees protection of interests of 
minorities. According to Article 29 (1) any section of the citizens residing in any part 
of India having a distinct language, script or culture of its own has the right “to 
conserve the same”. This clause protects the language, script or culture of a section of 
the citizens. To invoke the protection under this clause it is essential that a section of 
the citizens residing in India should have a distinct language, script or culture of its 
own, and then they have the right to protect the same. 
                                                 
83 AIR 1995 SC 605; (1994) 6 SCC 360. 
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Article 29(2) provides that admission is not to be denied to any citizen into any 
educational institution maintained by the state or receiving aid out of the state funds, 
on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. It thereby 
guarantees the rights of a citizen as an individual irrespective of the community to 
which he belongs. This provision is broad and unqualified. It is not confined to 
minority groups but extends to all citizens whether belonging to majority or minority 
groups in the matter of admission to the educational institutions maintained by or 
aided by the state. Article 29 (2) extends protection against the state, or anybody else, 
who denies the right conferred by it. It gives protection against only a particular 
species of wrong namely, denial of admission into state aided or maintained 
educational institutions. Further Article 30 guarantees the right of a minority to 
establish educational institutions. Under this Article the linguistic and religious 
minorities are given the right to establish and the right to administer the educational 
institutions of their choice. 
5.10 Right to Remedy 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the right to remedy under 
Article 8. It provides that everyone has the right to an effective remedy by competent 
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted to him by the 
Constitutions or by law. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does 
not directly recognize or guarantee the right to effective remedy as provided in the 
Universal Declaration. However this right is definitely recognized in other provisions 
where states are obligated to ensure the enjoyment of rights by legal process. It 
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provides that ‘where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures 
each state party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps in 
accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present 
Covenant, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give 
effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant’84. Further it provides that ‘ 
each state party to the Covenant undertakes (a) to ensure that any person whose rights 
are or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, 
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in official 
capacity; (b) to ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right 
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or 
by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the state, and to 
develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; (c) to ensure that the competent authority 
shall enforce such remedies when granted’85. Such a right to remedy is guaranteed 
under the Constitution. 
Declaration of any rights is meaningless unless there is effective machinery for 
the enforcement of such rights and for remedy in case of violations. It is the remedy, 
which makes the right real, and worthwhile Article 32 of the Constitution guarantees 
such remedial right. Dr. Ambedkar called it “the very soul of the Constitution and the 
very heart of it.86 Article 32 (1) guarantees the right to move the Supreme Court by 
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86 CAD  Vol. VII at 953. 
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“appropriate proceedings” for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Clause (2) 
confers power on the Supreme Court to issue appropriate direction, or orders or writs, 
including the writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo 
warranto and certiorari.  
Article 32(1) says that the right to move the Supreme Court by ‘appropriate 
proceeding’ for the enforcement of rights conferred by this part is guaranteed. There 
is no freedom to move the Supreme Court by all sorts of proceedings but only by 
“appropriate proceedings’.  ‘Appropriate proceedings’ has reference to clause (2) of 
Article 32. Only those proceedings are appropriate which invoke, by original petition, 
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to issue, according to nature of the case, writs or 
orders or directions of the types described in clause (2). There is no limitation in 
regard to the kind of proceedings envisaged in clause (1) of Article 32 except that the 
proceedings must be appropriate and this requirement of appropriateness must be 
judged in the light of the purpose for which the proceeding is to be taken, namely, 
enforcement of fundamental right87. 
Article 32 of the Constitution gives the Supreme Court very wide discretion in 
the matter of framing writs to suit the exigencies of particular cases and the 
application of the petitioner cannot be thrown out simply on the ground that the 
proper writ or direction has not been prayed for. Clause (2) empowers the Supreme 
Court to issue directions or orders or writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, 
prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate for the 
                                                 
87 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 802, at 813-814. 
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enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. The court has 
clarified that the power of granting writs is not confined to the five writs specified in 
clause (2) of Article 32, because the power is given in inclusive terms and it is given 
to issue writs in the nature of the five specified therein but not exactly the same. 
Therefore, even if the conditions for issue of any of the five specified writs are not 
fulfilled the Supreme Court may still issue a writ in an appropriate case. 
The power of the Supreme Court under clause (2) is not confined only to the 
issuance of writs. It extends to issuing of any directions or orders that may be 
appropriate for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights. ‘The power of the 
court is not only injunctive in ambit, that is, preventing the infringement of a 
fundamental right, but it is also remedial in scope and provides relief against a breach 
of a fundamental right already committed88. Clause (2) does not lay down the 
procedure which the court has to follow in the enforcement of fundamental rights, the 
court can devise appropriate procedures within the broad judicial parameters to suit 
the enforcement of a fundamental right. The court is not bound by the adversary 
procedure envisaged in the procedural laws and can devise inquisitorial or other 
suitable procedure to achieve the object and purpose of Article 32. Such an approach 
to Article 32 is more in consonance to the social reality where majority of the people 
cannot properly fight out their claims due to poverty, ignorance and other similar 
factors. 
                                                 
88 M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1086, at 1091;( 1987) 1 SCC  395. 
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The court has held that Article 32 does not merely confer power on it but also 
lays a constitutional obligation to protect the fundamental rights of the people and for 
that purpose the court has all incidental and ancillary powers including the power to 
forge new remedies and fashion new strategies designed to enforce the fundamental 
rights89. While Article 9 (5) of the International Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights is a remedial right providing for compensation for violation of right against 
unlawful arrest and detention, Article 32 is wider in scope though it does not 
expressly mention right to compensation.  
In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India90 the Supreme Court held that the scope of 
Article 32 is wide enough to include the power to grant compensation for violation of 
fundamental rights. The power of the Court is not merely preventive, that is 
preventing the infringement of fundamental rights but also remedial in nature, i.e. 
power to grant compensation. The power of the court to grant such remedial relief 
includes the power to award compensation in appropriate cases and not in every case. 
Appropriate cases are those cases where “the infringement of the fundamental right is 
gross and patent”. It is incontrovertible and ex-glaring and either such infringement is 
on a large scale affecting a large number of persons or it is unjust and unduly harsh or 
oppressive on account of their disability or disadvantaged position to require the 
aggrieved to initiate or pursue the action in civil court.  
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Another early example of public interest litigation is Sebastian M. Hongray v. 
Union of India,91 seeking enforcement of right to remedy for violation of human 
rights of two persons who were whisked away and detained by army officer in charge 
and were held incommunicado. Sebastian. M. Hongray, a student of Jawaharlal Nehru 
University, Delhi moved the petition of habeas corpus. The Court in this case 
awarded compensation for the violation of the rights to person, torture, agony and 
mental oppression suffered by the wives of the two men. 
In Delhi Domestic Working Women’s Forum v. Union of India,92 a public 
interest litigation was filed under Article 32 at the instance of the petitioner, Delhi 
Domestic Working Women’s Forum, to expose the pathetic condition of four 
domestic women servants who were raped by seven army personnel in a running train. 
The women were traveling from Ranchi to Delhi by the Muri Express. As rape is 
violative of person as well as the dignity of women court held it to be infringement of 
fundamental rights. Court laid down that compensation to victims shall be awarded by 
the court on conviction of offender and by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board 
whether or not a conviction has taken place. It directed the government to set 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. In another public interest litigation93 by the 
Peoples Union for Civil Liberties the court awarded compensation in writ petition 
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92 (1995)  I SCC 14. 
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filed under Article 32 for the killing of two persons in fake encounters by police.94 
This right was further recognized and enforced in a number of later cases95 and it has 
been established that right to compensation as a human right is an enforceable 
fundamental right. 
5.11 Conclusion 
By adopting a creative approach in interpreting Part III and Part IV of the 
Constitution, which are both fundamental, the higher judiciary has brought home to 
every common man not only civil and political rights but also economic, social and 
cultural rights. In doing so, the courts have liberally referred to the international 
human rights instruments. Relying on the international charters of human rights the 
courts have read in to the domestic system certain rights that are not expressly 
enumerated in the constitution. A right against sexual harassment at the place of work 
provides a marvelous illustration of such approach. 
The right to equality, freedoms of Article 19, rights of the accused, right 
against exploitation, right to remedy etc., have been interpreted in public interest 
litigations to mean much more than what they appeared to connote initially. Now the 
liberty in its diverse facets has come to be better protected due to the dynamic 
approach of the courts in public interest litigations. Because of this, the human rights 
of common man have really become a limitation on the power of the State. 
  
                                                 
94 Ibid. 
95 See Right to Compensation, Infra Chapter VI. 
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CHAPTER VI 
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHT TO LIFE: INCLUSION 
OF SOME SPECIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS INTO IT 
 
 In a democratic polity like India the Judiciary is an indispensable and 
important organ of governance. It is a sharpened device to protect the personality of 
human beings in the collective efforts of forging social progress. Since individualism 
prevailed over the collective existence of human beings the judiciary too applied 
innovative technique to recognize the individual as a subject of right by extending the 
meaning and scope of right whereby a liaison got established between the public, 
governance and the rule of law.1 Hence, persons not directly aggrieved or affected 
could espouse the cause of actually affected or aggrieved persons, thereby every 
person could enjoy the right of access to justice. Effective access to justice is itself a 
basic human right. It is a requirement of a system which purports to guarantee human 
rights, and Indian judiciary has secured this right to the people.  
 The judiciary has not only protected the rights given in the written chapter but 
read in new positive rights also. Judicial decisions contributed tremendously to bring 
out essence of fundamental rights enshrined in the Indian Constitution. It desired to 
discover hidden facts about the existing concepts and ideas of fundamental rights2 and 
has accomplished the task to a great extent. 
                                                 
1 Furquan Ahmad, “Compensation for Arbitrary Arrest and Custodial Death: A Basic Human Right”, 
(2003) 27.C U.L.R., p.41 at 42. 
2 Ibid. 
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 Part III of the Constitution incorporated many of the civil and political rights 
recognized under international human rights instruments. Protection of right to life 
and liberty is the most important right guaranteed under Article 21. Initially, the right 
to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India was restricted to the protection 
against any arbitrary arrest or to protection of life and limb. But now due to the new 
dimension given by judicial activism, the right to life has come to include variety of 
rights which are very essential to enjoy life with human dignity3. These are the rights 
which are not expressly mentioned in the constitution, but they are either subsumed 
under the existing fundamental right or have been held to emanate from the existing 
right under the theory of emanation. Many unenumerated rights have been held by the 
courts to come within the ambit of Article 21 of the Constitution. They are, right to 
livelihood, right to environment, right to speedy trial, right to legal aid, right to health 
care, right to education, right to release and rehabilitation of bonded labour, rights 
against custodial violence, right against hand cuffing, right against public hanging, 
right against delayed execution and right to compensation.  
 So far as human rights concerning economic, social and cultural aspects are 
concerned they are exhaustively mentioned in the Indian Constitution under Directive 
Principles of State Policies. Though the directive principles are not enforceable 
through Courts yet they are not less important than the human rights covered under 
the heading of fundamental rights. Along with the list of fundamental rights the 
                                                 
3 N. S. Kamboj, “Human Rights and Judicial Activism” 41 J.I.L.I. 1999,  p.111. 
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Directive Principles of State Policy are the ‘Conscience of the Constitution’.4 Clauses 
1, 5 and 6 of the Objectives Resolution make up the Preamble. The goals of human 
rights can be read from this Preamble as a political, social, economic and cultural 
revolution that the people of India have committed themselves to. The scope of 
human rights in the form of fundamental rights is far greater than that under the 
international human rights instruments to which India is a party. So far as the binding 
nature is concerned, the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution are not 
only binding but are also enforceable through the Courts of law. While the courts 
have interpreted those human rights included in directive principles as part of 
fundamental rights and specifically those as part of right to life, they too have become 
binding and enforceable. In this endeavour public interest litigations have brought 
many of the matters affecting human rights of the people before the court and, the 
court has given significant decisions regarding such aspects which are included as part 
of right to life. The present chapter deals with such human rights protected under 
international human rights law, which find place in part IV of the Constitution and are 
read into Article 21 by the Courts, while deciding cases filed by public spirited 
individuals and groups to secure such rights to the deprived classes of the society. 
6.1 Right to Livelihood 
 Struggle for survival and for earning the livelihood is primarily a person’s 
individual responsibility. The recognition of human rights in the welfare states, 
however, has now led to recognition of obligation of state to assist in survival of the 
                                                 
4 Sankar Ghose,  Political Idea and Movements in India , (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1975), p.234. 
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needy. International recognition of socio-economic rights and inclusion of directive 
principles in the Constitution and their wide interpretations by the Courts have led to 
recognition of right to livelihood as a component of “right to life”. This is evident 
from the observation of the Supreme Court that “if the right to livelihood is not 
treated as part of the constitutional right to life the easiest way of depriving a person 
of his right to life would be to deprive him of his livelihood to the point of 
abrogation.5 The right to livelihood came to be founded on this assertion. Deprive a 
person of his livelihood and you shall have deprived him of his life.6 
 Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads : (1) Everyone 
has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing of himself 
and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary 
social services and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, 
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstance beyond his 
control and then suggests a larger obligation on the States as against their subjects.  
 The Constitution of India in Article 39(a) provides that “the State shall in 
particular, direct its policy towards securing that the citizens, men and women 
equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood. As the provision is in the 
form of a directive, State may not, by affirmative action, be compelled to provide 
adequate means of livelihood or work to the citizens. It is to be noted here that 
Article.37 of the Constitution has expressly made provisions of directive principles 
                                                 
5 Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545; AIR 1986 SC 180. 
6 Ibid  p.194. 
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unenforceable through a court of law. However, now any person deprived of his right 
to livelihood except according to just and fair procedure established by law can 
challenge the deprivation as offending the right to life conferred by Article 21 due to 
judicial interpretation. 
 Deprivation of livelihood would not only denude the life of its effective 
content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live. And yet such 
deprivation of life would not be in accordance with procedure established by law, if 
the right to livelihood is not regarded as a part of the right to life.7 Still, for long the 
Courts held the view that right to life in Article 21 does not include right to 
livelihood.8 
 Supreme Court in the Post-Emergency period started recognizing 
“unenumerated fundamental rights by reading directive principles into fundamental 
rights on the ground that right to life under Article 21 includes right to livelihood”.9 In 
Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India,10 Bhagwati J., wrote: “there 
is the complaint of non observance of the provisions of the Contract Labour 
(Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and the Interstate Migrant Workmen 
(Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act 1979 and this is also in our 
                                                 
7 M.P.Jain, Indian Constitutioal Law  5th ed. (New Delhi: Wadhwa and Company, Nagpur, 2003), 
p.1313. 
8 Re Sant Ram, AIR 1960 SC 932; A.V. Nachane v. Union of India (1982) I SCC 205; B.B. Raju v. 
Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 1073.  
9 Rajeev Dhavan, “Promises, Promises: Human Rights in India,” 39 J. I. L. I. 149 (170) 1977. 
10 (1982) 3 SCC 235. 
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opinion a complaint relating to violation of Article 21.”11Bhagwati J., further said that 
‘the article has acquired a new dimension as a result of the decision of the Court in 
Maneka Gandhi and it has received its most expressive interpretation in Francis 
Coralie’.12 
 Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation,13 popularly called the 
‘pavement dwellers case’ finally established the right to livelihood as an aspect of 
declared fundamental right. In this case, the petitioners had challenged the validity of 
certain provisions of Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 which empowered the 
Municipal Authorities to remove their huts from pavements and public places on the 
ground that their removal amounted to depriving them of their right to livelihood and 
hence it was violative of Article 21. While agreeing that the right to livelihood is 
included in Article 21 the Court held that it can be curbed or curtailed by following 
just and fair procedure. Thus it held the provisions of Bombay Municipal Corporation 
Act valid and thereby failed to secure the right to the poor and the right recognized 
became a “right without remedy”.14 In order to minimize the hardship on eviction, 
Court directed that they be removed only after the end of monsoon. The five judges 
bench of the Court finally ruled that the word ‘life’ in Article 21 included ‘right to 
                                                 
11 Ibid; 1982 (1) SCALE 818 para 11, as reproduced in Supreme Court on Public Interest Litigation-
Cases and Materials, vol II, (New Delhi:  LIPS Publication), p.37. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Supra n.5. 
14 Clark D. Cunningham, “Public Interest Litigation in Indian Supreme Court: A Study in the Light of 
American Experience” 28, J.I.L.I. (1987) 494 at 512. 
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livelihood’ when it said ‘the right to livelihood is born out of the right to life, as no 
person can live without the means of livelihood’. The Court observed:  
 “….. The question which we have to consider is whether the right to life 
includes the right to livelihood. We see only one answer to that 
question, namely, that it does. The sweep of the right to life conferred 
by Article 21 is wide and far-reaching. It does not mean, merely that life 
cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition 
and execution of the death sentence, except according to procedure 
established by law. That is but one aspect of right to life. An equally 
important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because, no person 
can live without the means of living, that is, the means of 
livelihood…… There is thus a close nexus between life and the means 
of livelihood and as such, that, which alone makes it possible to live, 
leave aside what makes it liveable, must be deemed to be an integral 
component of the right to life”.15 
 
 In view of the fact that Article 39(a) and 41 require the state to secure to the 
citizen an adequate means of livelihood and the right to work it would be sheer 
pendetary to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of the right to life.16 
 Further upholding the right of the people in hill areas for suitable approach 
road the court held that the “right to life in Article 21 embraces not only physical 
existence of life but also quality of life and for residents of hilly areas access to road 
                                                 
15 Supra  n.5, p.572; p.194; See also Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C . Mazdoor Congress, AIR 
1991 SC 101. 
16 Supra n.5. p.193  
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is access to life”.17 Right of agriculturists to cultivation is also held as part of their 
right to livelihood.18 
 Another important decision of the Supreme Court, in Delhi Development 
Horticulture Employees Union v. Delhi Administration19 recognized the right to 
livelihood. Court here held that the illegal or improper termination of employment of 
workmen amounts to deprivation of livelihood even though the Constitution does not 
recognize a fundamental right to work. The Court stated that broadly interpreted and 
as a necessary logical corollary, the right to life would include right to livelihood and 
thus right to work. But this is to protect persons against deprivation and does not 
obligate the state to provide work or livelihood to the people. There is no such 
positive obligation on the State.20 Hence the Court said that ‘this country has so far 
not found feasible to incorporate the right to livelihood as a fundamental right in the 
Constitution. This is because the country has so far not attained the capacity to 
guarantee it and not because it considers it any the less fundamental to life. Advisedly 
therefore, it has been placed in the chapter on Directive Principles, Article 41 of 
which enjoins upon the State to make effective provision for securing the same, 
“within the limits of its economic capacity and development.”21 
                                                 
17 State of Madhya Pradesh v. Umed Ram Sharma, (1996) 2 SCC 68 at 78; AIR 1996 SC 847. 
18 Charan Singh v. State of Punjab (1997) SCC 151; Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd v. Union of 
India.(1996) 10 SCC 104. 
19 AIR 1992 SC 789; (1992)4 SCC 99. 
20 M.P.Jain, supra n 7, p 1312 
21 Supra n 19.p.795. 
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 In D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries22 the Court has held that the right to life 
enshrined in Article 21 includes right to livelihood and therefore termination of 
service of a worker without giving him reasonable opportunity of hearing is unjust, 
arbitrary and illegal. 
 In LIC of India v. Consumer Education and Research Centre,23 the Court has 
held that right to life and livelihood also includes right to life insurance policies of 
LIC of India. Life insurance is a social security measure to make life meaningful, 
worth living and right to livelihood is covered against disablement or death of insured, 
economic support for dependents security of livelihood for insured or dependents. It 
depends upon the paying capacity and means of the insured. Therefore certain policies 
by LIC which is restricted only to salaried and government servants was held 
violative of Article 21. 
 In Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar,24 the petitioner challenged certain 
provisions of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 which provided for succession 
only in the male line on the ground that it is violative of equality clause in the 
Constitution. In deciding this matter the Court held that the denial of right to 
succession to women would amount to deprivation of their right to livelihood under 
Article 21. Hence exclusive succession in the male line of heirs under the Act must 
remain in suspended animation till the immediate female relatives of the last male 
                                                 
22 (1993) 3 SCC 259. 
23 (1995) 5 SCC 482. 
24 (1996) 5 SCC 125. 
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tenant continue to depend for their livelihood on the land. However the Court further 
held that- if it is the custom of tribals to have succession only in the male line and the 
legislature has recognized the custom the court is not inclined to declare the same 
ultra virus. The State of Bihar was directed to comprehensively re-examine the said 
law in the light of constitutional ethos. 
 Thus, a positive right to livelihood could not yet materialize. The public 
interest litigation cases discussed above have helped the rights of poor and the 
deserving to be realized through the Court by being recognized as rights included in 
the fundamental right to life. The right to livelihood, now is a negative right 
protecting the individuals against state actions, so that their right to livelihood is not 
deprived arbitrarily. 
6.2 Right to Health Care 
 The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the 
fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, 
political belief, economic or social condition.25 The very existence of human beings 
who are prone to sickness and diseases, very often depends on availability of efficient 
health care services at affordable cost. Right to live with dignity and the philosophy 
behind all human rights laws will be meaningless, unless medical services are made 
available to all. It is conceivable that there can not be an absolute right to enjoy all 
fruits of modern medical technology. But what can be considered as part of human 
right element is reasonable provision for medical services which is free from 
                                                 
25 Preamble to the Constitution of World Health Organisation (WHO). 
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deficiency.26Availability of basic medical facilities are part of individuals human 
rights. 
 Article 25 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides as under: 
(1)Every one has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and    
wellbeing of himself and of his family including ... medical care...27 
              Article 12 of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in para(2) provides that : 
      (2)  The steps to be taken by the State Parties to the present Covenant to achieve 
the   full realization of this right shall include those necessary for: 
a) ………… 
b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; 
c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and 
other diseases;  
d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and 
medical attention in the event of sickness.28 
The Constitution of India requires the State to raise the level of nutrition and 
the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health.29 
                                                 
26 A.M.Verkey, “Deficiency in Health Services: Human Rights Law Approach,” (2000) C.U.L.R. vol. 
XXIV, p.78. 
27 Article 25 of Universal  Declaration of Human Rights. 
28 Article 12(2) of  International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. 
29 Article 47(1) of Constitution of India. 
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  Health is thus a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing. Article 
21 of the Constitution imposes an obligation on the state to safeguard the right to life 
of every citizen.30 Of late, the right to health and access to medical treatment has been 
included in the plethora of rights brought under the ambit of Art.21. The attitude of 
the judiciary in expanding the horizons of Article 21 has been analysed with special 
reference to the right to health and medical assistance as a right under Article 21.31 
But the Constitution does not confer an enforceable fundamental right to medical 
assistance to have better health. This is achieved by judicial interpretation in public 
interest litigation and it is Article 47 under Part IV of the Constitution which imposes 
a primary duty upon the state to raise the level of nutrition and the standard of living 
and to improve public health, and by harmonious construction of the fundamental 
rights and directive principles has prescribed the modality of access to medical 
treatment.32 
  In Vincent Panikurlangara v. Union of India,33 a public interest litigation, 
challenging the drug policy of government, respondent contented that the matter of 
public health is incorporated only in Directive Principles and so they are not 
enforceable before the court of law. The Court rejected this argument on the basis of 
                                                 
30 Dr A. Raghunandh Reddy, “Liability of the Government Hospitals and Breach of Right To Life.” 
AIR 1998 Jour.153. 
31 C Manickam and S Sajith, “Right to health And Access to Medical Treatment under the Indian 
Constitution,” AIR 1997 Jour 104. 
32 Ibid. 
33 AIR 1987 SC 990. 
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its earlier decision in ABSK Sangh v. Union of India,34 wherein it made following 
observation: 
  “…….not withstanding their great importance, the Directive Principles cannot 
in the very nature of the things be enforced in a court of law….. does not mean that 
Directive Principles are less important than Fundamental Rights or that they are not 
binding on the various organs of the State.”35and held that a healthy body is the very 
foundation for all human activities…..(I)n welfare state it is the obligation of the State 
to ensure the creation and the sustaining of conditions congenial to good health.36 The 
Supreme Court asserted the significance of public health as follows: 
 “In a series of pronouncement during recent years this Court has called 
out from the provisions of Part IV of the Constitution these several 
obligations of the State and called upon it to effectuate them in order 
that the resultant picture by the Constitution framers may become a 
reality. As pointed out by us, maintenance and improvement of public 
health have a rank high as these are indispensable to the very physical 
existence of the community and on the betterment of these depends the 
building of the society of which the Constitution makers envisaged. 
Attending to public health in our opinion, therefore, is of high priority- 
perhaps the one at the top.”37 
 
  There can be no second opinion that preservation of human life is of 
paramount importance. For the fact that once life is lost the status quo ante cannot be 
                                                 
34 AIR 1981 SC 298. 
35 Ibid  p.335. 
36 Supra n.31. 
37 Supra n.33, p.995. 
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restored as resurrection is beyond the capacity of man. The patient whether he be an 
innocent person or be a criminal liable to punishment under the laws of the society it 
is the obligation of those who are in charge of the health of the community to preserve 
life so that the innocent may be protected and the guilty may be punished. Social laws 
do not contemplate death by negligence to tantamount to legal punishment.38 
  In Paramananda Katara v.Union of India 39a public interest litigation was filed 
by Mr. Paramanand Katara seeking direction by the court that every injured person 
brought for treatment should be given medical aid immediately to preserve life and 
there after the procedures regarding criminal law should be followed so that injured 
gets treatment first. A news report-that a person took a scooterist injured in an 
accident was told that victim should be taken to another hospital which was 
authorized to deal with medico-legal cases being 20 km away and the injured man 
succumbed to the injuries-was brought to the notice of the Court. The Court held:40 
 “Article 21 casts an obligation on the State to preserve life. Every doctor 
whether at the government hospital or otherwise has a professional 
obligation to extend his services with due expertise for protecting life. 
The obligation being total, absolute and paramount, laws of procedure 
which would interfere with the discharge of this obligation can not be 
sustained and must, therefore, give way. The matter is extremely urgent 
and brooks no delay to remind every doctor of his total obligation and 
                                                 
38 P.M. Bakshi, Public Interest Litigation,  (New Delhi: Ashok Law House, 2000), p 324. 
39 AIR 1989 SC 2039; (1990) Cri LJ 671; 
40 Ibid. 
 201
assure him of the position that he does not contravene law of the land by 
proceeding to treat an injured person.” 
 
In the absence of any statutory provision and court decision till 1989 it was 
difficult to assert that doctors owe a duty to render emergency services to victims. The 
law of criminal procedure enacts no prohibition against immediate treatment of the 
victim of accident and for that matter even the victim of a suspected crime. The 
assumption that the doctor should not touch a victim is purely the result of 
misunderstanding of law, fostered by bureaucratic indifference.41It is therefore, a 
matter of satisfaction that the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the matter through 
its decision in Paramanand Katara. The decision explains the nature of duty cast 
upon physicians. 
 Thus, a doctor in any government hospital is under a duty to render emergency 
services. It is a legal duty for, judiciary can legislate in areas not already covered by 
law. Holmes.J., one of the greatest American Judges, once stated: “I recognize 
without hesitation that Judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only 
interstitially, they are confined from molar to molecular motion.”42 However, there is 
no substantial change in the obligation of a private practitioner. The Court has 
observed that every doctor (other than a government doctor) has only a professional 
obligation and not a legal duty to extend his services. Again there is nothing 
applicable to private practitioner in the 1986 decision of the committee of which the 
                                                 
41 P.M. Bakshi, “Accident victims And The Criminal Law,” 31 J.I.L.I.  566 (1989) at 567. 
42 South Pacific Co v. Jensen, 244 SC 205 (1917) quoted by Rupert Cross, Precedents in English 
Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p.27. 
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Director General of Health Services was the chairman. The Court has further stated 
that the obligation is total, absolute and paramount. But any amount of emphasis 
added by the court can not convert the professional obligation into a legal one. 
Whatever may be the position as regards moral or professional duty definitely there is 
no legal duty upon a private practitioner and he can not therefore be held liable in law 
for refusing or failing to treat or arrange for treatment of a person to whom he owes 
no duty. To that extent the decision is a pious hope.43 
 In Paramananda Katara v.Union India44 the Court declared that legal or 
procedural technicalities can not stand in the way of a doctor providing emergency 
medical care to accident victims. Court gave direction that the treatment of the patient 
would not wait for the arrival of the police completing the legal formalities.  
 In another public interest litigation by Paschim Bangal Khet Mazdoor 
Samithi,45 petitioners complained of the denial of emergency medical aid in 
government hospital. The Court held that the government is duty bound to provide 
medical assistance to persons in serious maribund condition under Article 21 of the 
Constitution. Non-availability of beds can not be a justification for denial of medical 
facilities in government hospitals and state can not avoid Constitutional obligation on 
the ground of non availability of funds.46  In this case the petitioner, Hakim Singh, 
who was a member of an organization of agricultural labourers, had fallen from a 
                                                 
43 Chidananda Reddy, “Medical Care to Accident Victims,” (1991) C.U.L.R. 86 at 98. 
44 Supra n.39. 
45 Paschim Bangal Khet Mazdoor Samiti v. State of West  Bengal (1996) 4 SCC 37. 
46  Ibid. 
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running train and had suffered serious head injuries and brain hemorrhage. He was 
taken to various government hospitals in the city of Calcutta but because of non 
availability of bed he was not admitted. Ultimately he was admitted in a private 
hospital as an indoor patient and he had to incur an expenditure of Rs.17000 in his 
treatment. The Court held that Article 21 imposes an obligation on the State to 
provide medical assistance to every injured person. Preservation of human life is of 
paramount importance. Failure on part of government hospital to provide timely 
medical treatment to a person in need of such treatment results in violation of his right 
to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court’s dictum reiterates 
the position that the right to medical services is part of right to life and the State has a 
duty to provide it.  
In the two cases referred above, the Supreme Court was considering access to 
medical services to victims of accidents. But emergency situations do arise in non-
medico legal cases also. It appears that, the law declared by the Supreme Court does 
not reflect a human rights approach to this aspect.  
In India prominent players in health care scheme are private hospitals. In the 
absence of any duty on the private sector health care providers the declaration of 
Supreme Court may not yield any benefit to hapless victims of accident, leave alone 
the victims of diseases…47 
                                                 
47 A.M. Varkey, supra note 26, p.81. 
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Supreme Court in Consumer Education and Research Centre v. Union of 
India48 highlighted the occupational health hazards and diseases to workman 
employed in asbestos industries and held: 
“Right to health and medical care to protect his health and vigour while 
in service or post-retirement is a fundamental right of a worker under 
Article 21 read with Articles 39 (c), 41,43,48-A and all related Articles 
and fundamental human rights to make the life of the workman 
meaningful and purposeful with dignity of person.” 
 
Another important aspect of health care is the quality, safety and prices of 
products used in medical treatment. The human rights aspect relating to hazardous 
drugs was considered by the Supreme Court in Vincent Panikulangar v.Union of 
India49 and Common Cause v. Union of India.50 The Court gave many directions for 
improving the drug policy and functioning of blood banks in India. The Court in 
another public interest litigation held that right to life in Article 21 includes the right 
to protection from health hazards due to pollution and also health hazards due to 
harmful drugs.51  
 This right to health has been recognized as a basic human right. But the right 
has not been clearly defined. Health being a condition of person’s body or mind is 
                                                 
48 (1995) 3 SCC 42. 
49 Supra.n. 33. 
50 (1996) I S C C 753. 
51 Dr.Ashok v.Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 10. 
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relative and depends on individuals. Health of a person includes both physical and 
mental wellbeing.52 
 The right to proper health care in case of mentally ill is recognized world wide. 
In 1991 the United Nations General Assembly adopted 25 principles for the protection 
of mentally ill, and improvement of mental health care of such persons. A right as 
such though not recognized in Part III, the right to health which is recognized through 
Article 21 covers mental health too. This right became more important because it can 
not be enforced by the person affected, and State is to provide for the right even in the 
absence of demand, failure of this will be violation of fundamental right of the 
mentally ill person. Mentally ill persons are considered an underprivileged of society 
and have a right to equal status. A number of legislations are enacted in this regard, 
like Mental Health Act, 1987, Mental Retardation and Multiple Disability Act, 1999 
etc. Even though the right to health normally contemplates healthy surroundings and 
treatment for illness in the case of mentally ill, health includes treatment, 
rehabilitation and prevention.53 The Supreme Courts attention was drawn to the plight 
of mentally ill persons put in jail in Sheela Barase v.Union of India.54 The Court 
issued directions to the effect that admission of mentally ill to jails to be stopped, (in 
West Bengal) and that admission of non- criminal mentally ill persons to jails is 
                                                 
52 Rahimathulla K.B. “Human Rights Education: Right to Health As A Basic Human Right. With 
Emphasis on The Right of Mentally Ill”, in Human Rights Education,  Ranbir Singh and Ghashyam 
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53 Ibid., p.194. 
54 (1993) 4 SCC 204. 
 206
illegal and unconstitutional. In S.R. Kapoor v. Union of India55 where through another 
public interest litigation mismanagement of hospital for mental disease located at 
Shahadara in Delhi was brought to the notice of the Court, the Court directed that the 
Government of India to takeover its management from Delhi administration and to 
take steps to improve its working.   In case of death of 25 chained inmates of an 
asylum fire in Tamil Nadu, the Supreme Court took suo moto action and directed 
Governments to take proper steps for implementation of provisions of enactments 
relating to mentally ill persons.  
6.3 Right to Environment 
A right to clean environment is fundamental to the very existence of human 
being. Human existence without clean air or water is injurious to his integral 
existence. It is a risk to the health of the person and is also violation of the right to 
health, (in turn right to life) of the person. Often it is the poor and the underprivileged 
who are affected the most, as they lack “purchasing power to attain access to 
environment that is relatively cleaner to live in.”56 These people are forced to live in 
unhygienic and difficult living conditions and thus become immediate victims of 
diseases. It becomes absolutely necessary to keep environment clean and healthy to 
prevent pollution. The judiciary has played a very important role by giving guidelines 
and directions for controlling and preventing pollution, for improving quality of 
environment, for not disturbing the balance of ecological system, etc. And a major 
                                                 
55 AIR 1990 SC 752;(189) 3 SCC 387; see also People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, 
(1992) Supp 2 SCC 647. 
56 Handbook on Human Rights for Judicial Officers, (Bangalore: NLSIU, 2000), p.354. 
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role in this endeavour was by social activists, non-governmental organisations and 
public spirited people who by public interest litigations enabled the courts to act in 
this regard. 
 In a country where the most serious cost of environmental damage falls upon 
impoverished and illiterate groups with limited access to the courts, the new 
environmental right is championed as a legal gateway to speedy and in expensive 
legal remedy.57 This right to environment came to be read as a fundamental right 
through a number of cases most of which are public interest litigations. The judiciary 
has contributed to the attainment of cherished goal set by the law and the Constitution 
to have a pollution free environment. A careful examination of decisions handed 
down by the judiciary shows that “it stands for the best things men stand for”. When 
opportunity came the Supreme Court offered non-conventional interpretation of 
Article 21 for abating the pollution of the environment.58 
 The Stockholm Conference, 1972, in its first principle laid down that: “Man 
had the fundamental right to adequate condition of life, in an environment of a quality 
that permitted a life of dignity and wellbeing.” The Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development, 1992 provided that “human beings are entitled to a healthy and 
productive life in harmony with nature.” But none came out with a detailed proposal, 
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Evaluation,” Journal of Indian Legal Thought, Vol.1 2003,p.97. 
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as, it seems to be, they wanted this third generation right to be evolved in due course 
of time with the experiences. 
In India, a demand for Constitutional recognition of the right to environment 
was made in 1977.59  But none tried to develop a detailed structure of this right. They 
merely tried to extend the provinces of Article 21 to include this right as well. Though 
the Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976 got the credit of the first 
attempt in the world Constitutions to include detailed provision with respect to the 
protection of environment in the Constitution of India, yet the fundamental right did 
not find place in this amendment.60 The amendment inserted a new directive principle 
of state policy for the protection of environment, Article 48-A, which requires that 
‘the state shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard 
the forest and wild life in the country.61 It is also recognized a fundamental duty “to 
protect and improve the natural environment, including forests, lakes, rivers and 
wildlife and to have compassion for all creatures.62  These directives have been read 
as complementary to the fundamental rights.63  But no specific right to environment 
found place in the Part III of the Constitution. This gap was filled by the Supreme 
                                                 
59 See the Proceedings of the Seminar held under the auspices of Indian Law Institute, 1977. 
60 C.M. Jariwala, “The Fundamental Right to Clean Environment: Status and Prospects,” Paper 
presented at The Commonwealth Legal Education Association Conference on Economic Policies, 
Human Rights And The Legal Order, June 4-6-1993, Bangalore, p.2. 
61 Article 48-A of the Constitution of India. 
62 Article 51-A(g), ibid. 
63 Furqan Ahmad, “Origin And Growth Of Environmental Law in India,” 43  J.I.L.I. 2001.p.369. 
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Court64and the high Courts.65  The Courts have been guided by Article 48-A and 51-A 
(g).66 
 The laxity of administration and the carefree attitude of the citizen had led to 
the environmental degradation. To counter this situation and to protect and preserve 
the environment, active citizens and social organizations took up these issues with the 
court by filing public interest litigations. These litigations were responded positively 
and with a sense of responsibility, the hounourable Supreme Court innovatively laid 
down principles…. to cater to the need of environmental protection and 
conservation,67 and many high courts have also followed the same. 
 The credit for creation of host of environmental rights and to enforce them as 
fundamental rights, goes to the higher judiciary in India. This is very significant, as 
one learns from experience elsewhere. The legal system may guarantee a 
constitutional right to environment and statutes may accord the right to participate in 
environmental protection. However, when no tool for their protection is made 
available, then they are as good as non-existent. There is no direct articulation of the 
right to environment in the Constitution or for that matter in any of the laws 
                                                 
64 Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra, DehraDun v.State of U.P., AIR 1985 SC652; M.C .Mehta 
v.Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 965; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1037; Subhash 
Kuma .v. State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 420; M.C.Mehta v.Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 4016. 
65 T Damodar v. Special Officer, Municipal Corporation, AIR 1987 A.P. 171; Centre for 
Environmental World Wide Fund, India v. State of Orissa AIR 1999 Ori.15; Hamid Khan v. State of 
Madhya Pradesh AIR 1997 M.P.191. 
66 For instance, in Sachidananad Pandey v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1987 SC 1109, the Supreme 
Court pointed out that whenever a problem of ecology is brought before the Court, the Court is bound 
to bear in mind Articles 48-A and 51-A(g) of the Constitution. 
67 Supra n 57 p.144. 
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concerning environmental management in India. But this has been seized from below 
by activist lawyers, motivating the court to find and construct environmental rights 
from the available material. The statutory effect of such an articulation is of insulating 
the right, like any other fundamental right, from any legislative prescription or 
administrative action leading to its violation. Constitutional remedies, in the form of 
writs, are available for any violation of that right. One may approach the higher 
judiciary directly by challenging the state action for its violation.68 Here, the 
observations of Justice M.J.Rao in A.P. State Pollution Control Board v. M.V.Naidu,69 
is worth quoting: “Environmental concerns…… are in our view of equal importance 
as Human Rights concerns. In fact, both are to be traced to Article 21 which deals 
with the fundamental right to life and liberty. While environmental aspects concern 
life, human rights aspects concern liberty.”  
In T. Damodar Rao v. The Special Officer, Municipal Corporation of 
Hyderabad, 70the Andhra Pradesh High Court explaining the link between Article 21 
and environment, observed : (I)t would be reasonable to hold that the enjoyment of 
life and its attainment and fulfillment guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution 
embraces the protection and preservation of nature’s gift without which life can not be 
enjoyed. There can be no reason why practice of violent extinguishments of life alone 
should be regarded as violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. The slow poisoning 
                                                 
68 M.K. Ramesh, “Environmental Justice: Courts and Beyond”, Reading Material, Volume II, 
Assembled and Edited by Prof (Dr) N.R. Madhav Menon ,(N.J. Academy). 
69 AIR 1999 SC 812. 
70 AIR 1987 A.P. 171. 
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by the polluted atmosphere caused by environmental pollution and spoilation should 
also be regarded as amounting to violation of Article 21. It therefore becomes the 
legitimate duty of Courts as the enforcing organs of the constitutional objectives to 
forbid all action of the State and citizen from upsetting the environmental balance.71  
When the first environmental case to be entertained under the fundamental 
rights jurisdiction was decided, the Supreme Court gave judgement without explicit 
reference to the right being enforced.72  However, the Court alluded to the ‘right of 
people to live in healthy environment with minimal disturbance of (the) ecological 
balance’.73 
The right to ‘wholesome environment’ was first recognized by Supreme Court 
in Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra, Dehra Dun v. State of U.P.,74 wherein a 
letter by the Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra-alleging that illegal limestone 
mining in the Mussorie-Dehra Dun, region was devastating the fragile ecosystems in 
the region was treated as a writ petition under Article 32. 
In Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar,75 the apex court elucidated that the right to 
life includes the right of enjoyment of pollution free water and air for full enjoyment 
of life. If anything endangers or impairs that quality of life in derogation of law, a 
citizen has a right to have recourse to Article 32 of the Constitution for removing the 
                                                 
71 Ibid p.181. 
72 Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra, Dehra Dun v. State of U.P. supra n 64. 
73 Krishnayan Sen, “Right to Environment Under The Indian Constitution: An Appraisal”, AIR 2004 
(Jour)338  at 339. 
74 AIR 1988 SC 2187. 
75 Supra n. 64; also in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 4016 at 4044. 
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pollution of the water or air which may be detrimental to the quality of life.76 Many of 
the high courts have followed this77 reasoning. 
The Kerala High Court in Attakoya Thangal v. Union of India,78 observed that, 
the right to life is much more than the right to animal existence and its attributes are 
many fold, as life itself. A prioritization of human needs and a new value system has 
been recognized in these areas. The right to sweet water and the right to free air are 
the attributes of the right to life for these are the basic elements which sustain life 
itself.79 
In Oleum Gas Leak case,80 the Supreme Court impliedly treated the right to 
live in pollution free environment as part of fundamental right to life under Article 21 
of the Constitution.  
The Court has held that ‘both aspects of man’s environment, the nature and the 
man made are essential to his well being and to the enjoyment of basic human rights- 
even the right to life itself. The protection and improvement of the human 
environment is a major issue which affects the well being of people’s economic 
development throughout the world, it is the urgent desire of the peoples of the whole 
                                                 
76 Ibid. at 424. 
77 Kinkri Devi. v . State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1988 H.P. 4; S.K. Garg v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 
AIR 1999 All. 41; Free Legal Aid Cell v. Government t of  NCT of  Delhi , AIR 2001 Del 455 etc. 
78 (1990)(1) KLT 580. 
79 Cited in Ritwick Dutta, Environmental Activists, Handbook-II, (Mumbai: Socio-Legal Information 
Centre, 2002), p.299. 
80 M.C.Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1086. 
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world and duty of all Governments.81  For this court said that ‘closure of tanneries 
may bring unemployment, loss of revenue but life, health and ecology have greater 
importance to the people’.82 
In Virendra  Gaur v. State of Haryana, 83 the right to environment got full 
expression as part and parcel of right to life. The Supreme Court observed: 
“Enjoyment of life….. with human dignity encompasses within its orbit, the 
protection and  preservation of environment, ecological balance, free from pollution, 
of air and water, sanitation without which life can not be enjoyed. Any contra acts or 
actions would cause environmental pollution. Environmental, ecological, air, water 
pollution, etc., should be regarded as amounting to violation of Article 21. Therefore, 
hygienic environment is an integral part of right to healthy life and it would be 
impossible to live with human dignity without a humane and healthy environment”.84 
The enforcement agencies are under an obligation to strictly enforce environmental 
laws85 and governmental agencies may not plead non-availability of funds, 
inadequacy of staff or other insufficiencies to justify the non performance of their 
obligations. 86  
                                                 
81 M.C.Mehta v.Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1037, at 1039. 
82 Ibid.,  p.1048. 
83 (1995)2 SCC 577. 
84 Ibid  pp.580-581; also in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 2001 SC 1848. 
85 ICELA v. Union of India, (1996) 5 SCC 281 at 294-301; AIR 1995 SC 2252. 
86 Dr.B.L.Wadehra v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 2696 at 2976. 
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In Free Legal Aid Cell v. Government of NCT of Delhi,87 the Court referred to 
the timely challenges of noise pollution during festivals and marriages. The Court 
opined that, ‘the effect of noise on health has not yet received full attention of our 
judiciary, which it deserves. Pollution being wrongful contamination of the 
environment which causes material injury to the right of an individual, noise can well 
be regarded as pollutant because it contaminates environment, causes nuisance and 
affects the health of a person and would therefore offend Article 21 if it exceeds 
reasonable limits. 
The judicial response in the past few years towards the protection of 
environment has been substantial and effective as per the requirement of the time. 
Judiciary has been vigilant and active in protecting environment through 
Constitutional and other law.88  The above referred and other similar cases89 which 
have been decided by the high courts and the Supreme Court, especially through 
public interest litigations, indicate that the protection of the environment and related 
issues have been interpreted in the context of right to life under Article 21 read with 
Article 48-A.. 
                                                 
87 AIR 2001 Del 455. 
88 Supra n.57 p.143. 
89 Eg. Municipal Council Ratlam v. Verdichand, AIR.1980 SC 1922: Bhopal Gas Peedit Mahila 
Udyog Sangthatan v. Union of India. AIR 1989 SC 1069; F.K. Hussain v. Union of India 1990 
Ker.321; Charanlal Sahu v.Union of India (1990) 1SCC 613; Chhetriya Pradushan  Mukti 
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6.4 Right to Shelter 
 A large number of people, particularly in urban areas either have no shelter for 
themselves or live in homes unfit for human habitation. With the growth of population 
the problem of adequate shelter is escalating with the result that there is unabated 
growth of slums and squatter settlements, which are on one hand overcrowded, and on 
the other, a constant threat to health and life due to filthy residential environment.90 
Experience showed that the law as it stood did not help the poor and homeless and 
their need for a law which provided for a basic right to housing to all. United Nations 
response to this understanding was in the form of declaration of the year 1987 as 
‘International Year of Shelter for the Homeless.’ Other attempts by the United 
Nations were ‘The Vancouver Declaration for Human Settlement’ adopted by the 
United Nations Conference on Human Settlement in 1976 and the ‘Global Strategy 
for Shelter to the Year, 2000.91  
 Prior to the above mentioned declarations, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights had recognized the right to adequate shelter as a human right. The Universal 
Declaration provides that ‘Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for 
the health and well being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing 
… 92Similar provision is included in Article 11 (1) of the International Covenant on 
                                                 
90 Dr.U.Chandra,  Human Rights, (Allahabad: Allahabad Law Publications, 1999), pp.203-4. 
91 Ibid. p. 205. 
92 Article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which provides that : ‘ the State Parties to the 
present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for 
himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing and to the 
continuous improvement of living conditions’. 93 
 The need to provide shelter was a global problem faced by most of the nations. 
At the close of the International Year of shelter, the United Nations in its resolution 
recognized that ‘adequate and secure shelter is a basic human right and is of vital 
necessity for the fulfilment of human aspirations and that a squalid residential 
environment is a constant threat to health and to life’.94 The international recognition 
of right to shelter as a human right has influenced the changes brought about in Indian 
scenario as well. The movement for a legal or human right to shelter led to the 
litigations on behalf of the homeless resulting in recognition of right to shelter. 
 In India, the Constitution envisages the duty of State to promote “welfare of 
the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may, a social order in which 
justice social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of life”.95 The 
State is enjoined to strive to minimize the inequalities in income and endeavour to 
eliminate inequalities of status, facilities and opportunities, not only amongst 
individuals but also amongst groups of people residing in different areas or engaged 
                                                 
93 Article 11(1) of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
94 General Assembly Resolution, No, 42, 191 of 1987. 
95 Article 38(1) of  Constitution of India.  
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in different avocations.96 The State’s obligation to provide shelter to poor and other 
weaker sections of the society is implicit in these provisions. 
 Recognising the right to shelter was difficult in the absence of express 
constitutional or statutory provisions but the Supreme Court through expansive 
interpretation of fundamental rights and reading the Directive Principles into 
fundamental rights created new fundamental rights such as right to food, livelihood 
and shelter in some specific circumstances. The court has also recognized shelter as a 
basic need.97 Advent of public interest litigations and public interest lawyering for 
seeking such a right have also contributed in this endeavour of the Supreme Court. 
 The Supreme Court in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation,98 by 
conceding the right to dwell on pavements or in slums by the indigent and poor 
introduced the concept of right to shelter indirectly in Indian human rights 
jurisprudence. Acknowledging this right as an aspect of right to life under Article 21 
the court laid the foundation of the right to shelter, but, the right to shelter, however, 
did not directly figure in the decision.  
 In Shantistar Builders v. N.K.Tatame and others,99 the Supreme Court while 
upholding “food, clothing and shelter” as traditionally accepted basic needs of human 
beings, held that “the right to life would take within its sweep the right to food, the 
                                                 
96 Article 38(2) ibid.  
97 See, Upendra Baxi, “Constitutional and Legal Perspectives and Urbanisation Policy and Human 
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right to clothing, the right to decent environment and a reasonable accommodation to 
live”.100 Here the Court was considering the exemptions given under Sections 20 and 
21 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act for the purpose of constructing houses for weaker 
sections of the society. The Supreme Court has held the right to shelter as an inbuilt 
right to life under Article 21 and thus a fundamental right. The Court upheld the 
exemptions and gave directions to effectively implement the scheme under 
consideration. The right to shelter has been invoked to restrict individual right to 
property. In this case, Ranganath Mishra J., observed as follows:  
 “The right to life is guaranteed in any civilized society that would take 
within its sweep the right to food, the right to clothing, the right to 
decent environment and a reasonable accommodation to live in. The 
difference between need of an animal and human being for shelter has 
to be kept in view. For the animal it is the bare protection of the body, 
for human being it has to be suitable accommodation which would 
allow him to grow in every aspect- physical, mental and intellectual. 
Since a reasonable residence is an indispensable necessity for fulfilling 
the Constitutional goal in the matter of development of man and should 
be taken as included in life in Article 21 of Constitution”.101  
 
 In P.G. Gupta v. State of Gujarat, 102 individual claim for an allotment of a 
house constructed by the State Housing Board was recognized and this was for 
individual entitlement to shelter under certain limited context. For this purpose the 
                                                 
100 Ibid. at 527. 
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court observed that cumulative effect of Articles 19 (1) (e) and 21 is the existence of a 
human right to shelter under the Constitutional scheme. It further held that the weaker 
sections of the society are entitled to priority allotment as per the scheme. Thus, the 
Court has read the right to shelter in Article 19 (1) (e) and Article 21 to guarantee 
right to residence and settlement. Protection of life guaranteed by Article 21 
encompasses within its ambit the right to shelter to enjoy the meaningful right to life. 
The right to residence and settlement is regarded as a fundamental right under Article 
19 (1) (e) and it is a facet of inseparable meaningful right to life under Article 21. 
Food, shelter and clothing are minimal human rights.103 
 Once again in State of Karnataka v. Narasimhamurthy,104 the Court found 
Article 19 (1) (e) which guarantees the citizens freedom of movement and residence 
as the basis of right to shelter. The court relying on the concept of right to shelter 
upheld a Karnataka Law providing for compulsory acquisition of land for grant of 
house sites. 
 Chameli Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh,105 is another important case where in 
the Supreme Court further expanded the right to shelter, upholding compulsory 
acquisition of land by State for providing housing facilities to dalits and tribes. The 
court expounded its own concept of a shelter and observed that, “shelter for a human 
being is not mere protection of life and limbs. It is a home where he has opportunities 
                                                 
103 M.P. Jain, Supra n. 7,  p.1319. 
104 (1995) 5SCC 524,526. 
105 AIR 1996 SC 1015; (1996) 2SCC 549. 
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to grow physically, mentally, intellectually and spiritually. Right to shelter, therefore, 
includes adequate living space, safe and decent structure, clean and decent 
surroundings, sufficient light, pure air and water, electricity, sanitation and other civil 
amenities like roads, etc., so as to have easy access to his daily avocation. The right to 
shelter, therefore, does not mean a mere right to roof over one’s head but right to all 
the infrastructure necessary to enable them to live and develop as human beings. 
Right to shelter when used as an essential requisite to the right to live, should be 
deemed to have been guaranteed as a fundamental right….”106  
 Want of decent residence therefore, frustrates the very object of constitutional 
animation of right to equality, economic justice, fundamental right to residence, 
dignity of person and right to life itself.107 In Chameli Singh, referred to above, the 
Supreme Court inter alia held that in an organized society, the right to a human being 
is not ensured by meeting only animal needs of man. It ensures only when he is 
assured of all facilities to develop himself and is freed from restrictions which inhibit 
his growth. Right to life guaranteed in a civilized society implies right to food, right to 
decent environment, medical care and shelter. These are said to be the basic needs 
known to any civilized society. 
                                                 
106 Ibid, p.556; The Court has referred to the resolution passed by the United Nations General 
Assembly No.35/76 of 1980, focusing attention of the international Community to the problems of 
homeless people in the developing countries. 
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 The Court has again stated in later cases108 that right to shelter is a fundamental 
right, which springs from the right to residence assured in Article 19 (1) (e) and right 
to life under Article 21 of the Constitution.  
 In view of the importance of the right to shelter and realizing the mandate of 
the Constitution and the obligation under the international human rights law, the 
Court has held that it is the duty of the State to provide housing facilities to the dalits 
and tribes to enable them to come into the mainstream of national life. It is necessary 
to extend the same to other weaker sections of people also. 
 The right to basic necessities which must include the right to shelter should, 
therefore be available to any citizen on two different planes under the Constitution. 
Viewed as an essential ingredient of the right to live, it should be deemed to have 
been guaranteed as a fundamental right and as an enjoinment of the directive 
principles, the State should be deemed to be under an obligation to secure it for her 
citizen.109 
 As Prof.Upendra Baxi opined; ‘the concept of right to shelter cannot be 
purposeful unless it is declared as a fundamental right. However, it is beyond realistic 
expectation that the Indian State will or can commit itself to the enunciation of a 
fundamental right to shelter, which the Courts can under Articles 32 and 226 readily 
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enforce by way of duties’.110 There are no constitutional absolutes although there are 
broad binding obligations cast on the state. If this is so, a multidimensional approach 
is essential whereby certain sections of the citizens have legal entitlement to shelter to 
be provided by the State and some others may be to acquire a shelter by 
themselves.111In this direction, the courts stance through its various decisions 
regarding the right to shelter is a great step in legal recognition of individual 
entitlement to shelter under the constitutional scheme. 
6.5 Right to Human Dignity 
 The preamble of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
mentions that “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all the members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice 
and peace in the world” and recognizes “that these rights derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person.” Everyone – including those deprived of their liberty112  
-has a right to be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.  
 The Constitution of India has not expressly enumerated this right as a 
fundamental right, but the Supreme Court has recognized this right to dignity as 
emanating from Article 21 read with Articles 14 and 19. 
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 In Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi,113 the Supreme Court 
enunciated the law that the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the 
Constitution is not confined merely to right to physical existence, but also included 
within its fold, the right to the use of every faculty or limb through which life is 
enjoyed as well as the right to live with basic human dignity. This decision of the 
Supreme Court upheld the human right guaranteed under the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, to the status of fundamental right under Article 21 of the 
Constitution. The Court observed that no one can be deprived of his right to live with 
basic human dignity except by just, fair and reasonable procedure prescribed by law. 
Indeed no procedure which deprives a person of his right to live with human dignity 
can possibly be reasonable, fair and just. Therefore, the State can not by law or 
otherwise deprive any person of the right to live with basic human dignity. Such a law 
and the action of the State which encroaches human dignity is not permitted under 
Article 21 of the Constitution. Thus judicial decisions of the Apex Courts and 
different High Courts, which are judge made laws have added to a new vista and 
dimension to the protection of human rights against their possible encroachment and 
infraction, even from inconceivable quarters.114 
 In Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India,115 the Supreme 
Court held that non-payment of minimum wages to the workers employed in various 
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Asiad Projects in Delhi was a denial to them of their right to live with basic human 
dignity. Bhagwati, J., speaking for the majority held that the rights and benefits 
conferred on workmen employed by a contractor under various labour laws are 
“clearly intended to ensure basic human dignity to workmen and if the workmen are 
deprived of any of these rights and benefits, that would clearly be a violation of 
Article 21.” Thus non-implementation by the private contractors and non-enforcement 
by the State Authorities of various labour laws was held violative of the fundamental 
right of workers to live with human dignity. The Court has held that everyone in this 
country has a right to live with human dignity, free from exploitation. This right 
enshrined in Article 21 derives its life breath from the Directive Principles in Articles 
39 (a) and (f), 41 and 42.116  Even failure to rehabilitate the bonded labourer, the 
Court held, would amount to violation of Article 21 which guarantees the right to a 
dignified life.117  
 In State of Himachal Pradesh v. A Parent of Student of Medical College 
Shimla,118in a letter by a parent to the Shimla High Court, it was complained of 
rampant ragging of freshers in the Campus of Medical College, Shimla. High Court 
pressed the Chief Secretary to pass a law to prevent ragging. State of Himachal 
Pradesh preferred an appeal.  The Supreme Court in this case observed that ragging is 
subversive of human dignity and prejudicially affects the students.  
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 In Vikram Deo Singh Tomar v. State of Bihar,119 it was brought to the notice of 
the court that the female inmates of the ‘Care home, Patna’ were compelled to live in 
inhuman conditions in an old ruined building. They were ill treated and provided 
insufficient and poor quality food and no medical attention was provided to them. The 
Supreme Court held that, ‘the right to live with human dignity is the fundamental 
right of every citizen and the State is under a duty to provide at least the minimum 
conditions ensuring human dignity’. Accordingly the court directed the state to take 
immediate steps for the welfare of the inmates of the care home. The Court also 
directed that until a new building is constructed, the existing building must be 
renovated and sufficient necessary amenities must be provided. 
 In Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan120 also, the court emphasized on the right to 
live and right to work with dignity. It held that each incident of sexual harassment 
results in the violation of fundamental right to life. Right to life means the right to live 
with human dignity and an indignified life at one’s workplace means deprivation of 
one’s precious right to life, freedom to choose one’s profession. In Vishakha a writ 
petition was filed by Vishakha a nongovernmental organization by way of public 
interest litigation seeking enforcement of fundamental rights of working women under 
Articles 14,19 and 21 of the Constitution. Court relying upon International 
Conventions and norms which are significant in interpretation of rights held that right 
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to life with human dignity as well as right to work with human dignity as included in 
Article 21 
6.6 Right to Privacy 
 Respect for ones privacy is an inherent expectation of human being121 as it is 
important for the mental, spiritual and physical well being of the individual. Privacy 
secures to protect relationships between individuals.  Privacy is not just one possible 
means among others to insure some other value, but that it is necessarily related to 
ends and relations of the most fundamental sort, respect, love, friendship, and trust.122  
 However, there is no right to privacy in the Indian Constitution .Right to 
privacy being an integral part of ones right to life and personal liberty has to be given 
due importance .The recognition of right to privacy as a part of our constitutional 
right to life and personal liberty is considered as an illustration of progressive 
development.123 In its present form the right to privacy is commonly understood as the 
right to be let alone and is broadly described as the right to an inviolable 
personality.124 
 Privacy is “a condition people maintain by controlling who receives 
information about them and the terms on which others receive it. Importantly, privacy 
is a subjective condition. One person can not decide for another what his or her sense 
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of privacy should be.”125  The right to privacy is part of the right to human dignity and 
the public law on information must frown on the violation of that intimacy of life 
which is the core of individuality of being. 126  Thus, the constitutional right to life 
and personal liberty secures the right to live in seclusion or in public gaze, as one 
chooses so long as one does not interfere with the right of others.127  It can thus be 
deduced that privacy is a state of separateness from others. The right to privacy 
encircles within it the concept of dignity and decency also. This right has an element 
of secrecy or confidentiality. The right to privacy implies the right not merely to 
prevent incorrect portrayal of private life but to prevent its being depicted at all. The 
right has multi-pronged dimensions. In personal intimacies, it extends to home, 
family, marriage, motherhood, procreation and child bearing, consistent with dignity 
and decency.128 However, the term privacy has not been specifically defined in the 
Constitution of India, or under any other statutory provisions. 
 Privacy is claimed to be one of the fundamental human rights available to all 
human beings. This is very much evident from the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which recognizes right to privacy as a fundamental human right. Further the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also recognizes the right to 
privacy. 
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 The right to privacy is directly spelt in Article 12 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights as follows, “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with 
his privacy, family, home or correspondence, not to attack upon his honour and 
reputation. Every one has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks.’’129  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
1966 provides for rights to privacy in Article 17. It reads as follows: 
(1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home, correspondence, not to unlawful attacks on his honour 
and reputation.” 
(2) Every one has the right to protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks.”130   
Constitution of India does not expressly provide for the right to privacy as a    
fundamental right. But it is protected as a legal right under different statutes under 
different expressions like, privileged communication, matrimonial rights etc. 
However, the Supreme Court has considered the right to privacy as part of the 
fundamental right to life under Article 21. Although the Constitution does not 
expressly declare the right to privacy as a fundamental right the said right is an 
essential ingredient of personal liberty. The object behind Article 21 of the Indian 
Constitution is to prevent encroachments upon the personal liberty by the executive 
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except in accordance with law and in conformity with the provisions thereof.131 The 
right to privacy is granted to the citizens of India as one of the unenumerated rights 
read into the fundamental rights under the Constitution by the courts, in later 
decisions on the subject. 
 Initially, the court did not recognize the right to privacy. In M.P. Sharma v.  
Satish Chandra,132 the Court made it clear that when the Constitution makers have 
thought fit not to recognize a right to privacy, the court has no justification to import 
it, thereby refuse to recognize the right to privacy. In Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar 
Pradesh,133 the Supreme Court by majority held that the right to privacy is not a 
guaranteed right under our Constitution and therefore, the attempt to ascertain the 
movements of an individual, which is merely a manner in which privacy is invaded is 
not an infringement of fundamental right guaranteed by the Part III. It was in Govinda 
v. State of Madhya Pradesh134 that the Court took a pioneering view and recognized 
the right to privacy as a fundamental right. 
 In Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India,135 a public interest 
litigation was filed by the Peoples Union for Civil Liberties under Article 32 of the 
Constitution, highlighting the incidents of telephone tapping and citing from a CBI 
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report published in the Magazine “Mainstream”, the Court held that right to privacy 
which includes the right to hold telephonic conversations in privacy is a fundamental 
right protected under Articles 14, 19 (1) (a) and 21 of the Constitution as also under 
Article 14 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and Article 17 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Court also held that Section 
5 (2) of the Telegraph Act permits the tapping of telephones – however it can only be 
resorted to in conformity with fundamental rights. The Supreme Court further 
observed: “We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that right to privacy is a part 
of “right to life” and “personal liberty” enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. 
Once the facts in a given case constitute a right to privacy, Article 21 is attracted. The 
said right cannot be curtailed ‘except according to procedure established by law’. 
 The National Commission to review the working of the Constitution in its 
report has recommended the inclusion of a separate fundamental right to privacy in 
the Constitution in the following pattern:  
Article 21-B : “(1) Every person has a right to respect for his private and family life, 
his home, and his correspondence. (2) Nothing in the clause (1) shall prevent the state 
from making any law imposing reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right 
conferred by clause (1), in the interest of security of the State, public safety or for 
prevention of disorder or crime, or for the protection of health or morals or for the 
protection of the rights and freedom of others.”136 
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6.7 Right to Education 
 Article 45 of the Constitution as it originally stood, imposed an obligation on 
the state to provide free and compulsory education up to the age of fourteen years by 
1960. Due to problems of resources and determination of priorities in respect of 
different levels of education, this goal could not be achieved even after fifty years of 
adoption of the Constitution. However to secure elementary education in pursuance of 
the Directive principles all the State governments enacted laws declaring free and 
compulsory primary education. Accordingly, primary education up to the age of ten 
years, it was made free in all states and for age groups from eleven to fourteen it was 
made free in all except Orissa, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. In these states, girls 
and members of the scheduled castes, and tribes get free education, and incentives 
such as mid day meals, free books and uniforms. At secondary stage several states 
have free education for all children and those states that do not make free education 
available to all did so for girls, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes.137 
 In case of higher education the State’s obligation is not absolute. State’s failure 
in securing the basic education and the growing awareness led the people to seek 
court’s intervention and the judicial activism on part of the court in turn led to the 
assertion of right to education as a justiceable right emenating through Article 21, as 
the Constitution had not guaranteed a fundamental right to education. 
 The right to education is recognized as a human right under the international 
human rights law. Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides 
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that, ‘1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the 
elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. 
Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher 
education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit; 2) Education shall be 
directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms…… 3) Parents have a prior right 
to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children’.138 Similar right is 
included in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.139With a view to achieve full realization of this right it further recognizes that: 
a) “Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all; 
b) Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational 
secondary education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all by 
every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free 
education; 
c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, 
by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of 
free education; 
d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged or intensified as far as possible for 
those persons who have not received or completed the whole period of their 
primary education;  
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e) The development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively pursued, an 
adequate fellowship system shall be established, and the material conditions of 
teaching staff shall be continuously improved.”140 
Article 41 of the Constitution lays down that the State shall within the limits of 
its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right 
to education. Article 45 of the Constitution provided that “the state shall take steps to 
ensure free and compulsory education for all children up to the age of fourteen 
years.”141 Article 46 speaks about promotion of educational and economic interest of 
scheduled caste, scheduled tribes and other weaker sections. Moreover, Articles 29 and 
30 which are incorporated in Part III as fundamental rights also lay down following 
provision regarding right to education- 
a) No Citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution 
maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State fund on the grounds 
only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them.142 
Till the Constitution (Eighty-Sixth Amendment) Act 2002, right to education 
was not specially guaranteed as a fundamental right under the Constitution. It was the 
Supreme Court which declared it as part of fundamental right. The Supreme Court has 
often asserted the right to life as inclusive of many other rights and as deriving its life 
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breath from the Directive Principles of State Policy. In Mohini Jain v. State of 
Karnataka143  Kuldip Singh J., observed: 
 “Right to life is compendious expression for all those rights which the 
courts must enforce because they are basic to the dignified enjoyment of 
life. It extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to 
pursue. The right to education flows directly from the right to life. The 
right to life under Article 21 and the dignity of an individual can not be 
assured unless it is accompanied by the right to education”. 
 
It can be respectfully submitted that the court’s view of right to education as a 
fundamental right as held in Mohini Jain was too wide to be practicable. However, the 
decision was reviewed the very next year in UnniKrishnan v. State of Andhra 
Pradesh.144 Though the Court here recognized right to education as a fundamental 
right it limited the scope of the same by holding as under: 
“Right to education, understood in the context of Articles 41 and 45 
means (a) every child/citizen has a fundamental right to free education 
until he completes the age of fourteen years, and (b) after a child/citizen 
completes fourteen years, his right to education is circumscribed by the 
limits of the economic capacity of the state and its developments.” 
 
Thus the right to education as a fundamental right was restricted only to 
primary education, the court here established that free and compulsory education up 
to the age of fourteen years was fundamental right and it was the duty of the state to 
provide it. These decisions prompted the introduction of Constitution Eighty-Third 
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Amendment Bill to make the right to education up to the age of fourteen-as held by the 
Court a fundamental right. Clause 2 of this Bill proposed to insert Article 21-A to the 
effect that “1) the State shall provide free and compulsory education to all citizens of 
the age six to fourteen years. (2) The right to free and compulsory education referred 
to in clause (1) shall be enforced in such manner as the State may, by law determine. 
(3) The State shall not make any law, for free and compulsory education under Clause 
(2), in relation to the educational institutions not maintained by the State or not 
receiving aid out of State funds.” 
Thus it was only the Court which had widely interpreting Article 21 recognised 
right to education as one of the aspects of personal liberty. This was done by the 
judiciary exercising its role of judicial activism and not by legislators who are deemed 
to be reflecting the wishes of the people. However, though subsequently, right to 
education has been made by the Constitution (Eighty-Sixth Amendment) Act 2002, a 
fundamental right. A fundamental duty has also been cast regarding this upon the 
parents and guardians.145 After the Amendment, the newly substituted Article 45 now 
provides for provision for early childhood care and education to children below the 
age of six years. It says that the State shall endeavour to provide early childhood care 
and education for all children until they complete the age of six years.146 And the new 
Article 21-A guaranteeing the right to education provides that, “The State shall 
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provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of six to fourteen 
years in such manner as the State may, by law determine.”147 
The Court had thus, considered the vital importance of education and the need 
for its promotion and regulation as conceived by the framers of the Constitution and 
had aptly declared the right to education as a fundamental right, emanating from right 
to life. This has resulted in insertion of an express fundamental right to education in 
Part III of the Constitution. It is submitted that this proves the effectiveness of the 
Courts’ decision. The role of courts in stimulating the other organs of the State 
vindicate human rights of the people, has been very successful.  
6.8 Right to Speedy Trial 
In India it is not uncommon to have long delays in judicial administration. A 
trial often continues for an unreasonably long time. It is the constitutional obligation 
of the state to devise such a procedure as would ensure speedy trial for the accused. 
When there is breach of this obligation and there is no speedy trial, there are public 
spirited people who have brought the matter to the notice of the courts and the courts 
acted in this regard. Thus public interest activists and the Courts make the obligation 
of speedy trial fulfilled, by securing it as a right of the persons concerned. 
The human rights of the accused as well as victims find place in Constitution 
and other enactments. The principle of openness of judicial proceedings acts as a 
check against caprice or vagaries and builds up confidence of the public in judicial 
administration. Provisions of Articles, 14, 19 (1) (a) and 21 are means to achieve this 
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end. Though there are no specific provisions for a speedy trial in the Indian 
Constitution, by judicial interpretation, the Supreme Court has held that Article 21 of 
the Constitution confers this right on the accused.148 Section 309 of Criminal 
Procedure Code149 also is an importance provision in this regard. 
Thus the right to speedy trial is not a specific right either under the 
Constitution or under Criminal Procedure Code or any other enactment. However, 
Courts have recognized this cardinal principle of law that speaks of speedy trial 
namely: “justice delayed is justice denied.” The Supreme Court of India also adopted 
an activist approach and took positive steps in the direction of implementing Article 
14(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which lays down 
that everyone shall be entitled in the determination of any criminal charge against him 
“to be tried without undue delay.” Article 16 of the principles on equality in the 
administration of justice reiterates that everyone shall be guaranteed in the 
determination of any criminal charge against him, the right to a prompt and speedy 
hearing.150 
The following two provisions of International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights refer to speedy trial. Article 9(3) provides that any one arrested or detained on 
a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized 
by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable 
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time or to release (emphasis added). It shall not be the general rule that persons 
awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to 
appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion 
arise, for execution of the judgement.151 
Article 14 further provides in para 3, clause (c) that: In the determination of 
any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the certain minimum 
guarantees, in full equality, inter alia  “to be tried without undue delay.”152 
Under the Indian Constitution the right to speedy trial has been held as a 
fundamental right arising within the scope of Article 21.153  Section 309 of Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1973 provides that “in every enquiry or trial, the proceedings 
shall be held as expeditiously as possible. In particular, when the examination of 
witnesses has once begun, the same shall be continued from day to day until all the 
witnesses have been examined, unless the Court finds the adjournments of the same 
beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded.154 
Apart from a number of adversarial matters the Courts got to deal with the 
right of speedy justice in many public interest petitions. In Hussainara Khatoon v. 
State of Bihar155 and Kadra Pahadia v. State of Bihar156 the issues pertaining to 
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shockingly large number of undertrial prisoners in the jails of various states and the 
State of Bihar in particular were highlighted. In Hussainara Khatoon the Supreme 
Court referred at length to the information contained in the issue of “The Indian 
Express,” dated 8th and 9th January 1979. It issued notice to the State of Bihar and 
directed the concerned authorities that they place before it all information, particulars 
and numbers of undertrial prisoners languishing in the state jails. The lists and charts 
of such prisoners kept and lodged in several jails showed that their number was really 
large. The Court found that these prisoners were kept in jails in violation of directory 
provision of Section 167 (2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, without they having 
been produced regularly before the appropriate magistrates, or without being 
remanded by the magistrates, often for periods longer than the maximum term for 
which they could be sentenced on conviction and without their trial having been 
commenced. Even though many among them were charged with bailable offences, 
they had not been released because, for reasons of lack of legal aid bail applications 
had not been made on them behalf, or they being poor themselves were unable to 
furnish bail.157 
The Supreme Court further held that, ‘the right to speedy trial is a fundamental 
right implicit in right to life and liberty of person.’ Fair trial implies a speedy trial. No 
procedure can be reasonable, just or fair unless that procedure ensures speedy trial for 
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determination of guilt or innocence of the person accused.158 It was observed by 
Bhagwati J., that: “A procedure which does not ensure a reasonably speedy trial and 
holds the detenue behind bars for long time without trial can not be regarded as 
“reasonable, fair or just” and thus not in conformity with the requirement of Article 
21.There is no doubt that speedy trial or in other words ‘reasonably expeditious trial, 
is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined 
in Article 21.159  It was further emphasized that speedy trial is the essence of criminal 
justice and delay in trial constitutes denial of it. 
Reasons for long pre-trial detentions are the irrational rules of bail, which insist 
on financial security from the accused and sureties. Court made constructive 
suggestions to change the legal provisions relating to bail. The court also laid down 
that if the trial Courts feel satisfied that the accused has his roots in the community 
and he is not likely to abscond, it can safely release him on his personal bond without 
securities. It has also suggested to the government to establish more criminal courts to 
ensure speedy trial.160 
In Kadra Pahadia v. State of Bihar161 the Supreme Court again reiterated that 
“speedy trial is a fundamental right of an accused implied in Article 21 of the 
Constitution.” A researcher and social scientist had addressed a letter to the Supreme 
Court pointing out that Kadra Pahadia and three other young boys, aged between nine 
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and eleven years and belonging to a backward tribe, were put in a Bihar jail about 
eight years back and were still languishing in the jail without trial and kept in leg-
irons and forced to do work outside the jail. Admitting this as a writ petition, the 
Court issued certain directions. The court held that ‘speedy trial is a fundamental right 
implicit in the guarantees to life and personal liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the 
Constitution and any accused who is denied of this right of speedy trial is entitled to 
approach this court for the purpose of enforcing such right and this court in discharge 
of this Constitutional obligation has the power to give necessary directions to the 
State governments and other appropriate authorities for securing this right to the 
accused. 
In Sheela Barase v. Union of India,162 in a writ petition before the Supreme 
Court, the petitioner raised the question of the condition of physically and mentally 
retarded children and also abandoned or destitute children who were lodged in various 
jails in the country for safe custody. There were orders issued by the courts earlier, 
but as they were not affected, this writ petition was filed once again to consider the 
condition and rehabilitation of the children who were housed in the prison. The court 
here held that the children were in jail for a long period without a trial. Right to 
speedy trial is a fundamental right implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution. If an 
accused is not tried speedily and his case remains pending before the Magistrate or the 
Sessions Court for an unreasonable length of time, it is clear that his fundamental 
right to speedy trial would be violated, unless of course the trial is held up on account 
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of some interim order passed by a superior court or the accused is responsible for the 
delay. The Court gave direction for their release and rehabilitation. 
In Madhu Mehta v. Union of India163 a petition was filed by the National 
Convener of ‘Hindustani Andolan’ seeking a writ of habeas corpus or an appropriate 
direction in favour of a person who had been awaiting the decision on his mercy 
petition pending before the President for eight or nine years. The Court held that there 
was inordinate, inexplicable delay of more than eight years in disposal of mercy 
petitions and inordinate delay in execution of death sentence which caused mental 
torture and agony to the convict. It was held that in the absence of sufficient reason 
for the delay and keeping in mind the mental agony suffered by the convict, the nature 
of crime, the trend against the death sentence and other circumstances, such action 
violated Article 21 which includes right to speedy trial. The death sentence was 
therefore altered to a sentence of life imprisonment. Thus the right to speedy trial 
covers all the stages of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial etc.164 
 Mention may be made here of two more cases where further leaves were added 
to the right of speedy trial. These consist of ordering for release on bail where the trial 
is protracted. The first decision in this regard is, in Supreme Court Legal aid 
Committee Representing Undertrial Prisoners v. Union of India165 wherein the court 
was concerned with the detention of large number of persons in jail in connection 
                                                 
163 (1989) 4 SCC 62. 
164 Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee, Representing Undertrial Prisoners v. Union of India, (1994) 
6 SCC 731; Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee v. Union of India, (1995) 4 SCC 695. 
165  (1994) 6 SCC 731; 1994 SCW 5115. 
 243
with various offences under Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. 
The Court after noting the stringent provisions relating to the bail as incorporated in 
that Act, directed for release of those undertrial prisoners who were in jail for a period 
exceeding half of the punishment provided in the Act. This decision was cited with 
approval in Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of  India166 in which harsh 
provisions of TADA were borne in mind and a pragmatic and just approach was 
adopted to release the detenues on bail because of delay in conclusion of trials. 
 Another public interest litigation167 by Mr. R.D.Upadhyay brought to the notice 
of the Court, the plight of a large number of under trial prisoners in Tihar jail 
languishing for long periods, some of them up to 11 years. The Supreme Court here 
recognizing right to speedy trial as part of Article 21, gave directions stipulating the 
time within which the different cases concerning the undertrials were to be disposed 
of. Further directions were given in Common Cause v. Union of India,168 which were 
more general in nature in as much as it dealt with undertrial prisoners lodged in 
various jails of the country. The court directed for their release on conditions laid 
down in the order. It was stated that directions shall be valid in all States, in Union 
territories and would apply not only to pending cases but also to future cases. 
 This progressive jurisprudence geared to secure speedy justice to undertrials 
suffered a major set back in 2002 where a seven judges’ bench of the Supreme Court 
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prospectively over ruled all earlier decisions169 stipulating time limits. This judgement 
was pronounced in the case of P. Ramachandra v. State of Karnataka,170 wherein the 
Court observed as under: 
 “In its zeal to protect the right to speedy trial of an accused, the Court 
can not devise and almost enact bars on limitation beyond which trial 
shall not proceed and arm of law shall lose its hold though the 
legislature and the statutes have not chosen to do so. Bars of limitation, 
judicially engrafted, are, no doubt, meant to provide a solution to the 
aforementioned problems. But a solution of this nature gives rise to 
greater problems like scuttling a trial without adjudication, stultifying 
access to justice and giving easy exit from portals of justice. Such 
general remedial measures cannot be said to be apt solutions. For two 
reasons we hold such bars of limitations uncalled for and impermissible: 
first, because it tantamounts to impermissible legislations – an activity 
beyond the power which the Constitution confers on judiciary, and 
secondly, because such bars of limitations fly in the face of law laid 
down by Constitution Bench in A.R. Antulay’s case [AIR 1992 SC 
1701] and, therefore run counter to the doctrine of precedents and their 
binding efficacy. 
xxx                          xxx                        xxx 
  Prescribing periods of limitation at the end of which trial court 
would be obliged to terminate the proceedings and necessarily acquit or 
discharge the accused, and further, making such decisions applicable to 
all cases in the present and for the future amounts to legislations, which, 
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in our opinion can not be done by judicial directives and within the 
arena of judicial-law making power available to constitutional courts, 
however liberally we may interpret Articles 32, 21, 141 and 142 of the 
Constitution.”171 
 
 It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court, on the other hand, in this very 
case reiterated the right to speedy trial in the following terms: 
 “….we should not even for a moment, be considered as having made a 
departure from the law as to speedy trial and speedy conclusion of 
criminal proceedings of whatever nature and at whichever stage before 
any authority or the court. It is the constitutional obligation of the State 
to dispense speedy justice, more so in the field of criminal law….”172 
 
 It is high time that the union legislature should take the message of this 
judgement and legislate in this area so that the right to speedy trial is entrenched in a 
legislation, either supreme or subordinate, than depend upon the judicial 
interpretation. 
6.9 Right to Legal Aid 
 Human rights could be meaningless unless a person is provided with legal aid 
to enable him to have access to justice in case of violation of his human rights. In 
India millions of people live below poverty line who are denied human rights either 
because they are ignorant or they cannot afford for the enforcement their rights. In 
order to secure social justice for them and to make their rights meaningful legal aid 
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becomes essential. The basic philosophy of legal aid envisages that the machinery of 
administration of justice should be easily accessible and should not be out of the reach 
of those who have to resort to it for the enforcement of their legal rights. In fact, legal 
aid offers a challenging opportunity to a society to redress grievances of the poor and 
thereby lay foundation of “Rule of Law”. The rule of equality before the law and 
equal protection of law under Article 14 of the Constitution would only remain 
constitutional sibboleth if a person can not secure legal protection because he is 
poor.173 The concept of ‘social justice’ promises a fair deal to the citizens. In our 
society if there is a legal battle between haves and have-nots, the concept of social 
justice requires that have-nots should be given some support in the form of legal aid. 
Though Preamble does not mention specifically the legal aid, it is implicit in its broad 
phraseology.174 The Preamble resolves to secure to all citizens, inter alia justice 
social, economic and political.  
 The need to provide legal aid was also realized at UN Conference on 
“Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders” at Stockholm in 1965. Here the 
need for legal aid to accused persons and those convicted of crime, who wish to 
appeal were discussed and the Conference expressly recognized the right to legal aid 
in criminal cases. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 also 
incorporates this right under Article 14 para 3 (d). It provides that “everyone shall be 
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entitled to be tried in his person and to defend himself in person or through legal 
assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case 
where the interest of justice so require and without payment by him in any case if he 
does not have sufficient means to pay for it.175 
 Indian Constitution does not guarantee the right to legal aid or assistance as an 
enumerated fundamental right. However, Article 39-A inserted by Forty-Second 
Amendment to the Constitution provides for equal justice and free legal aid. It reads 
as follows: “The state shall, in particular provide for free legal aid by suitable 
legislation or schemes or any other ways to ensure opportunities for securing justice 
are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities.176 
 Article 39-A is the most important and direct Article of the Constitution which 
speaks of the free legal aid. Though this Article finds place in Part IV of the 
Constitution, as one of the Directive Principles of State Policy, and though this Article 
is not enforced by the Courts the principles laid down their in are fundamental in 
governance of the country. Article 37 casts a duty on the State to apply these 
principles in making laws. This Article is the most potent source of providing free 
legal aid.177 The Supreme Court has often relied on this new provision in support of 
right to legal aid and also to support legal aid programs.178  
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 In furtherance of the Directive Principle in Article 39-A the Parliament has 
enacted the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, with the object of providing legal 
aid to the weaker sections of the society to ensure that the opportunity of securing 
justice is equally available to all. Because the operation of legal system must 
necessarily promote justice on the basis of equal opportunity for all. Even prior to this 
enactment, the court has pronounced that it is a right emanating from Article 21, as a 
part of the requirement of reasonable, fair and just procedure.179 In India legal aid has 
wider facets and it has been provided in criminal, civil, revenue and administrative 
cases, and also at different stages from obtaining guidance up to the final resolution of 
disputes.  
 Before the passing of the Forty-Second Amendment and the Legal Services 
Authorities Act, there was provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973, i.e., 
Section 304 (1) which spoke of legal assistance and was confined to Sessions cases. It 
says “where in a trial before the Court of Sessions, the accused is not represented by a 
pleader and where it appears to the Court that the accused has not sufficient means to 
engage a pleader, the court shall assign a pleader for his defence at the expense of the 
State.”180 
 Since late 1970s the Supreme Court has become active in providing access to 
the justice for the poor, as the Court held that providing legal aid to the needy is a 
“State’s duty and not government’s charity”. It held that free legal assistance at the 
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state cost is a fundamental right of a person accused of an offence which may involve 
jeopardy to his life and personal liberty and this fundamental right is implicit in the 
requirement of reasonable, fair and just procedure prescribed by Article 21. The 
exercise of this fundamental right is not conditional upon the accused applying for the 
free legal aid, hence, cannot be denied if the accused failed to apply for it.181 
 For the first time the Supreme Court recognized the right to legal aid and 
brought it within the gambit of Article 21, the right to life in Madhav H. Hoskot v. 
State of Maharashtra.182 Though not a public interest litigation, it is still important for 
the present discussion on the subject as it laid the foundation for the development of 
right to legal aid. In this case the petitioner, who was a Reader, was convicted for 
offence of counterfeiting university degrees. The lower court sentenced him to simple 
imprisonment till rising of the Court.  On appeal by State, the High Court enhanced 
the sentence to three years in 1973. Special leave petition was filed in 1978, that is 
after the petitioner under went imprisonment of full term of punishment. The reason 
for delay was non-service of copy of judgement. The Court held that there are two 
ingredients of right of appeal : (1) service of copy of judgement to the prisoner in time 
to enable him to file an appeal, and (2) provision of free legal service to a prisoner 
who is indigent or otherwise disabled from securing legal assistance. These are State 
responsibilities under Article 21. Krishna Iyer J., declared “this is State’s duty and not 
Government’s charity. If a prisoner is unable to exercise his constitutional and 
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statutory right of appeal including special leave for appeal for want of legal 
assistance, there is implicit in the court under Article 142, read with Articles 21 and 
39-A of the Constitution, the power to assign counsel to the prisoner provided he does 
not object to lawyer named by the Court.”  
 In Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar,183 it was held that 
Article 39-A emphasises that free legal service is an inalienable element of 
‘reasonable fair and just’ procedure without which person suffering from economic or 
other disabilities would be deprived of the opportunity for securing justice. The right 
of legal aid is therefore clearly an essential ingredient of “reasonable fair and just 
procedure” for a person accused of an offence and it must be held imperative in the 
guarantee of Article 21.184  In Khatri v. State of Bihar185 the Court cast a duty on the 
magistrates to inform the accused of his right to have legal aid at state expense. In the 
above case the court directed the State of Bihar that it can not avoid its constitutional 
obligation to provide free legal service to a poor accused by pleading financial or 
administrative inability.186 
 In Sheela Barase, v. State of  Maharashtra,187 the Supreme Court reiterated the 
legal assistance to the poor or indigent accused is constitutional imperative mandated 
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not only by article 39-A but also by Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Here 
Bhagwati, J., held: 
 “We have already had occasion to point out in several decisions given 
by this court that legal assistance to a poor or indigent accused who is 
arrested and put in jeopardy of his life or personal liberty is a 
constitutional imperative mandated not only by Article 39-A but also 
Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. It is a necessary sine qua non of 
justice and where it is not provided, injustice is likely to result and 
undeniably every act of injustice corrodes the foundations of democracy 
and rule of law, because nothing rankles more, in the human heart than a 
feeling of injustice and those who suffer and cannot get justice because 
they are priced out of the legal system, lose faith in the legal process and 
a feeling begins to overtake them that democracy and rule of law are 
merely slogans or myths intended to perpetuate the domination of the 
rich and powerful and to protect the establishment and the vested 
interests.”188 
 
 The Court also gave directions to the effect that whenever a woman is taken to 
police lockup the nearest legal aid committee should be informed and a Sessions 
Judge should make periodic surprise visits to the lockup to meet the prisoners; 
directions were also given for ensuring the provision of free legal aid to the woman in 
custody. The Superintendent of police was directed to send a list of all undertrial 
prisoners to the local legal aid committee and give all facilities to the lawyers 
maintained by the district legal aid committees to deal with their cases. 
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 In Sukdas v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh,189 the Court held that the 
right to legal aid can not be denied to an accused on the ground that he has failed to 
apply for it. The magistrate is under an obligation to inform the accused of his right. 
The Court held further that not providing legal aid at the trial is violative of Article 21 
of the Constitution. In case an accused is not told of this right and therefore he 
remains unrepresented by a lawyer his trial is vitiated by constitutional infirmity, any 
conviction as a result of such trial is liable to be set aside. 
 In Centre of Legal Research v. State of Kerala,190 the Supreme Court also 
emphasized the role of people, voluntary organization and social action groups in 
making legal aid meaningful, effective and purpose-oriented. Thus it is evident that 
‘provision relating to getting legal aid is now recognized as a right falling under 
Article 21’191 and many public interest litigations have been maintained to secure this 
right. 
6.10 Right against Torture  
 Though all types and forms of torture are condemned in general by the 
civilized societies, torture by authorities or agents of state are not tolerated, it 
infringes a person’s physical integrity, which is a part of ‘right to life’. A person’s 
physical integrity is considered as sacrosanct and inviolable which calls for 
prevention of torture. Hence, it is argued that every person has a right not to be 
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tortured or has a right against torture. Conversely states have a duty to protect that 
inviolable right against torture. Most of the International instruments recognize this 
right against torture. 
 Any form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment would fall within 
the inhibition of Article 21 whether it occurs during investigation, interrogation or 
otherwise. If the functionaries of the Government become law-breakers it is bound to 
breed contempt for law and would encourage lawlessness and every man would have 
the tendency to anarchy. No civilized nation can permit that to happen.192 
 The Constitution of India did not guarantee to the persons in Police Custody 
the needed effective safeguard to regulate the discretion of the police. The 
Constitution contained no specific right against torture, cruel, inhuman treatment and 
degrading punishment.193 It is well settled that a person whether, undertrial or a 
convict does not loose fundamental rights under the Constitution including the right 
under Article 21. The basic rights cannot be stopped at the prison gates; they can very 
well be enforced within the prison. 
 Torture usually denotes intense suffering, physical, mental and psychological, 
aimed at forcing someone to do or say something, against his or her will. It means 
breaking down under severe physical pain and extreme psychological pressure.194 
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 The prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment has 
been advocated ever since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, 1948, and the Geneva Convention, 1949, but it was only in 1984 that the UN 
Assembly for the first time adopted the Convention against Torture. The Convention, 
besides the other things carries the definition of torture. It defines torture as follows:  
 “For the purpose of this Convention the term “torture” means any act by which 
severe pain or suffering whether physical or mental is intentionally inflicted on a 
person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a 
confession, punishing him for an act, he or a third person has committed or 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official acting in the 
official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from inherent in or 
incidental to lawful sanctions”.195 
 Even prior to this convention, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
recognized the right against torture as ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
in human or degrading treatment or punishment’.196  This is reiterated in the Civil and 
Political Covenant. The words ‘No one shall be subjected without his consent to 
medical or scientific experimentation’ being added to the right. The Covenant 
provides: - ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
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treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free 
consent to medical or scientific experimentation.197 
 The right not to be subjected to torture, or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment has not been expressly enumerated as a fundamental right 
under the Indian Constitution, in Part III. It has been so recognized by the Supreme 
Court, in different cases. This right encompasses within it certain other related rights, 
like, right against custodial violence, right against handcuffing, right against bar 
fetters, right against solitary confinement and right against delayed execution. All 
these rights have been separately recognised by the Supreme Court as fundamental 
rights in different cases as coming within the purview of and as part of right to life, 
right to life with human dignity and procedural safeguards guaranteed under Article 
21 of the Constitution. They may also be called “Rights of Prisoners to be treated with 
humanity”.198 
 The Supreme Court of India by interpreting Article 21 has developed the 
human rights jurisprudence for the preservation and protection of prisoner’s right to 
human dignity. Emphasising the significance of human dignity the Supreme Court in 
Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India,199 observed that the right to 
life is not confined merely to physical existence or the use of any faculty or limb 
through which life is enjoyed, it also includes within its scope and ambit the right to 
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live with basic human dignity and the state can not deprive any one of this precious 
and invaluable right without just, fair and reasonable procedure established by law.200 
 In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration,201 the court had occasion to discuss in 
depth the prisoners’ rights with the new ferment of thought relating to human rights. 
The court in this case spoke powerfully and profoundly in favour of prisoners’ rights. 
The abuses of the various rights of the prisoners both convicts and under trials and the 
circumstances wherein  the voices of the victims could not be heard outside the 
prisons made it essential for the court to interpret right to life inclusive of rights 
against torture, right against hand cuffing, bar fetting, and solitary confinement etc. 
The court said jurisprudence cannot slumber when the very campuses of punitive 
justice witness torture. The court held that the prisoners are not wholly denuded of 
their fundamental rights. Though a prisoner’s liberty is in the very nature of the thing 
circumscribed by the very fact of his confinement, his interest in the limited liberty 
left to him is then all the more important. The court further held that “conviction for a 
crime does not reduce the person into a non-person, whose rights are subject to the 
whim of the prison administration, and, therefore the imposition of any major 
punishment within the prison system is conditional upon the observance of procedural 
safeguards”.202 In this case, the Court held that solitary confinement is by itself a 
substantive punishment which can be imposed by a court of law. It can not be left to 
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the whim and caprice of prison authorities. Thus the court considered every infliction 
of torture etc as an infraction of liberty or life in its wider sense, and can not be 
sustained unless Article 21 is satisfied. 
 In Article 21, the right to life and liberty deeply concerns with life and limb of 
the person. It becomes dysfunctional unless the agencies of law in police and prison 
have sympathy for human beings. The Supreme Court in Francis Coralie v. The 
Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi,203 made it clear that “any form of torture or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is offensive to human dignity and constitutes 
an in road into the right to live and would, therefore, be prohibitive of Article 21. 
 In Sheela Barase v. State of  Maharashtra,204 the Court held torture and ill-
treatment of women suspects in Police lock ups as violative of Article 21 of the 
Constitution. 
 In Khatri v. State of Bihar,205 the Supreme Court condemned the blinding of 
undertrials by police by piercing their eyeballs with needless and pouring acid in 
them. This Bhagalpur Blinding case illustrated key aspects of the pattern of torture, 
the sanction of torture by state, and the local judicial authorities, the routine 
concealment of torture, the failure to conduct proper enquiries and the inordinate 
length of judicial proceedings. 
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 Although the prohibition of torture in specific terms lacks constitutional 
authority Indian Courts have held, that Article 21 implies protection against torture 
and that certain provisions of the Indian Penal Code and the Indian Police Act etc. 
specifically forbid torture. Apart from torture, various other physical ill treatments are 
generally taken recourse to in the jails. Some of these are done under the colour of the 
provisions of the jail manuals. The Supreme Court in several cases has made weighty 
pronouncements decrying and condemning the conduct of authorities in torturing, 
hand cuffing the prisoners, undertrials, social workers, advocates and even a chief 
judicial magistrate without any lawful justification. 
 Custodial death is perhaps one of the worst crimes in a civilized society 
governed by the rule of law. A number of public interest litigations206 brought to the 
notice of Court such incidents of torture resulting in death of persons in custody. In 
D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal,207 the Executive Chairman of the Legal Aid 
Services in West Bengal addressed a letter to the Chief Justice of India drawing his 
attention to news items regarding the death of persons in police lock-ups and custody. 
The chairman submitted that it was imperative to examine the issue in depth and 
develop “custody jurisprudence” and formulate modalities for compensation to 
victims and their families for atrocities and deaths by the police. The letter was treated 
as a writ petition by the court. Here, the Court laid down guidelines to be followed by 
the Central and State investigating agencies, in all cases of arrest and detention. With 
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regard to custodial deaths the Court held that custodial death is one of the worst 
crimes in a civilized society governed by the rule of law. Any form of torture, or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution 
whether it occurs during interrogation, investigation or otherwise. The right 
guaranteed under Article 21 extends to undertrials, convicts or detenues or prisoners 
in custody. The Court also issued eleven specific requirements to be followed in all 
cases of arrest or detention till legal provisions are made in that behalf as preventive 
measures.208 These requirements, flow from Article 21 and 22 (1) of the Constitution 
and need to be strictly followed.209 
6.10.1 Right against Hand Cuffing  
 In Sunil Batra,210 and, Prem Shankar Shukla,211 Court had declared hand 
cuffing of undertrial prisoners violative of the fundamental rights. In Citizens for 
Democracy v. State of Assam,212 allegations of police indulging in hand cuffing of 
undertrial prisoners in violation of the law declared by the Supreme Court, and it was 
also alleged that seven patient prisoners in hospitals were handcuffed and tied with 
ropes. The Court held that handcuffing and tying with ropes of patient prisoners was 
inhuman and is violative of human rights and is not permissible under Articles 14, 19 
and 21, except where permission is obtained from the magistrates in rare cases. 
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 In Sunil Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh213 the court condemned the conduct 
of the escort party who arrested, abused, beat up the social workers by handcuffing 
them while taking to the court. The public interest litigation was brought by the social 
workers alleging that they were working against the exploitation of the local farmers 
and tribal people. Cases had been booked against them with charges of obstructing 
public servants in the discharge of their public functions. They were arrested, abused, 
beaten up and taken to the magistrate after handcuffing them. The Court held that it 
was essential for the escort party to take directions from the court before handcuffing 
any prisoner.  As the petitioners were educated persons and agitating for a public 
cause, and they submitted themselves for arrest. They did not even seek bail but chose 
to continue in prison for a public cause. They had no tendency to escape. There was 
no sufficient cause to handcuff them. They were subjected to humiliation in violation 
of their rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The similar conduct of 
handcuffing judicial officer by the police was severely condemned by the Court in 
Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat. 214 
6.10.2 Right against Bar-Fetters 
 In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration ,215 the court has observed that Article 
21 forbids deprivation of personal liberty except in accordance with the procedure 
established by law and curtailment of personal liberty to such an extent as to be a 
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negation of it would constitute deprivation. Bar fetters make a serious in roads on the 
limited personal liberty which a prisoner is left with and therefore, before such 
erosion can be justified it must have the authority of law. 
 Section 56 of the Prisons Act does not permit the use of bar fetters for an 
unusually long period, day and night and that too when the prisoner is confined in 
secure cells, from where escape is somewhat inconceivable. In such situation use of 
bar fetters would amount to violation of the right under Article 21. Krishna Iyer.J., has 
held that bar fetters are a barbarity generally and, like the whipping, must vanish, 
civilized consciousness the walled camps. … The correctional orientation is a 
constitutional implication of social justice whose index-finger points to Article 14 
(anti-arbitrariness), Article 19 (anti-reasonableness) and Article 21 (sensitivised  
processual humanism).216 
 In Kishore Singh v. State of Rajasthan,217 a telegram was sent to Supreme 
Court by three prisoners lodged in Jaipur Central Jail alleging that a convict had been 
confined in a cell with fetters for more than eight months. Supreme Court held that 
many prison rules have become outdated and unconstitutional. It held bar fetter 
amounted to torture and was illegal. The Court further directed all State governments 
to modify the old rules under the Prisons Act, so that they are in conformity with the 
Constitution, especially Article 21 and with new interpretation put upon it by the 
court. 
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6.10.3 Right against Delayed Execution 
 The rational behind the right against delayed execution is that a prisoner who 
has experienced living death for years is entitled to request the court to consider 
whether after all the agony and torment he is subjected to is just and fair, to allow 
sentence of death to be executed. It is acknowledged that prolonged delay in 
executing a sentence of death can make the punishment inhuman and degrading. 
 The right against delayed execution was recognized in T.V.Vatheeshwaran v. 
State of Tamil Nadu218 and developed through Sher Singh v. State of Punjab219 and 
Triveni ben v. State of Gujarath,220 wherein it was reaffirmed that long delay in 
execution of death sentence will entitle the condemned prisoner to approach the court 
for conversion of death sentence into life imprisonment. Even a person sentenced to 
death is entitled to procedural fairness. Article 21 requires that any procedure which 
takes away the life and liberty must be just, fair and reasonable. Undue delay in 
execution of death sentence due to delay in disposal of mercy petition would result in 
mental agony to the condemned prisoner which would therefore, be violative of 
Article 21. This enabled public interest litigations to be brought before the court on 
behalf of prisoners sentenced to death awaiting execution, in protection of the rights 
of such persons.  
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 A public interest litigation was filed in Madhu Mehta v. Union of India,221 by 
Ms. Madhu Mehta, President of the public interest organisation called Hindustan 
Andolan. It was alleged that a person who had been condemned to death in 1981 had 
his mercy petition pending before the President for more than eight years. In the mean 
time, his mental condition had deteriorated to such an extent that it was feared that he 
may commit suicide. The Supreme Court held that undue delay in the execution of 
death sentence would entitle a condemned prisoner to invoke Article 21 of the 
Constitution which guarantees speedy trial. And also, there was not sufficient reason 
to justify the long delay of over eight years in the disposal of the mercy petition of the 
condemned prisoner. The court observed that the time and the manner in which the 
matter of mercy petition pending before the President was dealt with made a sad 
reading and spoke of the deplorable lack of speed and promptitude which should have 
been there in the disposal of the issue. Considering the fact that the convict had 
already suffered much mental agony of living under the shadow of death for long, 
waiting for it, the Court held that he should not suffer any longer. Therefore it 
directed that the death sentence should not be carried out and it was converted into 
life imprisonment.  
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6.10.4 Right against Solitary Confinement  
 Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration,222 raised an important question before the 
Supreme Court, as to whether solitary confinement imposed on prisoners sentenced to 
death would violate Article 14,19, 20 and 21. of the Constitution. The Court held a 
total deprivation of camaraderie amongst co-prisoners, co-mingling and talking and 
being talked to would offend Article 21.223 In this case two convicts who were 
confined in Tihar Central Jail challenged the validity of sections 30 and 56 of the 
Prisons Act. Sunil Batra was sentenced to death by the district and sessions judge and 
the sentence of death was subject to confirmation by the High Court and to a possible 
appeal to the Supreme Court. But he was kept in solitary confinement from the date of 
conviction by the Session Judge. It was contended that Section 30 did not authorize 
prison authorities to impose solitary confinement. Solitary confinement itself is a 
substantive punishment under Sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Penal Code, which 
can be imposed by a Court of law and not by prison authorities. 
 In this case, the Court held that “prisoner under the sentence of death under 
section 30 (2) of Prisons Act means the prisoner whose sentence of death has become 
final. A sentence is not final until there is a right to appeal against the sentence or to 
an appeal for mercy. Since the convict’s sentence was not confirmed, the Court held 
solitary confinement was violation of Article 21.The liberty to move, mix, mingle, 
talk share company with co-prisoners if substantially curtailed would be violative of 
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Article 21 unless curtailment had the backing of law. So while holding solitary 
confinement to be violative of Article 21, the Court held Section 30 of Prisons Act as 
valid for the procedure prescribed for was fair, just and reasonable within the meaning 
of Article 21.  
 Justice Desai observed that solitary confinement has a degrading and 
dehumanising effect on prisoners. Constant and unrelieved isolation of a prisoner is so 
unnatural that it may breed insanity. Special isolation of a prisoner represents the most 
destructual, abnormal environment. Results of long solitary confinement are 
disastrous to the physical and mental health of those subjected to it.224 
6.11 Right to Compensation 
 The emergence of compensatory jurisprudence in the light of human rights 
philosophy is a positive signal indicating that the judiciary has undertaken the task of 
protecting the right to life and personal liberty of all the people irrespective of the 
absence of any express constitutional provision and of judicial precedents.225 
Generally the concept of monetary compensation is to make good the loss, suffered 
through a wrongful act, in the form of money. In cases of irreversible damage it 
remains a sole effective remedy for enforcement of right. On violation of human 
rights through the agency of a State, their redressal through monetary compensation 
has acquired peculiar significance than mere making good the loss, suffered by an 
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aggrieved person.226 The ever increasing abuses of power by public authorities and 
arbitrary interference with the life and liberty of the citizens came to be recognized by 
the Court and the Court held such infringements to be wrong in public law and State 
was held liable to compensate the victims.227 In the absence of a comprehensive 
legislation and a statutory scheme for providing compensation to the aggrieved or the 
victim, justice requires him to be fully compensated. The legislative vacuum of a legal 
right to monetary compensation for violation of human rights has been supplemented 
by the higher judiciary by developing a parallel constitutional remedy.228 
 It is an internationally recognized principle that enforceable right to 
compensation is not alien to the concept of enforcement of guaranteed right. Article 8 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes such a right. It says 
‘everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for 
acts violating the fundamental rights granted to him by the constitution or by law’.229 
Article 9 (5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: 
“anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an 
enforceable right to compensation”.230 This clause in Article 9 suggests that the court 
does not do full justice if it merely frees a person from unlawful arrest or detention. It 
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also maintains implicitly that the right to life, liberty and security guaranteed under 
Article 9 (1) of the Covenant requires the court to recognize the person’s right to 
compensation.  
 India adopted the Covenant with a reservation regarding the enforceable right 
to compensation. The Declaration by the Government of India of 10th April 1979 in 
respect of Article 9 (5) is as under: “Declaration II: With reference to Article 9 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Government of the Republic 
of India takes the position that the provisions of the Article shall be so applied as to be 
in consonance with the provisions of Clauses (3) to (7) of the Article 22 of the 
Constitution of India. Further under the Indian legal system, there is no enforceable 
right to compensation for persons claiming to be victims of unlawful arrest or 
detention against the State”. 
 India’s ratification of Article 9 Para (5) with the above reservation made the 
State unaccountable even in cases of unlawful arrest or detention.231Although the 
absence of a provision like Article 9 (5) of the Covenant from the Indian Constitution 
cannot be attributed to oversight of Constitution makers, the Indian Supreme Court, 
speaking through Chief Justice Chandrachud, wove into the rich tapestry of the right 
to life and liberty, yet another colourful strand glowing with social relevance; it held 
                                                 
231 Prof.Y.R.H. Reddy, “Compensation To The Victims of State Lawlessness : New Trends,” Paper 
presented at Second Biennial Conference of the Indian Society of Victimology held from 4th to 6th 
Oct, 1996 at NLSIU Bangalore.p.4. 
 268
that when in case of gross violation of the right to personal liberty, if the Court refuses 
to pass an order of Compensation, it would only be paying lip-service to liberty.232 
 The question of compensation for the infractions of the rights implicit in 
Article 21 were brought before the court in Khatri v. State of Bihar;233 Sant Bir v. 
State of Bihar;234 and Veena Sethi v. State of Bihar,235 but were left unanswered. 
However they helped the development that finally enabled the Supreme Court to hold 
that compensation is payable in case of unlawful arrest and detention, as the Court 
viewed it as a gross violation of the right to life. This dynamic move of the Supreme 
Court resulted in the emergence of compensatory jurisprudence for the violation of 
right to personal liberty through Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar.236  
 Rudul Sah depicted a sordid state of affairs of Bihar jail administration. The 
petitioner was acquitted by the Court of Sessions in June 1968, but released from the 
prison after more than 14 years after habeas corpus petition was filed in the Supreme 
Court under Article 32. In this petition he prayed for his release from illegal detention 
as well as for ancillary reliefs such as rehabilitation, reimbursement of expenses 
which he might incur on medical treatment and compensation for his illegal 
incarceration. The Government informed the court that the petitioner had already been 
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released, when the petition was taken up for hearing. Under the general rule the 
petition became infructuous237. However the Court issued notice to the Government 
regarding ancillary reliefs including the claim of compensation. The only justification 
for the unauthorized detention offered by the state was unsoundness of mind of the 
petitioner which the Court did not believe. Court felt that illegal detention for such 
long period constituted a flagrant infringement of the petitioner’s fundamental right 
guaranteed under Article 21. The Court ordered interim compensation without 
prejudice to the rights of agitating for more compensation under a civil suit. The 
Court in Rudul Sah by ordering payment of compensation ensured an enforceable 
right to compensation in cases of unlawful arrest or detention.238 The Court 
observed,239 “Article 21 which guarantees the right to life and liberty will be denuded 
of its significance if the power of this court were limited to passing orders of release 
from illegal detention. One of the telling ways in which the violation of that right can 
reasonably be prevented and the compliance with the mandate of Article 21 secured is 
to order its violators to pay monetary compensation”. 
 The scintillating statement of Bhagwati. J., as to why the courts should not be 
prepared to forge new tools and devise new remedies for the purpose of vindicating 
the precious fundamental rights to life and personal liberty240 has inspired the legal 
thought paving way for awarding compensation and it provided compensation for 
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238 Dr.Y.R.H.Reddy supra n.231. 
239 Supra n.236. at 1089. 
240 Supra n.233. 
 270
illegal detention.241 The ever increasing abuses of power by the public authorities and 
arbitrary interference with life and liberty of the citizen came to be recognized by the 
Court and held such infringements to be wrong in public law and State was held liable 
to compensate the victims.242 Thus, the Court recognized and declared it a settled law 
that the right to life and personal liberty includes the right to compensation. 
 The case of Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa,243 came before the Supreme 
Court by way of public interest litigation claiming compensation for custodial death 
of Suman Behera, a boy of twenty two years, contravening Article 21 of the 
Constitution. The victim was taken into police custody and he was found dead the 
next day on the railway track without being released from custody and his unnatural 
death was caused by multiple injuries sustained by him. The Court inferred that the 
fatal injuries were inflicted on the deceased in police custody resulting in his death for 
which the State of Orissa was responsible. An inquiry by the District Judge also had 
shown that it was a case of custodial death. On the facts of the case the Court directed 
the State to pay Rs. 1,50,000/ as compensation to the mother of the victim. Here the 
Court observed that, the order for monetary relief is to be read into the powers of the 
Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Courts under Article 226 of  
                                                 
241 M.S.V.Srinivas, “Compensation under Arts. 32 and 226 for Violation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms” AIR 1997 Jour. 167 at 170. 
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the Constitution. Though there is no express constitutional provision for grant of 
compensation when right to life is violated, the Supreme Court has judicially evolved 
the constitutional remedy by way of compulsion of judicial conscience. This is the 
only effective remedy to apply as balm to the wounds and give much solace to the 
family members of the aggrieved or victim. It is the only practical mode of 
enforcement of the fundamental right with a view to preserve and protect the rule of 
law. This decision has been appreciated as ‘a significant decision’244 and ‘of 
tremendous significance’.245 
 The principle enunciated in Rudul Sah and reiterated in Nilabati Behera has 
been applied in a series of cases; compensation has been awarded to family members 
of the persons who were found dead after being taken for interrogation by army 
police246, or died in police custody due to torture,247 or due to neglect of authority in 
providing medical care in time248 or died in fake encounters.249  Further compensation 
has been awarded to those persons who suffered due to ill-treatment,250 torture,251 
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forced labour in detention,252poisonous gas,253 or suffered bodily harm,254 or to those 
persons who were refused medical treatment at government hospitals.255 
 In D.K .Basu v. State of West Bengal256 the court made the position under 
Indian law clear as against the Article 9 (5) of International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. It observed that ‘the Government of India at the time of its 
ratification (of ICCPR) in 1979 had made a specific reservation to the effect that the 
Indian legal system does not recognise a right to compensation for victims of 
unlawful arrest or detention and thus did not become a party to the Covenant. That 
reservation, however, has now lost its relevance in view of the law laid down by this 
court in a number of cases awarding compensation for the infringement of the 
fundamental right to life of a citizen.257  
 The source of public law proceedings stems from the prerogative writs and the 
order for monetary relief is therefore to be read into powers under Articles 32 and 
226. Thus the court further observed:258  
 “since the purpose of public law is not only to civilise public power but 
also to assure the citizens that they live under a legal system wherein 
their rights and interests shall be protected and preserved. Grant of 
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compensation in proceedings under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution 
of India for the established violation of fundamental rights guaranteed 
under Article 21 is an exercise of the Court’s power under the public 
law jurisdiction for penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for 
the public wrong on the State which failed in the discharge of its public 
duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen”. 
 
 The National Human Rights Commission in exercise of its power under 
Section 18 (3) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, has also advanced the 
cause of compensatory justice to the victims of human rights violations when the 
sanctity and dignity of a person is violated by the agencies of State. 
 As for granting of compensation for violation of human rights in general - not 
particularly for violation of life and liberty, - The National Human Rights 
Commission, also has contributed much since its constitution. The National Human 
Rights Commission has laid down precedents on powerful foundations in awarding 
compensation to the victims of violation of human rights. The Commission has 
always given cogent reasons for awarding the monetary relief which any authority can 
not reject. Whenever the act in question is unauthorized, unlawful, illegal, grossly 
negligent, involves non-implementation of law; dereliction of duty, etc., 
compensation is awarded to the victims of such action.259 
 Award of compensation by the Courts for violation of basic rights is creative 
jurisprudence developed by the Courts. However the criteria adopted by the Courts in 
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quantifying the compensation have varied from case to case. Supreme Court in D.K. 
Basu referred to this point   but failed to lay down a definite criterion in determining 
the compensation. The Court went on to say that in the assessment of compensation, 
the emphasis has to be on the compensatory and not on punitive element, and the 
quantum of compensation will depend upon the peculiar facts of each case and no 
straight-jacket formula can be evolved in that behalf. Thus it is submitted that the 
Apex Court should evolve an acceptable scientific criteria to assess the quantum of 
compensation. 
6.12 Conclusion 
 The institution of public interest litigation provided the launching pad to the 
judiciary not only to enforce the human rights expressly enshrined in the Constitution 
but also it provided it with an opportunity to pour in lot of positive content in to them. 
Using that opportunity the judiciary came up to the expectations of public spirited 
individuals and institutions and read in many positive rights especially in to right to 
life and personal liberty of Article 21. The protection of Article 21 which was once 
restricted to mere protection against arbitrary arrest and protection of only life and 
limb has now become a bastion of veritable rights which are very essential to enjoy 
life with human dignity. The social revolution contemplated in Part III and Part IV of 
the Constitution is becoming a reality. 
 By recognising ‘right to livelihood’ as a component of ‘right to life’, the 
judiciary has created hurdles against abrogation of that right. In addition the right has 
become much meaningful than ever before. Due to this interpretation, welfare 
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legislations like Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and the 
Interstate Migrant Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) 
Act, 1979, etc., got fresh impetus. The element of resettlement and rehabilitation of 
evicted people with adequate access to livelihood finding place in the policy decisions 
is the fallout of this interpretation. 
 Right to life interpreted as right to live with human dignity will be irrelevant 
unless it includes right to health care. Through a catena of cases this position is 
achieved and the Supreme Court has gone to the extent of ordering reimbursement of 
expenditure incurred by a patient at a private hospital because of non availability of 
those services at government hospitals. 
 Understanding the relevance of clean environment for the existence of human 
being and the quality of their life, the apex court has taken up the cudgels to save the 
environment for posterity. It has made all out endeavour to save rivers, forests and 
mountains, exhibiting concern, at the same time utmost concern to the problems of 
air, water and noise pollutions. 
 Sharing the international concerns, the apex court has interpreted Article 21 to 
encompass right to shelter. ‘Shelter’ for the apex court did not mean what is adequate 
to protect the person from nature, but meant a shelter that is necessary for the 
fulfilment of human aspirations. 
 It is abundantly clear from the discussion in the preceding pages that the 
Supreme Court has evolved, recognized and encapsulated the most subtle and basic 
rights and added them as frills to the right under Article 21. They are right to privacy, 
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right to education, right to speedy trial, right against torture and the right to 
compensation etc,. This altruistic gesture has to continue on part of the court to 
provide remedy to hapless and disadvantaged people so that their life is really worth 
living.   
 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
7.1 Conclusions   
 The history of mankind has been associated with the struggle of individuals 
against injustice, exploitation and disdain. The recognition, first at national and later 
at international level, of human rights is one of the most remarkable manifestations of 
this struggle. This struggle was for liberalism. Man has fought all attempts aimed at 
curbing his freedoms. The vested interests in early rulers sought to accumulate and 
accentuate maximum power subjugating the people and curtailing their freedoms. The 
people who were weak, ignorant and submissive quietly acquiesced. In later periods 
human rights came to be considered as inalienable. Liberty superseded authority and 
subsequent natural law theories propounded in terms of justice, ensuring life and 
liberty.  
 The struggle to preserve, protect and promote human rights is as old as human 
civilization. The roots of this concern may be traced to humanitarian traditions and to 
the increasing struggle for freedom and equality in all parts of the world; and in as far 
as more recent developments are concerned, to the historic pronouncements of 
statesmen, philosophers and political leaders of the last four centuries.1 And the rights 
of people came to be recognized. The notion of right was found since antiquity 
everywhere, though with varying degree of emphasis. While at times in some 
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societies individual’s rights got prominence, at others, duties of government were 
emphasized to respect individual’s rights2. 
 In earlier usage the expression “right” had a legal connotation; for example, the 
individual had an “inalienable” right to life and he could not be deprived of that right 
by the state without due process of law. Today, the word ‘right’ has also the 
connotation of a goal: for example, the individual has the right to free education, free 
legal aid, pollution free environment, free medical care etc., which the state is 
expected to provide furthermore protection and implementation of the human rights is 
a legal problem which requires the definition and codification of rights in the form of 
municipal laws and treaties.  
 The rights – in the form of human rights - were highlighted at the international 
sphere when the threat to survival of mankind was felt in the form of World War II, 
and also invention of weapons of mass destruction. Threat to the survival of mankind 
due to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction including nuclear arsenals, the 
need to curb overwhelming governments from acting arbitrarily and growing concern 
for the individual well-being were believed to be responsible for the revival of right-
talk in the form of human rights.3  Hence the United Nations Charter and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and all other international instruments that 
followed4. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 and the 
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 are the other 
significant developments. Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, 
the concept of right – in the form of human rights came to the forefront. International 
recognition of human rights and their incorporation into Constitutions of the States is 
the most significant development of the post- world war. It brought the concept of 
human rights to the centre of legal, social and political philosophy. 
 According to Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, a noted protagonist of human rights and 
one of the most eminent international law jurists of post world war era, “the 
protection of human personality and of its fundamental rights is the ultimate purpose 
of all law, national and international”. Indeed, recognition of international human 
rights is one of the most characteristic features of the post- world war international 
relations and represents a revolutionary development.5 
 The notion of human rights falls within the framework of constitutional law 
and international law, the purpose of which is to safeguard by institutional means, the 
rights of human beings against violations committed by the organs of the state and to 
promote the establishment of humane living conditions and the all-round development 
of the human personality. In the context of welfare state, it is necessary to establish a 
just relation between the rights of the individual and the responsibilities of the state.6 
Violation of the rights by the state leads to a feeling of alienation in the victim, which 
may be fatal to the system. 
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 In India, the fascination for human rights gained ground during the efforts of 
the people to unite against the expansionist designs of the British. When the Indian 
National Congress was steering the freedom struggle against British rule human 
dignity, equality, liberty and justice were the mortar materials upon which the 
structure of the modern, free India was to be constructed7. 
 The framers of the Indian Constitution while committing themselves to 
promote justice social, economic and political made distinction between justiciable 
fundamental rights and non justiciable directive principles but asserted that directive 
principles are equally fundamental in the governance of the country. Consequently, 
socio-economic rights associated with the directive principles remained in the realm 
of executive power and policy and these rights served to enhance the powers of the 
executive government.8  The process of realization of directive principles was not as 
effective as contemplated. The ultimate result was the widespread violations of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and the continued misery of the poor and the 
marginalised. As the democratic process failed in its constitutional goal of promoting 
the welfare of the poor and the oppressed, attention was shifted to the judicial process. 
By opening up for new vistas, the Supreme Court gave extensive effect to the rights of 
people specially those of socially and economically disadvantaged. 
 The courts, through judicial review, are evolving for the poor and the 
downtrodden new rights which are part of basic human rights, but are today inchoate 
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and struggling to be recognized and are being infringed. The judiciary has come out in 
the service of the weaker sections of Indian humanity. The constant increase in policy 
and administrative interventions of the higher judiciary are due to a variety of factors 
like reposition of confidence in the courts by the litigators, as the final and sometimes 
the only resort of justice. As a matter of sheer necessity to activate and make the 
administration function well and as an aspect of its legal and constitutional obligation 
of rendering justice the court liberalized the judicial process in the interest of general 
public. The most commonly used vehicle for this purpose has been the instrument of 
public interest litigation9. 
 Having its root in the actio popularis of the Roman law, the concept of public 
interest litigation developed as a response to the problems of policy formulation, 
lacunae in the law and legal system in United States of America, and as ‘relator 
actions’ in the United Kingdom. In India it developed as an instrument of legal aid 
jurisprudence10. In India, public interest litigations have been the most important, 
novel and also powerful instruments in safeguarding the interest of the poor and 
weaker sections of people. Those who were interested bonafide in protection and 
enforcement of the rights of those who could not safeguard their own rights took the 
avenue of public interest litigation successfully11. 
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 A public interest litigation is more beneficial than an individual case. In a 
public interest litigation, decision of the court ensures justice to a large section of the 
people who are unable to have access to justice. Increasing number of public interest 
litigations indicate a sign of faith in judiciary. A perusal of various public interest 
litigations in the post-emergency India, especially a quarter century that followed 
emergency, show that most of the public interest litigations have been filed in the area 
of human rights violations12.   
 The seeds of the concept of public interest litigation were sown in Mumbai 
Kamgar Sabha v. Abdul Bhai, and took their shape and have been institutionalised in 
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India. Public interest litigation helped in realizing the 
constitutional goals. This reaffirmed that judicial justice is not the monopoly of the 
rich and the affluent and that “public resort to court to suppress public mischief is a 
tribute to the system”13. The Indian courts have used this tool of public interest 
litigation exhaustively to keep the Government within its constitutional limits, protect 
the weaker sections of the society against exploitation. Public interest litigation has 
shown public or social concern on part of the people, the Bar and the Bench. 
 Admitting public interest petitions was an innovative step taken by the 
Supreme Court of India which is the guardian of the fundamental rights. Such 
innovation was desirable keeping in view that majority of the people in India are poor, 
illiterate, exploited ones and ignorant. Their rights would have been meaningless as 
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against their violations if there was no one to fight for them in the courts against their 
strong and powerful opponents. To vindicate the human rights of the people in general 
and the poor, illiterate and indigent mass in particular, the courts have forged new 
techniques and devices like liberalising the rule of locus standi, accepting letter 
petitions, adopting inquisitorial procedure and issuing directions etc. By so moulding 
the procedure to suit the public interest litigations, the courts have ensured justice in 
cases of human rights violations14. 
 It also the duty of the court to protect the society from the so called protectors 
of the society. The court must, while entertaining public interest litigation be cautious 
and try to ascertain the bonafides of the petitioner15 and must indicate how the public 
interest was involved in the case.16 The court has hence rejected frivolous, vexatious 
petitions and petitions with ulterior or private motives.17 
  Rights entrenched in the Constitution are a list of limitations on the 
states power. They impose a concomitant duty on the state not to violate them while 
pursuing other ends. The violation of such constitutional duty is the basis of 
constitutional action for violation of the rights of the people whether taken up by 
themselves or on behalf of them by public spirited persons or institutions. Among 
those rights considered to be most basic and guaranteed as fundamental rights right to 
life is of foremost importance. 
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 Right to life recognized as a natural right, as a product of natural law is 
recognized since ancient times as a part of individual identity and autonomy in every 
civilization. With the changing times emphasis on rights changed so changed the 
doctrine of rights; but few rights remained constant, which were basic rights of man. 
Right to life was one such basic right, which was recognized as inalienable and 
foremost human right. The sanctity and inviolability of life and its non-deprivation 
have been the basic values of modern civilization. When the international human 
rights law emerged in the form of Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other 
international instruments on human rights under the auspices of the United Nations 
Organisation, including the two most significant covenants of 1966, the basic right to 
life and liberty was included as the most basic human right18. 
 No right has been so widely, so dynamically interpreted as the right to life has 
been. In interpreting the right to life under the Indian Constitution the judiciary took 
cue from the American Supreme Court by following the interpretation of the term life 
in Munn v. Illinois19. And thus, life is understood to include all those factors necessary 
to enable person live with dignity as a human being and not as any animal20.  Over a 
period of time the right to life has crossed the restrictive interpretation once accorded 
to it and has come to be encompassing all the many facets of life which are considered 
to be essential to guarantee the life with human dignity. 
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  Public interest litigation has been an instrument of legal aid jurisprudence. 
Framers of the Constitution while committing themselves to justice social, economic 
and political realized the need for the protection of the basic human rights and 
included these rights well into the Constitution itself, few as fundamental rights and 
the rest in the form of directives to the state21.  Though the civil and political as well 
as economic and social rights are equally important, a distinction was made between 
justitiable fundamental rights and non-justiciable directive principles of state policy. 
The socio-economic rights of the people which came in the form of non justiciable 
directives have been subject to widespread violations by the state agencies 
particularly. The situation is sought to be ameliorated by the courts through the 
decisions in public interest litigations.22 
 In giving effect to the human rights within the municipal legal system the 
courts in India have always interpreted the rights under the Constitution in conformity 
with the international human rights law and the courts have often expressly referred to 
a number of the provisions of the international human rights instruments to which 
India is a party.23 
 Because of the courts opening the doors to any person having sufficient interest 
in fighting the case for or on behalf of aggrieved, a host of matters of violations of 
basic rights of people came before the courts. Whether it was a matter of depriving a 
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person’s life directly or any such violation of his right to life indirectly by  depriving 
people of their means of livelihood, or by non payment of minimum wages, or by 
environmental pollution, or affecting his right to life by violating his privacy, dignity, 
or by inhumane treatments, etc., many sections of the society like lawyers, journalists, 
social workers and many other public spirited persons as well as  social organisations 
brought the matters to the courts. The courts too shedding their old cloak of 
procedural restrictions eagerly came to the rescue of millions of Indian people who 
were silently suffering the infringements of their rights without raising their voice. 
When the interest adversely affected was not a right guaranteed under the Constitution 
but a socio-economic right in the form of a directive, the court by its new, extensive 
interpretations gave effect to such rights also by reading them into the fundamental 
rights – especially into the right to life24. 
 The interpretative supremacy of the Supreme Court found its expression in the 
progressive interpretation of the Part III-the fundamental rights and Part IV-the 
directive principles of state policy. The Court has slowly enlarged the scope of 
fundamental rights by reading the non justiciable directives containing a number of 
socio-economic rights into the justiciable fundamental rights. Thereby the court has 
created many new enforceable fundamental rights25.  
 By recognizing the right to livelihood, right to shelter, right to human dignity 
and right to privacy etc., as forming part of the right to life in a number of public 
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interest cases the court has given them the status of fundamental rights. The right to 
education following the courts decision has been successfully incorporated in Part III 
of the Constitution.26  
 Regarding the right to health care, the court, in matters of public interest 
litigations, has created an obligation on the state to guarantee the right to medical 
assistance by the government hospitals and by others in case of emergency. 
Paramananda Katara to Paschim Bengal Khet Mazdoor Samiti is the route to medical 
aid a fundamental right.  Protection of right to environment has been another 
important aspect included in the scope of right to life through a series of public 
interest litigations. Further, the observations of the series of public interest litigations 
like Hussainara Khatoon and other cases show that the decisions in these litigations 
are of great influence in recognizing the right to speedy trial and right to free legal 
aid27. 
 No violation of human right has been the subject of so many conventions as 
‘torture’- aiming at total ban of torture in all its forms. Custodial torture is a naked 
violation of human dignity and degradation. It destroys, to a large extent the 
individual personality guaranteed under Article 21. The courts through public interest 
litigations have developed new prison jurisprudence which has brought drastic 
improvements in the rights of the prisoners and the prison conditions. 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
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 The right to compensation has also been read into the right to life by courts 
following a similar right available under international human rights instruments28. 
 The overall assessment of the role of public interest litigations as a vehicle for 
enforcing the human rights shows that such litigations with the enthusiastic support by 
the judiciary has contributed much to the development of human rights jurisprudence 
in India. The study further reveals that it is in cases of public interest litigations that 
the court has given dynamic interpretations to the rights of the people, whether as 
individual or in collectivity. For instance the litigations concerning environmental 
protection, health care, privacy, legal aid and speedy trial, release and rehabilitation of 
bonded labour, sexual harassment at workplace, prison conditions, health care, etc29. 
   
7.2 Suggestions 
 
It has been observed that, because of lack of articulate specifications of the 
nature and scope of certain human rights, which are in the form of fundamental rights 
under the Constitution, the courts had to interpret them as inclusive of certain other 
rights which emanate from the existing human rights under the Constitution. As the 
rights which emanate from the existing human rights have no concrete constitutional 
foundation and depend on the judicial interpretation and enforcement, one witnesses 
many variations in their scope and applications. The present researcher proposes to 
make the following suggestions:- 
                                                 
28  Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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1) Judicial enforcement of human rights also becomes difficult as the Constitution 
makes distinction in recognizing and adopting human rights as part of the 
constitutional scheme. Distinction made between justiciable fundamental rights and 
non justiciable directive principles often operates against the interest of people. Hence 
as far as the recognized basic human rights are concerned they must be made 
justiciable by amending the Constitution to insert them in Part III of the Constitution.  
2) The Parliament following the Courts decisions holding the right to education a 
fundamental right , though to a limited extent of primary education, has guaranteed 
the right to education a fundamental right by inserting Article 21-A in the Part III of 
the Constitution. It is suggested that, following the same trend the Parliament must 
include in the Constitution, the other human rights declared by the court as 
fundamental rights and forming part of the right to life, as constitutionally guaranteed 
fundamental rights in the Part III.  
3) Judicial recognition and enforcement of human rights has become necessary as the 
rights are intruded upon by state authorities directly or indirectly. When they are 
violated by individuals and the state fails to prevent, then state becomes responsible 
for such violation. Legislative pronouncement of these rights clearly defining these 
rights with delimiting    their scope is very much needed.  Then their enforcement 
through courts becomes easy. 
4) Proper implementation of human rights needs a full co-operation of the government 
and the governmental agencies, with the people and organization working for the 
protection of human rights.  Social organizations and public activists have a vital role 
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to play in this regard. They must come forward to create awareness in the people 
about the human rights and help them out when their human rights are violated. This 
should be continuous process and not dependant on whether court is more willingly 
receptive of such public interest petitions. 
5) Public interest litigation has come to stay and the study shows that it is through the 
number of cases by public spirited people and institutions that the cases of human 
rights violations were fought out successfully, whether it was for protecting and 
enforcing these rights or for claiming compensation in appropriate cases. Even today 
it is these public interest litigations which are in the forefront for protecting many of 
the rights like right relating to environmental issues and the rights of the working 
class etc. It is suggested that the activist persons and organizations should be 
encouraged in their endeavour. 
6) The government funded legal services programme for the poor must cover the 
public interest litigation activities. The government funding in this area of activities 
will help the vigour with which the public interest lawyering is taken up. The interest 
in pro bono services must not be allowed wane away for any reasons. Such services 
should not be taken up by public interested people or organisations as supplementary 
to other activities because of the lack of financial support. Governmental funding as 
well as private individual or institutional funding will go a long way in successful 
public interest litigations for vindication of human rights of larger sections of the 
society. 
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7) The role of the law requires to be played for the poor and ignorant who constitute 
the large bulk of the population of India. It is for the Courts to uphold the basic human 
rights of the weaker sections of the society. The Court must not allow its process to be 
abused. However it is necessary for the court to see that those who approach the court 
in public interest litigations are bonafide and not in personal garb of private profit or 
political motivation or other oblique considerations. Public interest litigation should 
not smack of any ulterior motives. No one has a right to achieve such an ulterior 
purpose through public interest litigations. So the courts must be stringent in rejecting 
such petitions and also punishing persons bringing such frivolous, vexatious public 
interest litigations to the courts or petition with malafide or ulterior motives. Such 
punishment is necessary to act as deterrent. 
 
***** 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX-I 
 THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 
 
PREAMBLE: 
WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a    
SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC   and to secure 
to all its citizens  
JUSTICE, social, economic and political; 
LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith, and worship; 
EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; 
And to promote among them all 
FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of 
the nation; 
IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this twenty sixth day of November, 1949, 
do HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO  
OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION. 
 
PART III 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: 
General 
 Article 12. Definition.—In this part, unless the context otherwise requires , “the 
state” includes the Government  and Parliament of India and the Government and 
the Legislature of each of the States and all the local or other authorities within the 
territory of India or under the control of the Government of India . 
Right to Equality 
Article 14.Equality before law. -- The State shall not deny to any person equality 
before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. 
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Article 15.Prohibition of Discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, 
or place of birth. –  (1) the state shall not discriminate against any citizen on 
grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.    
(2) No citizen shall, on the grounds of only religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth 
or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with 
regard to – 
(a) Access to shops, public restaurants, hotels, and places of public entertainment; or 
(b) The use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort 
maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general 
public. 
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provisions 
for women and children. 
(4) Nothing in this article or in the clause (2) of the Article 29 shall prevent the state 
from making any special provisions for the advancement of any socially and 
educationally backward classes of the citizens or the Scheduled Castes and the 
Scheduled Tribes. 
Article 16.Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment.— 
(1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to 
employment or appointment to any office under the State. 
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of 
birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect 
of, any employment or office under the State. 
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament from making any law 
prescribing, in regard to a class or classes of employment or appointment  to an 
office under the Government, or any local or other authority within that State or 
union territory, any requirement as to residence within that State or Union territory 
prior to such employment or appointment. 
(4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for 
reservation of appointments or posts in favor of any backward class of citizens 
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which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services 
under the State.  
(5) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any law which provides that 
the incumbent of any office in connection with the affairs of any religious or 
denominational institution or any member of the governing body thereof shall be a 
person professing a particular religion or belonging to a particular denomination.  
Article 17. Abolition of Untouchability.—“Untouchability” is abolished and its 
practice in any form is forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of 
“Untouchability” shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law. 
 
Article 18. Abolition of titles.—(1) No title, not being a military or academic 
distinction, shall be conferred by the State. 
(2) No citizen of India shall accept any title from any foreign state. 
(3) No person who is not a citizen of India shall, while he holds any office of profit 
or trust under the State, accept without the consent of the President any title from 
any foreign state. 
(4) No person holding any office of profit or trust under the State shall, without the 
consent of the president, accept any present, emolument, or office of any kind from 
or under any foreign State. 
Right to Freedom 
Article 19. Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc.—(1) 
All citizens shall have the right-- 
(a)  to freedom of speech and expression; 
(b)  to assemble peaceably and without arms; 
(c)  to form associations or unions; 
(d)  to move freely throughout the territory of India;  
(e)  to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and  
(f)   [***] 
(g)  To practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. 
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(2)  Nothing in sub clause (a) of clause (1) shall effect the operation of any existing 
law or prevent the State from making any law, insofar as such law imposes 
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause 
in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, 
friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency, or morality or in 
relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. 
(3) Nothing in sub clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any 
existing law in so far  as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law 
imposing, in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, 
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause. 
(4) Nothing in sub clause (c) of the said affect the operation of any existing law in 
so far as it imposes, or prevents the State from making any law imposing, in the 
interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality, 
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause. 
(5) Nothing in sub-clauses (d) and (e) of the said clause shall affect the operation of 
any existing law in so far as it imposes, or preview the State from making any law 
imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by 
the said sub clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection 
of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe. 
(6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any 
existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law 
imposing, in the interests of the general public reasonable restrictions on the 
exercises of the right conferred by the said sub clause and in particular, nothing in 
the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates 
to, or prevent the state from making any law relating to— 
(I) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practicing any 
profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or 
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(II) the carrying on by the State or by the corporation owned or controlled by the 
State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete 
or partial, of citizens or otherwise.  
Article 20. Protection in respect of conviction for offences.— 
(1) No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of the law in 
force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be 
subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the 
law in force at the time of the commission of the offence .  
(2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than 
once.  
(3) No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against 
himself. 
Article 21. Protection of life and personal liberty.—No person shall be deprived 
of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. 
Article 21-A. Right to Education – The State shall provide free and compulsory 
education to all children of the age of 6 to 14 years in such manner as the State may, 
by law determine. 
 
Article 22. Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases.-(1) No 
person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon 
as may be, of the grounds for such arrests nor shall he be denied the right to consult, 
and to be defended by, a legal practitioner  of his choice. 
(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before 
the nearest Magistrate within a period of twenty four hours of such arrest excluding 
the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the 
Magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period 
without the authority of a Magistrate.  
(3) Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply--  
(a) to any person who for the time being is an enemy alien; or 
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(b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive 
detention. 
(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorize the detention of a 
person for a longer period than three months unless -   
(a) An Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, or are qualified 
to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the 
said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such 
detention: 
Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorize the detention of any person 
beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-
clause (b) of clause (7); or  
(b) Such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by 
Parliament under sub clause (a) (b) of clause (7). 
(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law 
providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as 
may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made 
and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the 
order. 
(6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any such order as is 
referred to in that clause to disclose facts which such authority considers to be 
against the public interest to disclose. 
(7) Parliament may by law prescribe— 
(a) the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of case in which, a 
person maybe detained for a period longer than three months under any law 
providing for preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory 
Board in accordance with the provision for the sub clause (a) of clause number (1). 
(b) the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes of cases 
be detained under any law providing for preventive detention; and  
(c) the procedure to be followed by an advisory board in an enquiry under  
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Sub-clause (a) of clause (4).  
Right against Exploitation 
Article 23. Prohibition in Traffic in human beings and forced labour. — (1) 
Traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour are 
prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable in 
accordance with law. 
(2) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from imposing compulsory service 
for public purposes, and in imposing such service the state shall not make any 
discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste, class or any of them.  
Article 24. Prohibition of Employment of Children In Factories,  etc-  No child 
below the age of fourteen years shall be employed to work in any factory or mine or 
engaged in any other hazardous employment. 
Right to Freedom of Religion 
Article 25. Freedom of conscience and free profession,  practice and 
propagation of religion.—(1) Subject to public order, morality and health  and to 
the other provisions of this Part all persons are equally entitled to freedom of 
conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion. 
(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevents 
the State from making any law— 
(a) Regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political, or other secular 
activity which may be associated with religious practice; 
(b) Providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious 
institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. 
Explanation I—the wearing and carrying of Kirpans shall be deemed to be 
included in the profession of the Sikh religion. 
Explanation II—in sub-clause (b) of clause (2), the reference to Hindus shall be 
construed as including a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jain or Buddhist 
religion and the reference to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed 
accordingly. 
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Article 26. Freedom to manage religious affairs – Subject to public order, 
morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have 
the right— 
(a)  to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes;      
(b)  to manage its own affairs in matters of religion; 
(c)   to own and acquire moveable and immoveable   property; and  
(d) To administer such property in accordance with law. 
Article 27. Freedom as to payment of taxes for promotion of any particular 
religion.--  No person shall be compelled to pay any taxes, the proceeds of which 
are specifically appropriated in payment of expenses for the promotion or 
maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination. 
Article 28. Freedom as to attendance at religious instructions or religious 
worship in certain educational institutions—(1) No religious instructions shall be 
provided in any educational institution wholly maintained out of State funds. 
(2) nothing in clause number(1) shall apply to an educational institution which is 
administered by the State but has been established  under any endowment or trust 
which requires that religious instruction shall be imparted in such institution. 
(3) No person attending any educational institution recognized by the State or 
receiving aid out of State funds shall be required to take part in any religious 
instruction that may be imparted in such institution or to attend any religious 
worship that may be conducted in such institution or in any premises attached there 
to unless such person or, if such person is a minor, his guardian has given his 
consent thereto. 
Cultural and Educational Rights 
Article 29. Protection of interests of Minorities—(1) Any section of the citizens 
residing in the territory of India or any part thereof having a distinct language, script 
or culture of its own shall have the right to conserve the same. 
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(2) No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained 
by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, 
caste, language or any of them. 
 
Article 30. Right of Minorities to establish and administer educational 
institutions—(1) all minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have 
the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.  
(1A) In making any law providing for the compulsory acquisition of any property of 
an educational institution established and administered by a minority, referred to in 
clause (1), the State shall ensure that the amount fixed by or determined under such 
law for the acquisition of such property is such as would not restrict or abrogate the 
right guaranteed under that clause. 
(2) The State shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate 
against any educational institutions on the ground that it is under the management of 
a minority, whether based on religion or language. 
Right to Constitutional Remedies 
Article 32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this part.—(1) the 
right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of 
the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed. 
(2) The Supreme Court shall have the power to issue directions or orders or writs, 
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, qua 
warranto, and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any 
of the rights conferred by this Part. 
(3)  without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court  by clauses (1) 
and (2) Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local 
limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court 
under clause(2). 
(4) The right guaranteed by this Article shall not be suspended except as otherwise 
provided for by this constitution. 
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Article 33. Power of Parliament to modify the rights conferred by this Part in 
their applications etc.—Parliament may, by law, determine to what extent any of 
the rights conferred by this Part shall, in their application to – 
(a) the members of the armed forces; 
(b) the members of the forces charged with the maintenance of public order; or 
(c)  persons employed in any bureau or other organization established by the State 
for the purposes of intelligence or counter intelligence or  
(d) persons employed in, or in connection with, the telecommunication systems 
setup for the purposes of any Force, Bureau or Organization referred to in clauses 
(a) to (c), be restricted or abrogated so as to ensure the proper discharge of their 
duties and the maintenance of discipline among them. 
Article 34. Restriction on Rights conferred by this Part while martial law is in 
force in any area.—Notwithstanding  anything in the foregoing  provisions of this 
Part Parliament may by law indemnify any person in the service of the Union or of a 
State or any other person in respect of any act done by him in connection with the 
maintenance or restoration of order in any area within the territory of India where 
martial law was in force or validate any sentence passed, punishment inflicted, 
forfeiture ordered or other act done under martial law in such area. 
 
PART IV 
DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY 
Article 36. Definition. — In this part, unless the context otherwise requires. “the 
state” has the same meaning as in Part III. 
Article 37. Application of the principles contained in this Part.—the provisions 
contained in this Part shall not be enforceable by any court, but the principles 
therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and 
it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws. 
Article 38. State to secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the 
people.—(1) the State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing 
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and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, 
economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life.  
(2) The State shall in particular strive to minimize the inequalities in income, and 
endeavor to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities, not only 
amongst individuals but also amongst groups of people residing in different areas or 
engaged in different vocations. 
Article 39. Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State.—the State 
shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing— 
(a) that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means to 
livelihood; 
(b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so 
distributed as best to sub serve the common good; 
(c) that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of 
wealth and means of production to the common detriment; 
(d) that there is equal pay for equal work for both men and women; 
(e) that the health and strength of workers, men and women, and the tender age of 
children are not abused and that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to 
enter a vocation unsuited to their age or strength; 
(f) that children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner 
and in conditions of freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth are protected 
against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment. 
Article 39A. Equal justice and free legal aid.—the State shall secure that the 
operation of the legal system promotes justice, on a basis of equal opportunity and 
shall in particular provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any 
other way to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any 
citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. 
Article 40. Organization of village panchayats—the State shall take steps to 
organize village panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may 
be necessary to enable them to function as units of self government. 
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Article 41. Right to work, to education and to public assistance in certain 
cases.—the State shall within the limits of its economic capacity and development 
make effective provision for securing the right to work, to education and to public 
assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in 
other cases of undeserved want. 
Article 42. Provision for just and humane conditions work and maternity 
relief—the State shall make provision for securing just and humane conditions of 
work and for maternity relief. 
Article 43. Living wage etc for workers – the State shall endeavour to secure, by 
suitable legislation or economic organization or in any other way, to all workers, 
agricultural, industrial or otherwise, work, a living wage, conditions of work 
ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and 
cultural opportunities and, in particular, the State shall endeavour to promote cottage 
industries on an individual or co-operative basis in rural areas. 
Article 43A. Participation of  workers in management of industries.—the State 
shall take steps, by suitable legislation or in any other way, to secure the 
participation of workers in the management of undertaking, establishments or other 
organizations engaged in any industry. 
Article 44. Uniform civil code for the citizens.—the State shall endeavour to 
secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India. 
Article 45. Provision for free and compulsory education for children.—State 
shall provide early childhood care and education for all children until they complete 
the age of six years. 
Article 46. Promotion of  educational and economic interests of Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes and other weaker sections.—The State shall 
promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker 
sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. 
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Article 47.  Duty of the State to raise the level of nutrition and the standard of 
living and to improve public health—the State shall regard the raising of the level 
of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public 
health as among its primary duties and, in particular, the State shall endeavour to 
bring about prohibition of the consumption except for medicinal purposes of 
intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health. 
Article 48. Organization of agriculture and animal husbandry.—The State shall 
endeavour to organize agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific 
lines and shall, in particular, take steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and 
prohibiting the slaughter, of cows and calves and other milch and drought cattle. 
Article 48A. Protection and improvement of environment and safeguarding of 
forests and wildlife.—The State shall endeavour to protect and improve the 
environment and to safeguard the forests and wildlife of the country. 
Article 49. Protection of monuments and places and objects of national 
importance.—It shall be the obligation of the State to protect every monument or 
place or object of artistic or historic interest, declared by or under law made by 
Parliament  to be of national importance, spoilation, disfigurement, destruction, 
removal, disposal or export, as the case may be. 
Article 50. Separation of judiciary from executive.—The State shall take steps to 
separate the judiciary from the executive in the public services of the State. 
Article 51. Promotion of international peace and security.—The State shall 
endeavor to— 
(a) promote international peace and security; 
(b) maintain just  and honorable relations between nations; 
(c) foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of 
organized peoples with one another; and 
(d) encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration. 
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APPENDIX –II 
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 1948 
Article 1: All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.  They are 
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood.  
Article 2: Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.  
 Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, 
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person 
belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self governing or under any other 
limitation of sovereignty. 
Article 3: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. 
Article 4: No one shall be held in slavery or servitude, slavery and the slave trade 
shall be prohibited in all their forms.  
Article 5: No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. 
Article 6: Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the 
law. 
Article 7: All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to 
equal protection of the law.  All are entitled to equal protection against any 
discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such 
discrimination.  
Article 8: Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national 
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or 
by law.  
Article 9: No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. 
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Article10: Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations 
and of any criminal charge against him.  
Article 11: (1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all 
the guarantees necessary for his defence. 
(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission 
which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the 
time when it was committed.  Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that 
was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.  
Article 12: No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, or to attacks upon his honour and reputation. 
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks.  
Article 13: (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within 
the borders of each state.  
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his 
country.  
Article 14: (1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum 
from persecution. 
(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising form 
non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations.  
Article 15: (1) Everyone has the right to a nationality. 
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to 
change his nationality. 
Article 16: (1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, 
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family.  They are 
entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. 
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(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending 
spouses. 
(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the state. 
Article 17: (1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association 
with others. 
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. 
Article 18: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; 
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone 
or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief 
in teaching, practice, worship and observance.  
Article 19: Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right 
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.   
Article 20: (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association. 
(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association. 
Article 21: (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives. 
(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country. 
(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will 
shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and 
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting 
procedures.  
Article 22: Everyone, as member of society, has the right to social security and is 
entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in 
accordance with the organization and resources of each state, of the economic, social 
and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his 
personality.   
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Article 23:(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just 
and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.  
(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.  
(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring 
for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, 
if necessary, by other means of social protection. 
(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his 
interests. 
Article 24:  Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation 
of working hours and periodic holidays with pay. 
Article 25: (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health 
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services and the right  to security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in 
circumstances beyond his control.  
(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, 
whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.  
Article 26: (1) Everyone has the right to education.  Education shall be free, at least 
in the elementary and fundamental stages.  Elementary education shall be 
compulsory.  Technical and professional education shall be made generally available 
and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit. 
(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and 
to the strengthening of respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms.   It shall 
promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious 
groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of 
peace.  
(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to 
their children.  
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Article 27: (1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the 
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. 
(2)  Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from the scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.  
Article 29: (1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development of his personality is possible. 
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due 
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just 
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic 
society.  
(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations. 
Article 30: Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, 
group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX-III 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON  
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, 1966 
 
Article 6:(1) Every human being has the inherent right to life.  This right shall be 
protected by law.  No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.  
(2) In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be 
imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the 
time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present 
Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide.  This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered 
by a competent court. 
(3) When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood that 
nothing in this article shall authorize any State Party to the present Covenant to 
derogate in any way from any obligation assumed under the provisions of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
(4) Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of 
the sentence.  Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be 
granted in all cases.  
(5) Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below 
eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women. 
(6) Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of 
capital punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant. 
Article 7: No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free 
consent to medical or scientific experimentation.  
Article 8: (1) No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all their 
forms shall be prohibited. 
(2) No one shall be held in servitude. 
(3)  (a) No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour; 
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(b) paragraph 3 (a) shall not be held to preclude, in countries where imprisonment 
with hard labour may be imposed as a punishment for a crime, the performance of 
hard labour in pursuance of a sentence to such punishment by a competent court; 
(c) For the purpose of this paragraph the term “forced or compulsory labour” shall not 
include: 
i) Any work, or service, not referred to in subparagraph (b), normally required 
of a person who is under detention in consequence of a lawful order of a 
court, or of a person during conditional release from such detention;  
ii) Any service of a military character and, in countries where conscientious 
objection is recognized, any national service required by law of conscientious 
objectors. 
iii) Any service exacted in cases of emergency or calamity threatening the life or 
well-being of the community; 
iv) Any work or service which forms part of normal civil obligations.  
Article 9 :(1) Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.  No one shall 
be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty 
except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by 
law. 
(2) Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for 
his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.  
(3) Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before 
a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be 
entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule 
that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to 
guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, 
should occasion arise, for execution of the judgment.  
(4) Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to 
take proceedings before a court, in order that, that court may decide without delay on 
the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful. 
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(5) Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an 
enforceable right to compensation.  
Article 10: (1) All persons deprived of their liberty shall ble treated with humanity 
and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. 
(2)(a) Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated from 
convicted persons and shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate to their status 
as unconvicted persons; 
(b) Accused juvenile persons shall be separated from adults and brought as speedily 
as possible for adjudication. 
(3) The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of 
which shall be their reformation and social, rehabilitation.  Juvenile offenders shall be 
segregated from adults and be accorded treatment appropriate to their age and legal 
status.  
Article 11: No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfill a 
contractual obligation.  
Article 12:Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, 
have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence. 
(1) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.  
(2) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those 
which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order 
(ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others and 
are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant. 
(3) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country. 
Article 13: An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present 
Covenant may be expelled there from only in pursuance of a decision reached in 
accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons of national security 
otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have 
his case reviewed by, and be represented for the propose before, the competent 
authority or a person or persons especially designated by the competent authority.  
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Article 14: All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the 
determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a 
suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The Press and the public may 
be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre 
public) or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private 
lives of the parties so requires or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the 
court in special circumstances where \ publicity would prejudice the interests of 
justice; but any judgment rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law shall be made 
public except where the interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or the 
proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children.  
(1) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law. 
(2) In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be 
entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:  
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands 
of the nature and cause of the charge against him;  
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and 
to communicate with counsel of his own choosing;  
(c) To be tried without undue delay;  
(d) to be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal 
assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal 
assistances, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in 
any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by 
him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it; 
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the 
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same 
condition as witnesses against him; 
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(f) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or 
speak the language used in court;  
(g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. 
(3) In the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such as will take account of 
their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation 
(4) Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence 
being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law.  
(5) When a person has by a final decision been convicted of criminal offence and 
when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on 
the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has 
been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result 
of such conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is proved that 
the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to 
him. 
(6) No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he 
has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and 
penal procedure of each country.  
Article 15: (1)No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any 
act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or 
international law, at the time when it was committed.  Nor shall a heavier penalty be 
imposed than the one that was applicable at the tie when the criminal office was 
committed.  If, subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made by law 
for the imposition of the lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.  
(2)Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for 
any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according 
to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations. 
Article 16: Everyone shall have the right to recognition everywhere as a person 
before the law. 
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Article 17 :(1) No shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and 
reputation. 
(2)Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks.  
Article 18:(1) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion.  This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his 
choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and 
teaching. 
(2)No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to 
adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 
(3)Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, 
health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.  
(4)The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty 
of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral 
education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.  
Article 19: (1)Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.  
(2)Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression, this right shall include 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other 
media of his choice. 
(3)The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it 
special duties and responsibilities.  It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions 
but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary.  
(a) For respect  of the rights or reputations of others; 
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of 
public health or morals.  
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Article 20: (1)Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law. 
(2)Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.  
Article 21: The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized.  No restrictions may 
be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the 
law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or 
morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  
Article 22: (1)Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others 
including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 
(2) No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which 
are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interest 
of national security or public safety, public order (order public), the protection of 
public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of other.  This 
article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on members of the armed 
forces and  of the polices in their exercise of this right. 
(3) Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour 
Organization Convention of 1948 concerning freedom of Association and Protection 
of the Right to Organize to take legislative measure which would prejudice, or to 
apply the law in such a manner as to prejudice the guarantees provided for in that 
convention. 
Article 23: (1)The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is 
entitled to protection by society and the State. 
(2) The right of en and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family 
shall be recognized. 
(3)No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent or the intending 
spouses. 
(4)States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure 
equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage during marriage and at 
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its dissolution. In the case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary 
protection of any children.  
Article 24: (1)Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour 
sex , language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such 
measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his 
family, society and the State.  
(2)Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name. 
(3)Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.  
Article 25: Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the 
distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:  
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives; 
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal 
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free 
expression of the will of the electors; 
(c) To have access on general terms of equality, to public serve in this country.  
Article 26: All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit 
any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against 
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin property birth or other status.  
Article 27: In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with 
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture to profess and practice 
their own religion, or to use their own language.  
APPENDIX-IV 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS, 1966 
 
Article 6: (1)The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to 
work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by 
work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take appropriate steps to 
safeguard this right.  
(2) The steps to be taken by a State Party to the present Covenant to achieve the 
full realization of this right shall include technical and vocational guidance and 
training progammes, policies and techniques to achieve steady economic, social 
and cultural development and full and productive employment under conditions 
safeguarding fundamental political and economic freedoms to the individual.  
Article 7: The States Parties to the present covenant recognize the right to 
everyone to the enjoyment of just and favorable conditions of work which ensure, 
in particular:  
(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with: 
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without 
distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions 
of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal 
work; 
(ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in accordance with the 
provisions of present Covenant: 
(b) Safe and healthy working conditions; 
(c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an 
appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than those of 
seniority and competence;  
(d) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays 
with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays.  
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Article 8: (1) The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure: 
(a) The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his 
choice, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, for the 
promotion and protection of his economic and social interests.  No 
restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those 
prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security or public order or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others; 
(b) The right of trade unions to establish national federations or 
confederations and the right of the latter to form or join international trade 
union organization; 
(c) The right of trade unions to function freely subject to no limitations other 
than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security or public order or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others; 
(d) The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with the 
laws of the particular country. 
(2) This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the 
exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces or of the police or of 
the administration of the State. 
(3) Nothing in this article  shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour 
Organization Convention of 1948 concerning  Freedom of Association of 
Protection of the Right to Organize to take legislative measures which would 
prejudice, or apply the law in such a manner as would prejudice, the guarantees 
provided for in that Convention.  
Article 9: The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to social security, including social insurance.  
Article 10: The States Parties to the present Convent recognize that; 
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(1) The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the 
family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society 
particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible for the care and 
education of dependent children. Marriage must be entered into with the 
free consent of the intending spouses. 
(2) Special protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable 
period before and after childbirth.  During such period working mother 
should be accorded paid leave or leave with adequate social security 
benefits.  
(3) Special measures of protection and assistance should be taken on behalf of 
all children and young persons without any discrimination for reasons of 
parentage or other conditions.  Children and young persons should be 
protected form economic and social exploitation.  Their employment in 
work harmful to their morals or health or dangerous to life or likely to 
hamper their normal development should be punishable by law. States 
should also set age limits below which the paid employment of child labour 
should be prohibited and punishable by law.  
 
Article 11: (1) The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family including 
adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living 
conditions.  The State Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization 
of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-
operation based on free consent.  
(2) The State Parties to the present Covenant recognizing the fundamental right of 
everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, individually and through international 
co-operation, the measures, including specific progammes, which are needed: 
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food 
by making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating 
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knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by developing  or reforming 
agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficient 
development and utilization of natural resources; 
(b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food-
exporting counties, to ensure an equitable distributions of world food 
supplies in relation to need.  
Article 12: (1) The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health. 
(2) The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve 
the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for: 
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality 
and for the healthy development of the child; 
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; 
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational 
and other disease; 
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and 
medical attention in the event of sickness.  
Article 13: (1)The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to education.  They agree that education shall be directed to the full 
development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall 
strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. They further 
agree that education shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free 
society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all 
racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further the activities of the United Nations 
for the maintenance of peace.  
(2) The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a view to 
achieving the full realization of this right: 
(a) Primary education shall  be compulsory and available free to all; 
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(b) Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and 
vocational secondary education, shall be made generally available and 
accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the 
progressive introduction of free education; 
(c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of 
capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive 
introduction of free education; 
(d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged or intensified as far as possible 
for those persons who have not received or completed the whole period of 
their primary education; 
(e) The development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively 
pursued, an adequate fellowship system shall be established, and the 
material conditions of teaching staff shall be continuously improved.  
(3) The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the 
liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to choose for their 
children schools, other than those established by the public authorities, which 
conform to such minimum educational standards as may be laid down or 
approved by the State and to ensure the religious and moral education of their 
children in conformity with their own convictions.  
(4) No part of this article shall be construed so as to interfere with the liberty of 
individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions, subject 
always to the observance of the principles set forth in paragraph 1 of this 
article and to the requirement that the education given in such institutions shall 
conform to such minimum standards as may be laid down by the State.  
Article 14: Each State Party to the present Covenant which, at the time of 
becoming a Party has not been able to secure in its metropolitan territory or other 
territories under its jurisdiction compulsory primary education, free of charge, 
undertakes, within two years, to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for 
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the progressive implementation, within a reasonable number of years, to be fixed 
in the plan, of the principle of compulsory education free of charge for all.  
Article 15: (1) The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone: 
(a) To take part in cultural life; 
(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its application; 
(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting 
from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.  
(2) The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve 
the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for the 
conservation, the development and the diffusion of science and culture. 
(3) The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect the freedom 
indispensable for scientific research and creative activity.  
(4) The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the benefits to be derived 
form the encouragement and development of international contacts and co-
operation in the scientific and cultural fields.  
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